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Home > Blog entry > The post-2030 Modernisation Fund – a carrot for central and eastern European Member States?

The post-2030 Modernisation Fund – a carrot for central and eastern European Member States?

The Commission’s proposal to extend the Modernisation Fund until 2040 offers central and eastern European (CEE) Member States the prospect of continued funding to modernise their energy systems, but with future resources dependent on the carbon price, and new fossil gas investments finally excluded from support.

Gligor Radečić, Gas campaign leader  |  20 November 2026


Clear skies ahead for Europe's energy transition, if EU lawmakers close the remaining fossil fuel loopholes in the post-2030 Modernisation Fund (photo: Martijn Stoof/Pexels).

In July of this year, the European Commission, as part of its broader revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Directive, unveiled its proposal for a new framework for the Modernisation Fund post-2030.  

The ETS proposal leaves much to be desired, with environmental organisations raising concerns about both its insufficient climate ambition and its support to industry at the expense of ordinary people.  

Still, some important changes are proposed for the Modernisation Fund framework specifically.  

The Commission has offered CEE countries (plus Portugal and Greece) a carrot by proposing to extend the Modernisation Fund until 2040, to support the modernisation of their energy systems. However, this comes with a stick: the amount of available funding is dependent on the carbon price. If the carbon price, as projected, goes up, more funding will be available for the region’s transformation. At the same time, higher carbon prices could greatly impact the fossil-fuel dependent CEE region, if the countries do not start rolling projects that go beyond their usual coal to gas switch. 

This puts CEE countries in a tricky position, as some have been vocal advocates of weakening the existing EU ETS framework, despite the carbon revenues’ continued importance as a source of investment for their energy transitions. 

The Commission’s proposal also introduces changes to the Fund’s revenues, priority areas, non-priority investments, transparency, and conditionality linked to the rule of law.  

While some of the proposed changes could end up improving the Fund’s operations, others, such as the introduction of biomethane or carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) technologies among the Fund’s priorities, would increase public funding of false solutions and compete with less energy-intensive alternatives.

Fossil gas may finally be out 

Most notably, under the Commission’s proposal, the Fund is extended to 2040 and, starting from 2031, it would finally close the door on financing fossil fuels. 

The proposed Article 10d(1)(3) provides that “[n]o support from the Modernisation Fund shall be provided to energy generation facilities that use fossil fuels or facilities that transport fossil fuels.” This would address one of the main issues with the Fund’s current operations, under which Member States have been using EU ETS revenues to finance gas investments.  

According to a recent Bankwatch report, in the Fund’s first five years of operation, at least EUR 2 billion, or approximately 10% of the Fund’s disbursements, went directly to fossil gas. This is a conservative calculation, as we did not include several schemes that allow support for gas, since the final allocations at the country level remained unclear. Furthermore, some beneficiary countries have already indicated plans to request funding for additional gas projects up to 2030. 

What about the funding and who will benefit?  

The proposed framework changes both the resources available through the Modernisation Fund and the way they can be used. 

The proposal reduces the total quantity of allowances available for beneficiary countries after 2031. In the Fund’s current phase, it’s estimated that over EUR 57 billion will be available to the beneficiary countries until 2030, based on a carbon price of EUR 75 per tonne of carbon dioxide. But it’s unclear how much will be available in its next phase.  

The European Commission’s Impact Assessment under the 2026 EU ETS Directive review uses an average benchmark carbon price of EUR 150 per tonne for 2031 to 2040 to evaluate policy scenarios. So even if the total quantity of allowances available for beneficiary countries is reduced significantly (as per the proposal), the total funding might be similar to the current 2021 to 2030 levels. However, even if the nominal amount stays similar, real purchasing power could be substantially lower due to inflation. 

We support increasing the share of ETS revenues allocated to the Modernisation Fund beyond the level proposed by the Commission, provided that all the funded investments fully comply with the fossil fuel exclusion and the Fund’s objectives.  

The proposal also changes the eligibility criterion for beneficiary Member States. The Fund would be available to Member States whose GDP per capita at market prices was below 75% of the EU average between 2022 and 2024. While the fund originally targeted countries with a GDP per capita below 60% of the EU average (2013 baseline), the 2023 revised EU ETS Directive expanded eligibility to include countries with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average (2016 to 2018 baseline). This could affect Slovenia, which has moved above the 75% threshold used in the proposal.  

Priority areas 

The number of priority areas could increase from six to eight.  

Three new priorities have been proposed: 

  • electrification of demand-side sectors, including industry, buildings and transport;  
  • industrial decarbonisation, including CCS, CCU and electrification; and 
  • the production of affordable ‘low-carbon’ and bio-based fertilisers. 

‘Heating and cooling from renewable sources’ would be integrated into ‘the generation and use of renewable energy sources…’.  

Some of these changes to the priority areas reflect legitimate EU decarbonisation priorities such as industrial decarbonisation and the electrification of demand side sectors. Others require much greater scrutiny. 

In particular, CCS and CCU, carbon dioxide infrastructure and biomethane should not qualify for Modernisation Fund support, while its approach towards hydrogen should be restrictive. 

Carbon capture is energy-intensive, commercially unproven, and its climate benefits are highly speculative so far, while the use of captured carbon dioxide in enhanced oil recovery directly supports continued hydrocarbon extraction. 

The priority concerning the modernisation and expansion of energy infrastructure and storage would also be expanded to cover hydrogen and CO₂ infrastructure. This should also be reconsidered. Modernisation Fund resources should focus on technologies that directly support the transformation of energy systems, rather than costly, energy-intensive infrastructure whose climate and environmental benefits remain questionable, while creating new pathways for fossil lock-in. Renewable hydrogen will remain a scarce and costly resource for decades, making its use difficult to justify in applications where direct electrification is possible. Support to hydrogen infrastructure must be restricted to the production of renewable hydrogen and its use as a feedstock where it replaces current uses of fossil-based hydrogen.  

The proposal also adds ‘the recovery of waste heat from incineration plants for district heating’ to the priority concerning energy efficiency. If not specified that this refers only to existing plants, and that it must not extend their lifetime or capacity, this could create an incentive to treat waste incineration as an energy-efficiency investment. Modernisation Fund support must not create incentives for additional waste incineration capacity or undermine waste prevention, reuse and recycling objectives. 

Biomethane is usually made from upgraded biogas (around 90 per cent worldwide today) using technologies like water scrubbing and membrane separation. These are quite energy-intensive. Also, there are multiple risks with scaling up this technology, such as methane leakage and supporting intensive animal farming.  The energy needed to grow the crops, produce the fertilisers and upgrade the biogas suggest it will not be carbon neutral. Public funds should therefore not support biomethane production and usage. 

At the same time, the new Directive should explicitly recognise the growing importance of cooling systems, which were omitted from the proposal. The priority concerning energy infrastructure should be expanded to include district cooling alongside district heating. This would better reflect the direction of EU energy policy, particularly as cooling demand increases due to climate change. 

The priority areas ‘support for low-income households…’ and ‘a just transition in carbon-dependent regions…’, for which governments have so far failed to request funding, remain unchanged.  

Priority vs. non-priority investments 

The Commission’s proposal increases the share of Fund revenues that must be directed towards priority investments. At least 95% of revenues would have to support priority areas, compared with 80% or 90% under the current framework, depending on the category of funds used.  

Only 5% can be allocated to non-priority investments, and these could receive up to 50% of the relevant investment cost, down from the current ceiling of 70%. 

This might be interpreted as ensuring that a higher share of the Fund’s future investments is genuinely aligned with the EU’s energy and climate priorities. However, our previous research has shown that up to now, ‘non-priority investments’ have ranged from fossil fuel projects such as gas pipelines in Romania to support schemes such as one for residential heat pumps in Poland. At the same time, the bulk of the funding for fossil fuels, biomass combustion and waste incineration has been channelled through priority investments. So some ‘non-priority investments’ have been highly useful, while some ‘priority investments’ have been counterproductive in terms of decarbonisation. 

What about the ‘do no significant harm’ principle in the Fund? 

The Commission’s proposal provides almost no detail on how the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) assessment would actually be applied to investments supported by the Fund. 

Therefore, it is yet to be seen how the DNSH principle, applying since 2025 to some of the Fund’s investments, depending on the category of funds used, will be integrated after 2031. While unified new guidance is being developed for the next long-term EU budget, it is unclear whether it also applies here. 

According to the proposed Article 10f (‘do no significant harm’ principle) “Revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances destined for the Modernisation Fund pursuant to Article 10d… shall be used in line with the principle of ‘do no significant harm’ referred to in Article 33(2), point (d) of Regulation of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. (Finance Regulation)”. Most likely this means that ‘transfers’ are yet again excluded from the DNSH assessment.  

At the very least, to avoid loopholes, the principle must apply to all sources of funding of Modernisation Fund investments. Currently, the so-called transfers, which are beneficiary countries’ own emission allowance revenues that they transferred to top up their Modernisation Fund resources, are excluded from the DNSH assessment. In the 2021 to 2030 period, six beneficiary Member States have voluntarily transferred nearly 320 million allowances (amounting to around EUR 24 billion based on a carbon price of EUR 75 per tonne of CO2) to top up their national Modernisation Fund allocations. 

Transparency and stakeholder participation must be further developed 

The Commission has also recognised that the selection criteria and procedure on the beneficiary country level need improvements (‘the beneficiary Member States shall apply criteria and procedures which are non-discriminatory and transparent’). The proposal introduces, among other things, an obligation to publish information on Fund recipients. 

However, both the transparency and investment selection will still need to be addressed through the implementing regulation on the Modernisation Fund (the current one was last revised in 2023). The Directive proposal itself does not establish clear and direct obligations for beneficiary Member States on selecting investments, involving stakeholders (including the public), or making decisions. 

More Fund improvements needed in the legislative process 

The Commission’s proposal addresses some of the most obvious issues with the current Modernisation Fund. Most importantly, it would extend the Fund’s operations for a decade ahead and end support for fossil fuels after 2030. 

The exclusion of fossil fuels must be maintained through the legislative process, while the eligibility of CCS/CCU, hydrogen and CO₂ infrastructure, waste-incineration-related investments, biomethane and other energy-intensive, ineffective or potentially lock-in creating investments should be eliminated.  

Revenues must be invested transparently and strategically in industrial transformation, clean infrastructure, and social support. The Fund’s design and operations in the next phase must focus on cleaning up electricity generation, on electrifying land transport and low temperature heating and cooling.  

A strong emphasis must be placed on helping lower-income households, vulnerable groups and just transition regions which have been neglected by the Fund until now. The CEE region suffers from some of the highest levels of energy poverty in the EU due to an inefficient building stock and high energy needs. This explains the CEE countries’ resistance to the ETS2 proposal, but, if planned correctly, the Modernisation Fund could help them ease into ETS2 pricing schemes. In addition, as the Just Transition Fund will likely be removed from the next Multiannual Financial Framework, financing for just transition regions will be even more scarce, yet still necessary.  

The Irish Presidency is expected to publish its general ETS approach in December, followed by a vote in the European Parliament’s ENVI Committee, with trilogue negotiations scheduled to begin in January 2027. 

CEE countries have been offered a carrot. It’s now on them whether will they take it. 

 

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Institution: EU

Theme: Modernisation Fund

Project: Fossil gas

Tags: Modernisation Fund

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