

DEAD END AHEAD

How gas plans are distracting
the Western Balkans from the
energy transition





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This briefing is also endorsed by the Organic Agriculture Association, Albania, and the Aarhus Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Executive summary

In 2024, the six Western Balkans countries consumed only one per cent of the gas used in the EU, and around four per cent of that used in Germany.¹ And three of the countries – Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro – barely use gas at all. But instead of maintaining this advantage, all the countries except Kosovo plan to increase gas consumption.

This briefing provides an update on gas build-out plans in the Western Balkans since March 2023² and finds that they have remained remarkably steady in the last two years, despite increasing risks and financing challenges.

Of the 2,715 kilometres (km) of pipelines, 2.4 gigawatts (GW) of power plants, and two liquefied gas (LNG) terminals identified in 2023³, 2,551 km of pipelines are still on the table, and one LNG terminal, in Montenegro. 2.9 GW of power plants are now planned. While some power plans have been quietly shelved, new ones have been announced in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

If built, the planned pipelines – not including interconnectors within the region – would increase annual import capacity to the region by 10.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) – more than three times the region's total gas consumption in 2023, creating strong risks of either stranded assets or increased lock-in.

Unlike the EU, none of the gas-consuming countries in the region – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia – have any active strategies to reduce gas demand. Given the limited supply options, their higher costs, and the long lead-time of new pipelines, relying mainly on new infrastructure exposes the countries to prolonged dependence on Russian gas and a high likelihood of oversized projects becoming stranded assets.

With the EU virtually closing the door on gas financing in the Western Balkans, funding options for pipeline construction will be limited. But the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved a loan for the Greece to North Macedonia interconnector in 2024, and the North Macedonia to Serbia interconnector may still receive EU support, despite mainly serving to gasify southern Serbia.

The financing prospects for the power plants are unclear. With promoters from Greece, Azerbaijan and Turkey involved, it remains to be seen how successful they will be in mobilising financing.

Given the high risks, project failure is likely in many cases. To avoid losing precious time, resources and opportunities that need to be used in pursuing alternatives, Western Balkan governments need to proactively revise their gas build-out plans in line with current data and take action to manage gas demand.

The countries are recommended to make credible plans to leapfrog straight to sustainable forms of renewable energy, together with ramping up energy savings measures, including housing insulation, heat pumps, and cutting losses in electricity distribution networks.

The European Commission and other international partners also need to play a role by sending clear messages to Western Balkan governments on the need to avoid gas lock-in, take a cautious approach towards hydrogen, and prioritise no-regret investments.



Introduction

The Western Balkan countries are embarking on a transformation of their energy sectors, from ones based mainly on heavily polluting coal and climate-vulnerable hydropower, to more efficient, decarbonised and decentralised systems.

This will bring major benefits such as cleaner air and water; decentralised, more resilient electricity generation; reduced grid losses; and increased participation of individual households and communities in generating their own power and heat.

In this endeavour, they have one major advantage over most of their EU counterparts: they are much less dependent on fossil gas.

Three of the countries – Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro – are not connected to international gas networks,⁴ and gas makes up only 2.6 per cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina's total energy supply,⁵ mainly to heat Sarajevo. North Macedonia and Serbia use more gas, but even there it makes up only 11.4⁶ and 14.3 per cent⁷ of total energy supply respectively, compared to 26 for Germany⁸ or 21 per cent for the EU as a whole.⁹

In 2024, the Western Balkans' gas consumption was equal to just one per cent of what the EU consumed that year, and around four per cent of what Germany used.¹⁰

Together with the falling price of wind and solar, and the increasing availability of solar thermal, geothermal and heat pump technologies, this offers the potential to leapfrog straight from coal to a fully renewable power and heat sector.

As signatories of the Sofia Declaration on the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, the region's governments have committed to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the EU Climate Law.

But as parties to the Energy Community Treaty and aspiring members of the European Union (EU), in reality Western Balkan governments will have to act much faster.

From 1 January 2026, carbon-intensive power generation in the Western Balkans and other regions neighbouring the EU will be disincentivised by the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), which will see an import fee levied on electricity imports to the EU, based on the exporting country's carbon intensity.

To gain exemptions from CBAM, exporting countries will need to introduce carbon pricing at a level equivalent to the EU's emissions trading scheme (ETS), further disincentivising coal and gas-based electricity generation. And they will have to join the ETS upon accession to the EU in any case, again disincentivising the use of fossil fuels.

In July 2025, the European Commission also proposed a greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 90 per cent by 2040, relative to 1990.¹¹ This is just fifteen years away.

All this means that energy installations built now need to be fully decarbonised, in order to avoid either lock-in of new fossil fuel dependencies or stranded assets.

The Western Balkans' energy transformation started slowly, as plans to build new coal power plants and an excessive focus on hydropower¹² crowded out the development of wind and solar. But the new coal era is nearing its end in the region.¹³ Only two new units have been built since 1991 (Kostolac B3 in Serbia and Stanari in Bosnia and Herzegovina), but at least eight others have been cancelled or shelved in the last decade.

In March 2023, Global Energy Monitor and Bankwatch identified plans for EUR 3.5 billion worth of planned new gas infrastructure in the Western Balkans,¹⁴ representing a distraction similar to coal and threatening to derail governments' attention from decarbonisation.

The plans included 2.4 gigawatts (GW) of gas-fired power plants, 2,715 kilometres (km) of gas pipelines, and two liquefied gas (LNG) terminals, which would lead either to stranded assets or increase imports and delay the region's shift toward clean, domestic energy production. Several of the projects had received technical, political and/or financial support from the EU and/or the United States (US).



This briefing provides an update of how plans have changed since then. It finds that all the governments except Kosovo's are still actively planning new gas pipelines and gas power plants. Most are also planning distribution networks.

It is difficult to assess which projects will go ahead: since the EU is closing the door on gas funding in the region, the countries are finding new partners, with as yet unclear results.

Due to the high risks of stranded assets or increased lock-in, the briefing recommends the countries to avoid investments in gas and make credible plans to leapfrog straight to sustainable forms of renewable energy, together with ramped up energy savings measures, including housing insulation, heat pumps and cutting losses in electricity distribution networks.

It also calls on the European Commission and other international partners to send clear messages to Western Balkan governments on the need to avoid gas lock-in, be cautious about expectations from hydrogen, and prioritise no-regret investments.



Western Balkans Gas Infrastructure

LNG Import Terminals



proposed

Gas Pipelines



construction



proposed

Gas Plants



Announced



pre-construction

Operating



pipelines



gas plant





Gas pipeline plans not yet adjusted to new reality

Gas pipeline plans in the Western Balkans have remained relatively stable in the last two years, despite EU funding no longer being available for most cross-border fossil gas interconnection projects.

One project has come online in this period: an EU-funded 1.8-billion-cubic-metre (bcm) interconnector from Bulgaria to Serbia, completed in December 2023, which aimed to diversify Serbia's gas supply.¹⁵

The 2,551 kilometres of gas transmission projects now planned would increase costly fossil fuel imports to the region and expand the network to areas that have so far remained gas-free. For more details, see Annex 1.

The planned gas pipelines to the Western Balkans would increase annual import capacity to the countries by 10.5 bcm.¹⁶ This is **more than three times the region's total 2023 gas consumption**, representing a risk of stranded assets or increased gas lock-in and import dependence.

However, the countries' ability to build the pipelines will be limited by the EU closing the door on gas financing in the Western Balkans. In 2019, the European Investment Bank (EIB) was the first EU institution to mandate an end to direct financing of unabated fossil fuel energy projects, including gas, by the end of 2021. Its loan for the Greece to North Macedonia gas interconnector, signed in December 2021, closed the era of EIB fossil fuel lending but opened an era of increased import dependence for North Macedonia.

In December 2023, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) adopted a new energy lending strategy which restricted financial support for fossil fuels to midstream and downstream gas projects deemed 'exceptional cases.' While this was deemed insufficient by civil society organisations in view of the accelerating climate emergency,¹⁷ the EBRD will nevertheless not support most planned gas projects in the Western Balkans.

All the countries in the region are parties to the Energy Community Treaty,¹⁸ which aims to integrate them into the EU energy market. Following the adoption of the updated TEN-E Regulation¹⁹ by the Treaty's Ministerial Council, in 2024 the Council adopted the first list of priority energy infrastructure projects using the Regulation's new criteria, which exclude gas infrastructure.²⁰

Since the EU's Western Balkan Investment Framework (WBIF) and the EBRD tend to follow this prioritisation, this greatly lowers the likelihood that new gas transmission and storage infrastructure will be financed. This has also been reinforced by the EU's Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans excluding the use of its funds for fossil fuels.²¹

Exceptionally, the door may still be partly open for the North Macedonia to Serbia interconnector. The Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC) High-Level Group brings together EU and non-EU countries from the region and in 2024 adopted an Action Plan on Gases,²² which prioritises two gas projects from the region – the Greece to North Macedonia and the North Macedonia to Serbia gas pipelines. The former has already been funded but the latter may still be eligible for EU financing.

The WBIF is already providing technical assistance in the project, and the EBRD is reportedly interested in financing construction.²³ The rationale for the EU to prioritise this project is unclear, as an EU-funded interconnector from Bulgaria to Serbia was already completed in December 2023 in order to diversify Serbia's gas supply,²⁴ and north-south gas routes are already available via Bulgaria. The main novelty of the North Macedonia to Serbia pipeline would be the gasification of Serbia's two southernmost administrative districts,²⁵ locking them into new dependencies or resulting in stranded assets.

Despite current pipeline plans being vastly oversized and unlikely to secure financing in most cases, the countries are showing no signs of scaling them back. On the contrary, during the last year the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina entity government has renewed its efforts to move forward not only with the long-stalled southern gas interconnection with Croatia, but also with the western and northern ones.²⁶

Question marks over LNG terminal plans



The Vlora LNG terminal in Albania does not appear to be moving forward and is considered to have been shelved.

The floating terminal which had been planned for Albania was instead taken to Germany,²⁷ and no replacement plans appear to have been made.

And after strong public opposition to including the Bar terminal in its new national spatial plan, in June 2025 Montenegro's parliament adopted a final version without the facility.²⁸

But just months later, in September, government representatives signed a memorandum with Japanese company Jera aiming to analyse the feasibility of an LNG terminal and accompanying power plant.








Shelved gas power projects replaced by new plans

Since 2023, overall gas power plant plans have increased from 2.4 GW to 2.9 GW, but the specifics have changed.

Three plants planned in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not progressed in the last two years and are considered shelved.

Montenegro's national spatial plan²⁹ and draft national energy and climate plan (NECP)³⁰ indicate that it no longer plans to build the three gas power plants it previously announced, but the recent memorandum with Jera puts the planned plant in Bar back on the table again.

Figure 1. Planned gas power plants vastly outweigh operating ones



Other, governments have announced several new plans in the meantime, and as of July 2025, the Roskovec plant in Albania, promoted by a Greek-Albanian consortium, is undergoing permitting.

Serbia's NECP, adopted in July 2024, plans 350 megawatts (MW) of new gas capacity,³¹ and its energy strategy, adopted just a few months later, plans new gas units in Novi Sad and Niš.³² In parallel, a memorandum was signed with Azerbaijan for the development of a 500 MW gas power plant near Niš,³³ which is much larger than foreseen in the strategy.

North Macedonia's NECP³⁴ – currently being revised – says the country should consider building a gas power plant if the Cebren pumped storage plant is not built. But its government is currently pursuing three gas power plants and Cebren.^{35,36} At least 905 MW of gas capacity is planned, and in July 2025 North Macedonia's government signed a memorandum with Turkey's Kazancı Holding to build EUR 1 billion's worth of gas power plants, gas distribution systems and district heating grids.³⁷ The names and locations of the planned projects were not specified.


The least advanced new plans are Bosnia and Herzegovina's Zvornik and Kakanj units, which are in the electricity transmission operator's indicative generation development plan for 2026 to 2035³⁸ but not in its draft NECP.³⁹

It remains to be seen how many of these plans will attract financing. With companies from Greece, Azerbaijan and Turkey signing agreements in the region, much will depend on their ability to mobilise resources from their home countries.

Table 1. Planned gas-fired power units in the Western Balkans⁴⁰

Country	Plant name	Status	Capacity (MW electric)
Albania	Roskovec	pre-construction	170
Albania	Vlora	announced	350
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Kakanj	announced	175
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Zvornik	announced	63
Montenegro	Bar	announced	440
North Macedonia	Bitola	announced	250
North Macedonia	Skopje	announced	105
North Macedonia	Negotino	announced	500
Serbia	Novi Sad	announced	350
Serbia	Niš	announced	500





New dependencies increase cost, geopolitical and decarbonisation risks

Diversification away from Russian gas and security of supply have often been cited by EU and US officials as the main reason to build new gas infrastructure in the Western Balkans.⁴¹

But any infrastructure would cement completely new dependencies, either on Azeri gas or LNG, mainly from the US, arriving via Greece. This is particularly true for gas-free Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro, but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia.

The Greece to North Macedonia pipeline's planned annual capacity of 1.8 bcm is more than four times North Macedonia's highest ever consumption, encouraging increased import dependence. At a groundbreaking ceremony in July 2025, the US Ambassador to North Macedonia emphasised: 'The United States, as the largest LNG producer, wants our natural gas transported through this pipeline as soon as possible'.⁴²

And in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the southern gas interconnection alone would have a capacity of almost six times as much as BiH's 2022 consumption,⁴³ dramatically increasing its overall gas consumption. The US Embassy in Sarajevo has also actively promoted this pipeline,⁴⁴ which would transport LNG from Croatia's Krk terminal.⁴⁵

Serbia has advanced further with diversification investments, but this has made only a small dent in Russian gas imports. Although it started to import Azerbaijan's gas via the new pipeline from Bulgaria, in 2024, these amounted to 13 per cent of Serbia's total available gas, with 77 per cent still coming from Russia.⁴⁶ Serbia is expected to sign a new supply agreement with Russia in September 2025 for three or ten years, citing a lack of availability of affordable alternatives to Russian gas.⁴⁷ It also plans new interconnections with Romania and North Macedonia, further encouraging even higher consumption.

The major difference between current gas policy in the EU and the Western Balkans is that reducing consumption plays an important role in the EU's efforts to halt imports of Russian gas.

In its REPowerEU Plan,⁴⁸ the EU has concentrated both on short-term measures to diversify supply and on measures to reduce gas consumption, resulting in a drop in gas demand of 80 bcm from 2021 to 2024, or a 17 per cent reduction in gas demand between August 2022 and February 2025.⁴⁹ EU countries have also ramped up wind, solar and heat pump installation.

The EU's goal of halting Russian energy imports by the end of 2027 will entail reducing demand by a further 40 to 50 bcm, and 100 bcm by 2030.⁵⁰ Several Member States have also introduced bans on installation of new gas boilers.⁵¹

But although gas consumption in the Western Balkans peaked in 2021, this is not the result of policy decisions. Rather than reducing gas demand, expanding its use is an explicit policy goal in all countries except Kosovo. It is common to hear decision makers describing gas as 'clean energy', a 'fuel of the future' and 'necessary for decarbonisation'.⁵²

These statements represent a less measured version of what EU and US officials have been saying for decades. While the EU has made significant policy changes and is closing the door to gas financing in the Western Balkans, reversing the impacts of years of active support for such plans requires time and concerted effort.

Dependence on imported gas was a high-risk strategy in the first place, but the time lag between the EU's gas build-out and the Western Balkans' plans renders the latter obsolete and greatly amplifies the risks involved.

//// The era of cheap gas is over

A major change in recent years is the cost of gas, which remains unaddressed in Western Balkan governments' plans. Russian gas was widely used – and in some countries still is – because it was relatively cheap. Once imports cease, the era of cheap gas is over.

LNG is more expensive than pipeline gas due to the transformation process. And because it is traded globally, its price fluctuates significantly.⁵³

Azerbaijan's pledge to export 20 bcm of gas to the EU annually by 2027 remains constrained by infrastructure capacity,⁵⁴ thus pushing up prices. EU bodies are reportedly sceptical about Azerbaijan's ability to deliver more gas after three years of stagnating supply.⁵⁵

//// No silver bullet to replace Russian gas

Geopolitical risks also remain high. Without concerted policies to reduce gas use, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue to depend on Russian gas for the foreseeable future.

Serbia's plans to build interconnectors to Romania and North Macedonia will, if built, take many years to realise, while Bosnia and Herzegovina's plans to build interconnectors from Croatia are unlikely to be realised at all.⁵⁶ If its southern interconnection is built, apart from increased dependence on US LNG, it would be coupled with an increase in Russian gas imports as well. The Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina plans a new pipeline with Serbia to import Russian gas, and is using it as a bargaining chip in return for allowing the southern interconnection to go ahead.⁵⁷

It is unclear to what degree North Macedonia is still dependent on Russian gas, as an agreement signed with the Bulgarian authorities in October 2022 paved the way for non-Russian gas to be piped via the existing pipeline.⁵⁸ In late 2023, North Macedonia's state-owned power utility announced it was sourcing Azeri and U.S. gas via a Bulgarian supplier.⁵⁹ No information is publicly available on the extent to which this has alleviated the situation. But in any case, building a new pipeline from Greece is not a quick way to tackle the issue.

The interconnector broke ground in July 2025,⁶⁰ but construction will take several years as expropriation is not complete. North Macedonia's record in commissioning gas pipelines is also very poor. Several pipelines have been built, but even after seven to eight years they are still not operational.⁶¹

Western Balkan governments' ever-closer relations with Baku also bring risks, not only on whether Azerbaijan can deliver sufficient gas, but also on geopolitical grounds.

Although the EU's relations with Azerbaijan have developed in recent decades, this may not last forever. Civil society groups and human rights bodies have long criticised the authoritarian nature of the Azeri regime and its high levels of corruption.⁶² And in October 2023, the European Parliament demanded that the EU suspend any negotiations on a renewed partnership with Baku, as well as the current energy memorandum.⁶³

This did not happen, but earlier this year, Azerbaijan's president expressed frustration with the EU's unwillingness to finance infrastructure upgrades, threatening to sell gas elsewhere.⁶⁴ It is unclear whether this represents a blip or a longer-term cooling of relations.

//// Hydrogen no panacea for decarbonisation risks

To avoid ending up as stranded assets, the planned build-out would have to result in increased gas consumption. Given the decades-long lifetime of energy infrastructure, this contradicts the countries' commitments to achieve net zero by 2050 at the latest. And the EU's proposed greenhouse gas emissions reduction target of 90 per cent by 2040 relative to 1990⁶⁵ demonstrates that there is no time at all to build new fossil fuel infrastructure.

All energy installations built now need to be fully decarbonised. Western Balkan countries do not have the resources to replace infrastructure after ten to fifteen years: whatever is built is usually used to the end of its designed lifetime and beyond.

The countries' (draft) NECPs and, where existing, their long-term strategies under the Paris Agreement, do not resolve this issue. The NECPs only contain detailed plans until 2030, and the long-term strategies do not ensure carbon neutrality or correspond to the countries' current plans.

In North Macedonia and Serbia, decision makers increasingly mention hydrogen as a future substitute for gas, following the EU's increased interest in this fuel carrier in the last few years. The EBRD also encouraged this by requiring the Greece to North Macedonia pipeline to be 'hydrogen ready'.⁶⁶ But this is not backed by any publicly available analysis on the availability and cost of renewable hydrogen, nor on the extent to which it would need to be transported by large international pipelines instead of being produced near the site of consumption.

Being a fuel carrier, rather than an energy source, means hydrogen is highly energy-intensive to manufacture and thus expensive. Only a tiny percentage is currently manufactured using renewable energy, and caution is needed to ensure it does not divert electricity needed for direct electrification. Most hydrogen used in the near future will therefore be based on gas, prolonging the use of fossil fuels.

Renewable hydrogen is never likely to be affordable or plentiful enough to use in power, heating⁶⁷ and local transport, as more efficient and less costly alternatives exist – it is only likely to play a role in hard-to-decarbonise sectors, primarily replacing the existing application of fossil-based hydrogen.⁶⁸ The EU has overestimated hydrogen's potential and has now scaled down initial expectations.⁶⁹ The Western Balkan countries need to avoid repeating this mistake.

Given the risks described above, many planned gas projects may not find financing. This would free up space for alternatives and avoid stranded assets or additional fossil fuel lock-in, but would still represent a major input of time, preparatory costs and lost opportunities in pursuing alternatives. To avoid this, the Western Balkan governments need to proactively revise their gas build-out plans in line with current data and take action to curb gas demand.



Conclusions and recommendations



The Western Balkans – particularly Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro, which remain free of gas imports, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, with only a tiny share of gas – have a major opportunity to leapfrog straight to renewable energy and avoid developing a strong dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Yet the region's gas build-out plans have remained remarkably steady in the last two years, despite increasing risks and financing challenges.

In 2023, 2,715 km of gas pipelines were planned, of which 2,551 km are still on the table. A new pipeline from Bulgaria to Serbia started operating in December 2023.

However, the plans' realisation will be limited by the EU closing the door on gas financing in the Western Balkans.

Despite some announced plants being shelved in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, others have taken their place, increasing overall plans from 2.4 GW to 2.9 GW.

With promoters from Greece, Azerbaijan and Turkey involved, it remains to be seen how successful they will be in mobilising financing.

Not including the interconnectors within the Western Balkans, the planned pipelines would increase annual import capacity to the region by 10.5 bcm – more than three times the region's total gas consumption in 2023, creating strong risks of either stranded assets or increased lock-in. The countries have not adjusted their build-out plans in light of higher gas prices and limited supply options.

Unlike the EU, none of the gas-consuming countries in the region – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia – has any active strategies to reduce gas demand. Given the limited supply options, their higher costs, and the long lead-time of new pipelines, relying mainly on new infrastructure exposes the countries to prolonged dependence on Russian gas and a high likelihood of oversized projects becoming stranded assets.

Recommendations

To the Western Balkan governments:

- Review all gas projects in light of higher gas costs, limited financing and supply routes, the imminent need to decarbonise, and uncertainties about renewable hydrogen's availability and cost.
- Use the Energy Community's deadline of December 2026 to update long-term strategies under the Paris Agreement in line with the need for decarbonisation by 2050 at the latest, taking into account the EU's proposed target of 90 per cent greenhouse gas reductions by 2040 compared to 1990.
- Leapfrog straight to sustainable forms of renewable energy⁷⁰ and increase grid development and energy efficiency, including via housing insulation, increased use of heat pumps and cutting losses in electricity distribution networks.
- Take a precautionary approach to renewable hydrogen development and consider the limited scale and delays of hydrogen projects in the EU before making concrete plans.

To the European Commission:

- Revise the CESEC 2024 Action Plan on gases to exclude the North Macedonia to Serbia interconnector.
- Send clearer political messages to the Western Balkan countries on the need to stop investing in gas infrastructure to ensure successful decarbonisation.
- Take a precautionary approach to hydrogen policy in the region and encourage realism in modelling and planning.

To international financial institutions and other international partners:

- Send clearer political messages to the Western Balkan countries on the need to stop investing in gas infrastructure to ensure successful decarbonisation.
- Take a precautionary approach to hydrogen policy in the region and encourage realism in modelling and planning.



Annex 1.

Planned gas pipelines in the Western Balkans

Route countries	Name	Status	Capacity, if known (bcm)
Albania, Kosovo	Albania to Kosovo (ALKOGAP)	proposed	
Albania	Fier to Vlora	proposed	1
Albania, Montenegro, Croatia	Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP)	proposed	5
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	Southern Gas Interconnection	proposed	1.5
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	Western Gas Interconnection	proposed	
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	Northern Gas Interconnection	proposed	
North Macedonia, Albania	North Macedonia to Albania	proposed	2.1
North Macedonia, Bulgaria	Bulgaria to North Macedonia	proposed	
North Macedonia	Greece to North Macedonia Interconnector	construction	1.8
North Macedonia	Skopje-Tetovo-Gostivar	construction	
North Macedonia	Sveti Nikole-Veles*	proposed	
North Macedonia	Gostivar-Kichevo*	proposed	
Serbia, Romania	Romania to Serbia Interconnection	proposed	1.2

Serbia, North Macedonia	North Macedonia to Serbia Interconnector	proposed	1.6
Serbia	Paraćin-Prahovo*	proposed	
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina Interconnector	proposed	1.2
Serbia	Prahovo-Niš	proposed	
Greece, Albania, Italy	Trans-Adriatic Pipeline expansion	proposed	10

*These pipelines do not yet have Global Energy Monitor (GEM) profiles.

Country	Name
North Macedonia	Klečovce-Negotino Gas Pipeline
North Macedonia	Negotino-Bitola Gas Pipeline
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Zenica-Noví Trávník Gas Pipeline*
Serbia	Aleksandrovac-Noví Pazar-Tutin Pipeline

* This pipeline does not yet have a GEM profile.



Endnotes

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