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Nuclear power plant safety upgrades, Ukraine

Ukraine plans to extend the lifetimes of its fifteen nuclear reactors, most of which will soon pass their expiration date. The EBRD has agreed to finance a Safety Upgrade Programme that is a crucial stepping stone for the reactors’ prolonged use.


The lifetimes of two old reactors at the Rivne nuclear power plant have already been expanded. More are to come. (Image by Dyakov Vladimir Leonidovich - CC 3.0)

Instead of supporting the dangerous lifetime extension of aged nuclear reactors, the EU and the EBRD should help Ukraine with the reactors’ safe closure and decommissioning, while supporting alternatives to nuclear power: the development of local renewable energy sources and utilising Ukraine’s enormous potential for decreasing the energy intensity of the economy.

Ukraine’s nuclear reactors: ripe for closure

These are the same reactors that are to be connected via the transmission lines of the EU-backed Second Backbone Corridor that would enable nuclear electricity exports to the EU.

Read more on the Second Backbone Corridor project

12 of Ukraine’s 15 reactors were designed to finish operations before 2020; two of them have already got their licenses extended (see table below).

Ukraine’s national energy strategy for 2030 envisages that all of the country’s 15 nuclear reactors will have their lifespan expanded.

The Safety Upgrade Programme (SUP) includes safety modernisation measures for all 15 nuclear reactors in Ukraine and is partly necessary for the reactors’ for lifetime extension, as an independent expert’s review has shown.


Nuclear reactors in Ukraine that expect EU financing for their lifetime extension.

But even with safety upgrades, with every year of operation after a reactor's lifetime has ended the risk of accidents involving radioactive emissions significantly increases, for instance short circuits or the appearance of cracks in covers of reactor vessels.

Accident at the Rivne NPP - a telling example for the (un)safety of old nuclear reactors

In December 2010, operations at Rivne nuclear power plant’s Reactor 1 were extended for another 20 years in spite of its lifetime having expired. Then just one month later, an accident occurred and the reactor's output was taken down to 50 percent.

While no radiation leaked in this case, the nuclear industry claims safety as long as no terrible accidents like Fukushima happen. Extending the lifetime of Ukrainian nuclear reactors - some of them from the 1970's - will create a situation prone to disaster. The EU should not to get involved in such plans and the risks they pose to the people in Ukraine and beyond.

Short-sighted and incomplete plans

What to do with radioactive waste and spent fuel?

While investments in the safety upgrade programme are being pushed for with full force, Ukraine’s government has made no preparations for the obvious need to dispose radioactive waste and spent fuel:

  • If the nuclear plans go ahead, the total amount of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Ukraine could increase to 200 million tons annually.
  • The Ukrainian government has made zero investments in infrastructure for the long-term, safe isolation of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
  • Neutralisation of this hazardous waste could cost exceptional sums – costs which are so far not being mentioned.

Inadequate Environmental Assessment

Particularly after the accident in Fukushima, the project’s nuclear nature and potential impacts should clearly require a full Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). But the EBRD agreed on (and funded) only a much narrower Ecological Assessment.

Despite the requirement to be “in accordance with the principles of the UNCE Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) protocol”, the assessment does not pay attention to all the risks and negative impacts posed by the lifetime expansion and provides misleading information as to the objectives of the programme:

  • The role of the SUP measures in enabling the lifetime extension of reactors was omitted. This allowed Energoatom not to assess potential risks and impacts of reactors operating beyond their designed lifetime.
  • Alternatives were not properly assessed, including the most obvious of shutting down the reactors at the end of their designed lifetime.
  • Neighbouring states were not informed as required by the Aarhus and ESPOO Conventions.

Risky decisions were made behind closed doors

Ukrainians were not informed or asked about the plans that will shape the countries energy sector for the coming decades.


Image from a public action on March 12, 2012 (anniversary of the Fukushima accident) against the governments lifetime extension plans

The decision to continue relying on nuclear power (from Soviet-era reactors) has been made without public oversight, let alone the involvement of Ukraine’s citizens:

  • The Nuclear Power Plants Safety Upgrade Programme is based on the recommendations of a joint study by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Commission and Ukraine from 2010.
    The study is a restricted document; the public had no access to the information.
  • Since 2009 Ukrainian legislation does not require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the lifetime expansion.
    One year before the first nuclear reactor’s lifetime (Rivne 1) should have expired, the respective law was changed to exclude public and local authorities from the decision-making. Lifetime expansions are now a 'private business' of Energoatom – a situation that contravenes international best-practices in the nuclear energy field.

Trans-boundary context

International conventions breached?

The Safety Upgrade Program was a requirement for the lifetime extensions of Rivne 1 and 2 (granted in 2010 and 2011 respectively) - a proof for the SUP's role in the lifetime extensions.

A strategic assessment should have therefore analysed alternatives to keeping old reactors running as well as the programme's consequences, including its trans-boundary impacts according to the ESPOO Convention.

Currently, the ESPOO Implementation Committee is inquiring a violation in case of the Rivne 1 and 2 lifetime extensions.

An independent European expert’s review commissioned by Bankwatch shows that no information on the safety upgrades was provided outside of Ukraine.

The review concludes that the EBRD’s approach of preparing limited-scale ecological assessment instead of an SEA, was

    ”far from best practice in the nuclear field and not complying with international conventions like ESPOO on trans-boundary impact assessment or Aarhus on environmental information, nor coming even close to fulfilling EU legislation.”

One year after the Fukushima accident, the European public would welcome information about the lifetime extension of NPPs that are already three decades old.

Before any such extension is granted public European support, the alternatives should be carefully considered. This includes safely closing down ageing reactors - another costly activity that may be better suited for investing public money.


For more information contact our Ukrainian Bankwatcher Iryna Holovko

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Publications

Advocacy letter | July 1, 2015

The request is made in the context of Ukraine's obligations under the Espoo convention, such that the EBRD and EuroAtom should "take steps for suspending the loan proceedings until a full trans-boundary EIA process for nuclear units lifetime extension is launched and carried out in accordance with international treaties to which Ukraine is a party."

Bankwatch Mail | May 14, 2015

Citing 33 safety issue failings, at the end of April Ukraine's nuclear regulator took the decision to suspend operations at Unit 2 of the South Ukraine nuclear power plant by a May 12 deadline, the date marking the end of the plant's design lifetime. Under the terms of the Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Council's decision, should the state-owned nuclear energy operator Energoatom wish to resume the unit's operations beyond its design lifetime it will have to implement all necessary measures by May 2017.

Briefing | May 12, 2015

The EBRD has denied its role in enabling Ukraine’s ageing units to operate beyond their design lifetime. It has also claimed that through the loan it has important leverage over its client Energoatom to help ensure a proper level of nuclear safety and the compliance with Ukraine’s international commitments in the nuclear energy sector. However, developments in January-May 2015 show the EBRD has been over-optimistic about the role and leverage it has gotten by granting the loan for the safety upgrade project.

Advocacy letter | March 30, 2015

In this letter 46 non-governmental organisations alarm European Union representatives involved in the decision-making at the EBRD and Euratom to the fact that Ukraine is pressing ahead with its plans to extend the life-time of its old nuclear reactors even though they are in breach of international law (Espoo Convention) and without proper impact assessments and despite UKraine's obligations under the loans provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Euratom.

Briefing | March 17, 2015

This independent study reveals critical vulnerabilities in the 32 year old nuclear unit 1 in the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, whose lifetime was extended by 10 years in December 2013. The study shows the reactor pressure vessel in unit 1 has several dangerous vulnerabilities that could lead to the appearance of micro-cracks in the vessel's metal casing. The observed wear in a number of elements in the reactor vessel already exceeds tenfold tolerable levels.

Latest developments


 

Press release | July 1, 2015

Twenty-five (updated: 4:45pm, CET) Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have signed a letter today urging the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Euratom to suspend their financial support for Ukraine's ageing nuclear reactors until the potential environmental impacts of their prolonged operation in Ukraine and on neighbouring countries are fully assessed.

The letter is available on the Bankwatch website.

Bankwatch in the media | May 15, 2015

Государственная инспекция ядерного регулирования не продлила лицензию для второго энергоблока Южно-Украинской АЭС, ссылаясь на его несоответствие требованиям ядерной безопасности. Однако оператор АЭС «Энергоатом» планирует устранить несколько десятков замечаний уже к декабрю этого года, что вызвало обеспокоенность экспертов.

Об этом говорится в постановлении Коллегии Госатомрегулирования от 30 апреля 2015 года.

nuclear
Bankwatch in the media | May 14, 2015

Dožívajúce sovietske reaktory vyvolávajú obavy o bezpečnosť. Neďaleko jednej obrovskej skládky jadrového paliva beží vojna a Kyjev o ich obnove svojich susedov riadne neinformuje.

nuclear, Ukraine
Press release | May 4, 2015

Prague, Kiev - CEE Bankwatch Network and the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine (NECU) welcome the Ukrainian State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate Council's decision at its meeting last Thursday (April 30) to suspend the operation of unit 2 in the South Ukraine nuclear power plant once it exceeds its design lifetime next week. According to the Council's decision, a lifetime extension license for this 30 year old nuclear unit could be considered in the future, but only if all required conditions are met.

Blog entry | April 30, 2015

For safety reasons, Europe must help the Ukrainian government retire, not revive, its nuclear reactors. (This commentary originally appeared on Project Syndicate.)