Nuclear power plant safety upgrades, Ukraine
Instead of supporting the dangerous lifetime extension of aged nuclear reactors, the EU and the EBRD should help Ukraine with the reactors’ safe closure and decommissioning, while supporting alternatives to nuclear power: the development of local renewable energy sources and utilising Ukraine’s enormous potential for decreasing the energy intensity of the economy.
Ukraine’s nuclear reactors: ripe for closure
These are the same reactors that are to be connected via the transmission lines of the EU-backed Second Backbone Corridor that would enable nuclear electricity exports to the EU.
Read more on the Second Backbone Corridor project
12 of Ukraine’s 15 reactors were designed to finish operations before 2020; two of them have already got their licenses extended (see table below).
Ukraine’s national energy strategy for 2030 envisages that all of the country’s 15 nuclear reactors will have their lifespan expanded.
The Safety Upgrade Programme (SUP) includes safety modernisation measures for all 15 nuclear reactors in Ukraine and is partly necessary for the reactors’ for lifetime extension, as an independent expert’s review has shown.
But even with safety upgrades, with every year of operation after a reactor's lifetime has ended the risk of accidents involving radioactive emissions significantly increases, for instance short circuits or the appearance of cracks in covers of reactor vessels.
Accident at the Rivne NPP - a telling example for the (un)safety of old nuclear reactors
In December 2010, operations at Rivne nuclear power plant’s Reactor 1 were extended for another 20 years in spite of its lifetime having expired. Then just one month later, an accident occurred and the reactor's output was taken down to 50 percent.
While no radiation leaked in this case, the nuclear industry claims safety as long as no terrible accidents like Fukushima happen. Extending the lifetime of Ukrainian nuclear reactors - some of them from the 1970's - will create a situation prone to disaster. The EU should not to get involved in such plans and the risks they pose to the people in Ukraine and beyond.
Short-sighted and incomplete plans
What to do with radioactive waste and spent fuel?
While investments in the safety upgrade programme are being pushed for with full force, Ukraine’s government has made no preparations for the obvious need to dispose radioactive waste and spent fuel:
- If the nuclear plans go ahead, the total amount of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Ukraine could increase to 200 million tons annually.
- The Ukrainian government has made zero investments in infrastructure for the long-term, safe isolation of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
- Neutralisation of this hazardous waste could cost exceptional sums – costs which are so far not being mentioned.
Inadequate Environmental Assessment
Particularly after the accident in Fukushima, the project’s nuclear nature and potential impacts should clearly require a full Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). But the EBRD agreed on (and funded) only a much narrower Ecological Assessment.
Despite the requirement to be “in accordance with the principles of the UNCE Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) protocol”, the assessment does not pay attention to all the risks and negative impacts posed by the lifetime expansion and provides misleading information as to the objectives of the programme:
- The role of the SUP measures in enabling the lifetime extension of reactors was omitted. This allowed Energoatom not to assess potential risks and impacts of reactors operating beyond their designed lifetime.
- Alternatives were not properly assessed, including the most obvious of shutting down the reactors at the end of their designed lifetime.
- Neighbouring states were not informed as required by the Aarhus and ESPOO Conventions.
Risky decisions were made behind closed doors
Ukrainians were not informed or asked about the plans that will shape the countries energy sector for the coming decades.
Image from a public action on March 12, 2012 (anniversary of the Fukushima accident) against the governments lifetime extension plans
The decision to continue relying on nuclear power (from Soviet-era reactors) has been made without public oversight, let alone the involvement of Ukraine’s citizens:
- The Nuclear Power Plants Safety Upgrade Programme is based on the recommendations of a joint study by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission and Ukraine from 2010.
The study is a restricted document; the public had no access to the information.
- Since 2009 Ukrainian legislation does not require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the lifetime expansion.
One year before the first nuclear reactor’s lifetime (Rivne 1) should have expired, the respective law was changed to exclude public and local authorities from the decision-making. Lifetime expansions are now a 'private business' of Energoatom – a situation that contravenes international best-practices in the nuclear energy field.
International conventions breached?
The Safety Upgrade Program was a requirement for the lifetime extensions of Rivne 1 and 2 (granted in 2010 and 2011 respectively) - a proof for the SUP's role in the lifetime extensions.
A strategic assessment should have therefore analysed alternatives to keeping old reactors running as well as the programme's consequences, including its trans-boundary impacts according to the ESPOO Convention.
Currently, the ESPOO Implementation Committee is inquiring a violation in case of the Rivne 1 and 2 lifetime extensions.
An independent European expert’s review commissioned by Bankwatch shows that no information on the safety upgrades was provided outside of Ukraine.
The review concludes that the EBRD’s approach of preparing limited-scale ecological assessment instead of an SEA, was
”far from best practice in the nuclear field and not complying with international conventions like ESPOO on trans-boundary impact assessment or Aarhus on environmental information, nor coming even close to fulfilling EU legislation.”
One year after the Fukushima accident, the European public would welcome information about the lifetime extension of NPPs that are already three decades old.
Before any such extension is granted public European support, the alternatives should be carefully considered. This includes safely closing down ageing reactors - another costly activity that may be better suited for investing public money.
For more information contact our Ukrainian Bankwatcher Iryna Holovko
Quick facts on Ukraine's NPP safety upgrades
Reactors & plans:
Ukraine has 15 Soviet-era nuclear reactors in operation and plans to extend the lifetime of all of them. The lifetimes of two reactors have recently been expanded, another ten would expire before 2020.
Some of the measures included in the Safety Upgrade Programme are necessary for the lifetime expansion of the plants and not for their regular functioning until the initially planned term.
Two European institutions consider financing the project with 600 million euros: EBRD (300 million) and EURATOM (300 million). Total project costs are estimated with EUR 1.45 billion.
Ukraine has not saved necessary finances for the closure or decommissioning of reactors. Neither has it accounted for future costs of nuclear waste treatment.
The loan decisions have been postponed several times for almost a year. The EBRD approved its loan on March 12, 2013, while Euratom's decision is still outstanding.