The 'Second Backbone Corridor' - High voltage electricity transmission lines, Ukraine

In its drive for 'energy security', the EU is looking to its eastern neighbour for cheap energy. But using a series of high-voltage transmission lines to import dirty energy supplies like nuclear and coal power from Ukraine will not make the EU safer, and it will lock both into an unstable and environmentally unsound energy mix.

Bankwatch believes that the European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the EU's Neighbourhood Investment Facility should not support Ukraine’s aspirations to increase its nuclear programme but rather should help the country make use of its vast energy saving potential and to transform its energy sector.

The Second Backbone Corridor - project brief

The massive Second Backbone Corridor is a series of ultra high voltage electricity transmission lines that are planned to connect 3 Ukrainian nuclear power plants (providing the generation) and two hydro pumped storage plants (PSP) (providing storage).

Stretching the length of Ukraine, the corridor would allow for an increase in the nuclear plants' output capacity and would lay the technical groundwork to export electricity to EU.

Both the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are and have been involved in several ways:

  • Over the last five years they invested approximately EUR 1 billion in the Ukrainian energy sector, mainly in other high voltage transmission lines that would complement the Second Backbone Corridor
  • Another export-oriented transmission line - Novoodeska-Artsyz - has been re-launched by the EBRD in November 2010 (after it had been stopped because of the constructor’s plans to cross a Ramsar site).

Ukraine's energy strategy – the plan behind the electricity transmission lines

By financing the Second Backbone Corridor project, the EBRD and the EIB would be involved in moving Ukraine and Europe further away from a safe and environmentally friendly energy mix.

How?

The Second Backbone Corridor is a vital part of Ukraine's controversial Energy Strategy till 2030.

Currently under redevelopment by the government, the strategy promotes a nuclear-intensive energy programme and includes several other problematic aspects:

  • assuming a sharp growth in energy demand
    (so far, energy consumption in Ukraine is fairly static)
  • mostly neglecting energy efficiency measures that would reduce Ukraine's immense energy intensity (see alternatives below)
  • more than doubling the energy production from coal (from 43,5 (2005) to 101 million tons of equivalent fuel (2030)) thus increasing the share of coal in the energy mix from 22% (2005) to 33% (2030) and doubling greenhouse gas emissions
  • constructing 22 new nuclear reactors and extending the lifetimes of old reactors currently in operation

(For a detailed criticism of the strategy see the technical analysis (pdf) prepared by Ukrainian NGOs and engineering institutes.)

In short, Ukraine plans to dramatically increase its energy production based on nuclear and coal. The Second Backbone Corridor will be the vehicle bringing this energy to the EU.


Why the EU should not get involved?

Chernobyl and more - nuclear energy in Ukraine is neither safe nor cheap

Nuclear energy and Ukraine are most notoriously synonymous with the meltdown at Chernobyl in 1986. But the nuclear industry is beleaguered by a slew of other dangerous issues:

Disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel

  • The Ukrainian government has made zero investments in infrastructure for the long-term, safe isolation of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
  • Under the energy strategy that relies on the Second Backbone Corridor, the total amount of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste in Ukraine could increase to 200 million tons annually.
  • Neutralization of this hazardous waste could cost exceptional sums – costs which are so far not being mentioned.

Dangerously old nuclear power plants

  • The Second Backbone Corridor will connect 12 nuclear reactors, most of which will reach the end of their lifetime by 2020 and are planned for extensions.
  • The European Commission and the EBRD are even considering getting factually involved in these extensions with a EUR 800 million loan for the Ukraine NPPs safety upgrade programme. (More information on our website.)
  • With every year of operation after a reactor's lifetime has ended the risk of accidents involving radioactive emissions significantly increases, for instance short circuits or the appearance of cracks in covers of reactor vessels.

Accident at the Rivne NPP - a telling example for the (un)safety of old nuclear reactors

In December 2010, operations at Rivne nuclear power plant’s Reactor 1 were extended for another 20 years in spite of its lifetime having expired. Then just one month later, an accident occurred and the reactor's output was taken down to 50 percent.

While no radiation leaked in this case, the nuclear industry claims safety as long as no terrible accidents like Fukushima happen. Extending the lifetime of Ukrainian nuclear reactors - some of them from the 1970's - will create a situation prone to disaster. The EU should not to get involved in such plans and the risks they pose to the Ukrainian people.


Alternatives to nuclear are abundant

Alternatives for investment in the Ukrainian power sector are abundant and promise benefits for people and environment in Ukraine:

  • Studies show that energy-saving technologies, coupled with alternative and renewable energy sources, can substitute the nuclear option in developing the Ukrainian power industry. (See for example the alternative energy strategy for Ukraine (pdf))
  • In the electricity transmission field the modernisation of local low-voltage grids (between 110 and 330 kV) should be prioritised. Reducing the current power losses of 11 % (twice as much as the EU average) would have the most direct positive effect on people in Ukraine.
  • Start-up financing for technical solutions to integrate modern renewable energy sources into the outdated electricity grid can help Ukraine increase its share of renewable energy sources.
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Publications

Advocacy letter

September 20, 2012

Bankwatch and its members appeal to Viktor Yanukovych, President of Ukraine, to stop the Ukrainian government's plans to construct two new nuclear units at the Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant. The letter asks Yanukovych to use his vetoing power and not sign the relevant law that was adopted by Ukraine's parliament on 6 September 2012, since the law is in direct violation of Ukraine’s international obligations.

Bankwatch Mail

May 14, 2012

Earlier this year at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Ukraine's president Victor Yanukovych met Thomas Mirow, the EBRD president, with Yanukovych deeming the ongoing cooperation between Ukraine and the bank to be “excellent”. Other than this being a diplomatic pleasantry, when it comes to energy infrastructure projects Ukraine certainly appears to have done very well out of the EBRD: since 2005 the EBRD has committed more than half a billion euros for these projects in Ukraine, in particular for the upgrade and construction of high-voltage transmission lines. Yet the experience for all concerned – including local communities – has been far from excellent, and concerns are mounting that further grid expansion plans could be storing up yet more problems.

Bankwatch Mail

March 13, 2012

Early in the new year Bankwatch and partner groups lodged two complaints with the EBRD's Public Complaint Mechanism (PCM): one concerning the loan agreement for the Rivne-Kyiv High Voltage Line project in Ukraine, the other concerning the EBRD's Šoštanj lignite thermal power plant loan in Slovenia.

Bankwatch Mail

March 13, 2012

There is more or less consensus among various stakeholders that developing decentralised renewable energy sources (RES) to feed local energy demand is the only way to build a long-term, truly sustainable, effective and fair way to satisfy Europe’s energy needs.

Study

February 16, 2012

How can fossil fuels and uranium be kept in the ground and agrofuels off the land in ways that do not inflict suffering upon millions? Mainstream policy responses to these issues are largely framed in terms of "energy security". Yet far from making energy supplies more secure, such policies are triggering a cascade of new insecurities for millions of people.

Briefing

January 15, 2012

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Euroatom plan to support the nuclear power plant safety upgrade project in Ukraine. The EU presents the project as a timely initiative to improve nuclear safety in the region. A closer inspection however shows that it in fact can increase nuclear risks, in that the project includes a significant number of measures necessary to extend the lifetime of the reactors.

Briefing

May 15, 2011

The EBRD is and has been involved in a number of high voltage electricity transmission lines in Ukraine that eventually would lay the technical groundwork to export nuclear and coal-based electricity to the EU.

In the Ukrainian electricity transmission field, the EBRD should focus its efforts on utilising the massive potential to increase the reliability and efficiency of Ukraine’s energy system through the modernisation of existing grid, especially low-voltage local grid below 110kV where power losses now are two times higher than average in the EU.

Briefing

May 15, 2011

In November 2010 the EBRD, together with the European Union, announced its involvement in the EUR 1.2 billion Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) safety upgrade project for Ukraine. While safety upgrades at first appear a positive initiative, this project makes sense only in the context of NPP lifetime extensions, otherwise there is no reason to finance costly upgrades for facilities that will anyway close in a couple of years. And though the project promoter clearly links these safety upgrades with lifetime extensions, the EBRD is reticent to do so.