A new chapter for the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism?

For years, civil society organisations have warned that the current policy falls short of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and international best practice. The hard truth is that the mechanism has failed to deliver. It has simply been unable to achieve its mission independently, efficiently, or in a meaningful way for the very people it is supposed to protect.  

Yet people continue to turn to the EIB-CM to raise concerns about EIB-financed projects. According to the EIB-CM’s 2025 annual report, 21 admissible complaints were registered that year. Despite deploying approximately 90% of its financing within the EU, 88% of these complaints came from outside the EU. The vast majority of these complaints were submitted by individuals seeking redress for the negative impacts of projects on housing and land, living conditions and livelihoods (mostly related to resettlement), as well as inadequate stakeholder engagement.  

While we welcome the EIB’s recent consultative efforts and have actively taken part, consultation alone isn’t enough. Together with a coalition of partner organisations, we’ve put forward a number of recommendations to improve the mechanism. If the EIB Group wants to uphold its reputation for sustainability and accountability, it needs to turn these recommendations into reality. 

When accountability fails 

Our experience shows that numerous complaints from local communities and civil society organisations have not been adequately addressed, while the institutional response to EIB-CM findings has frequently been insufficient, resulting in ongoing harm to affected communities.  

One notable example is the expansion of Budapest’s Liszt Ferenc International Airport, which the EIB agreed to finance in 2018. The project aims to increase passenger traffic by 50% over eight years. Residents living near the airport, supported by Friends of the Earth Hungary (MTVSZ), filed a complaint alleging inadequate public consultation and raising concerns about the project’s environmental impacts, including its contribution to climate change, increased air and noise pollution, and wider social impacts on affected communities. 

In 2021, the EIB-CM concluded that the project failed to comply with both EU environmental legislation and the EIB’s own environmental and social standards, issuing a series of recommendations. Yet these recommendations have still not been fully implemented, despite the Bank being required to do so within 24 months of the conclusions report. 

Another example concerns the construction of the Corridor Vc motorway south of Mostar in Bosna and Herzegovina, financed jointly by the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In 2017, affected residents filed a complaint about the project’s environmental and social impacts. The EIB-CM initially concluded in 2019 that there were no instances of maladministration.  

The complainants subsequently submitted an updated complaint to the EIB-CM and, shortly after, with the EBRD’s Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM). In autumn 2021, the EIB-CM again found no shortcomings in the route selection process or public consultations. 

However, in early 2024, the IPAM reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the route selection process had not complied with the EBRD’s Environmental and Social Policy. It recommended a new alternative alignment analysis along with a proper environmental and social impact assessment. Regrettably, many of the underlying issues, including the flawed route selection, remain unresolved. As a result, several new complaints have already been submitted to the IPAM in 2026. 

Promising reforms 

The draft Complaints Mechanism Policy contains several welcome improvements and addresses some long-standing expectations regarding the EIB-CM’s independence. In particular, we welcome the explicit recognition that the EIB-CM has a mandate to ‘facilitate access to remedy to address the negative environmental and/or social impacts of EIBG Projects’. However, the review should go much further. The revised policy must strengthen the EIB-CM’s independence from the Bank’s operational services, increase its capacity to facilitate effective remedy, and improve transparency and predictability.  

Closing the gaps 

First, although the draft policy designates the Head of the EIB-CM as the guarantor of the EIB-CM’s independence, it contains no meaningful safeguards governing how the Head or staff are appointed, assessed or protected from conflicts of interest. In this context, introducing clear rules on recruitment, post-employment restrictions, and conflicts of interest would align the EIB Group with international good practice and the policy provisions of peer accountability mechanisms at other multilateral development banks.   

Second, the EIB-CM’s standing within the EIB’s unique governance structure should be strengthened. The draft policy should clearly define the responsibilities of both the Management Committee and the Board of Directors in ensuring that the EIB Group fulfils its remedy mandate. The Board approves loans under the condition that they comply, or will comply before signature, with the EIB Group’s Environmental and Social Policy. 

Yet, despite serving as the institution’s ultimate decision-making body and legally accountable for the projects it approves, the Board currently has no role in authorising development of corrective actions where the EIB-CM finds non-compliance and management disagrees to develop corrective actions. The policy should therefore allow the EIB-CM to refer such cases to the Board for a final decision.  

Third, complainants should be consulted much earlier in the process and not be omitted from discussions between the EIB and its clients when corrective actions are being developed. The views of complainants are central to designing measures that reflect realities on the ground and effectively address verified harm. Transparency should also be a guiding principle throughout the process. Complainants should receive the final compliance conclusions report before corrective measures are developed, enabling them to prepare and engage in consultations.  

Finally, the EIB-CM’s institutional learning function should not be overlooked. One of its most important roles is to translate case-specific findings and dispute resolution experience into lessons that improve the EIB’s policies, project due diligence, and lending conditions. In line with the EIB Group Evaluation Policy, the Board of Directors should be required to consider the EIB-CM’s reports systematically, use their findings to inform decision-making, and hold the EIB Group accountable for implementing the recommendations.