Now GDDKIA has decided to self-fund the project and forfeit support from the EIB and the EU. From its point of view, the decision has two advantages. Firstly, it was a way to finally move forward with the project, as no end was in sight to the half-hearted procedures at both funders.  Secondly, this evades scrutiny of these EU institutions for that particular project. The self-funding was not a difficult thing to do because the problematic section was only eight kilometres, and GDDKIA has received plenty of EU money for the other sections of the very same road.

Works are underway on the eight kilometre stretch of the S7 in question, with bulldozers annihilating one of Poland’s best-preserved habitats of the Marsh Fritillary and a unique wetland ecosystem in the Oleśnica Valley. The project is expected to be completed in 2020. Unlike other sections of the S7 currently under construction, this particular stretch is not marked with billboards pointing to EU support: on paper everything is theoretically in order, but that does not change the fact that the S7 expressway, which in its entirety will be remembered as an emblematic case of EU funds, has pushed an endangered species closer to extinction.

As the body responsible for all major road projects in Poland, GDKKIA is a major beneficiary of EU funds. As part of the current EU budget, it has so far received a total of PLN 30.7 billion (EUR 7.3 billion) in EU grants for 49 road projects. Sadly, the Skarżysko-Kamienna section of the S7 is not the only case where it has attempted this kind of salami-slicing. The S3, a north-south expressway in western Poland, is another example of a road project lavishly supported by the EU, of which one particular section between Świnoujście and Troszyn threatens the Wolin National Park and the Wolin-Uznam Natura 2000 area, but which has not been submitted for financing to the EU.

The story of the S7 is a cautionary tale for the next budget, during which the EU must tighten environmental safeguards. The EU budget should not support projects whose environmentally-harmful elements have been cleverly taken out by the project promoters and should instead be used as leverage over large beneficiaries like national road construction agencies to strictly comply with EU environmental laws in all operations.

The citizens and municipal councilors complained to the European Investment Bank and the Commission about a lack of transparency related to the environmental and economic impacts of the project. The cost-benefit analysis for the project is not public as it is considered ‘confidential’, even though the Sofia municipality’s refusal to release the information was ruled illegal by the court at first instance.

The project claims to reduce by ten per cent air pollution due to the use of partially renewable energy (biogenic fraction in RDF). But citizens are concerned that alternatives to incineration could have had better results in terms of air pollution reduction if properly assessed.

Waste-to-energy methods are still controversially considered ‘climate-friendly’ investments, when energy saved from even just-once-recycled plastics by far exceeds the energy generated by burning them.

The Sofia incinerator, which will start operations after 2020 and continue for at least 30 years, is an example of a short-sighted and undemocratic project that received support from EU funds and the EIB.  The project indicators do not comply with the requirements of the new Circular Economy Package, specifically the updated targets in the Waste Framework Directive, Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive, nor with the Single Use Plastics Directive that enters into force in May 2019. For example by 2030 Bulgaria should double the amount of recycled waste to reach the 65 per cent EU target, in order to ensure the financial stability of the incinerator.

The project is currently under appraisal by the Commission, as it confirms funding for such ‘major projects.’ Civil society and the municipal councilors are hoping that the Commission will account for their arguments and initiate a review of the project’s alternatives and viability.  It is also worth mentioning that in the future EU funds regulation, the requirement for the Commission to approve ‘major projects’ will be removed.

The main problems that the report points to are the poor coordination between countries, a lack of governmental accountability, and overlooking solutions for upgrading existing conventional lines that could significantly bring down the costs.

The Rail Baltica project is an example how this can happen, even though the project is still at a stage where reasonable changes might be possible and the funds could be spent better.

The planned route passes through many Estonian swamps and bogs that act as natural carbon sinks: the effect of the railway dam on these ecosystems is poorly studied and the cost of building bridges and dams would be huge when compared to modernisation of the existing link.

A study of Rail Baltica’s socioeconomic benefits by Ernst and Young, a consultancy, was found to contain errors that increased the projected benefits and costs of the project by several billion euros because the study was based on unrealistic expectations about CO2 emission reductions from the transportation sector. These assumptions affected the overall transportation strategy in the region: the Estonian Ministry of Environment for example is expecting reductions of transport-related CO2 emissions in order to fulfill EU 2030 climate targets, chalking up the gains to the erroneous calculations in the Ernst and Young study.

In addition, a lack of transparency and the inclusion of citizens in decision-making has resulted in strong opposition in Estonia to the project. Over four hundred prominent figures have signed an open letter demanding the end of project in its current form.

Trencin is one of the coal regions in transition chosen by the European Commission and the Slovak government. Local communities are concerned that financing for the region, which should be spent on its re-development, will instead end up in the pockets of the private coal mining company Hornonitrianske bane Prievidza (HBP).

HBP has been aware of the need to phase out coal since 2005 when the Slovak government started to support electricity from domestic coal via an increasing feed-in tariff of up to EUR 103 million annually.

In March 2018, while local mayors were building grassroots participation in building a post-coal future for the region, the Slovak government suddenly opened a call for projects to be supported by the platform. The government launched the call after closed-door meetings with the Commission, regional authorities and only three companies, including HBP and its partners, during which the company presented twelve proposals totalling EUR 400 million.   

The Slovak government gave a deadline of only two months for submitting projects and said projects that already had a building permit would be favoured, a barrier to entry for any citizen or small business.

The most controversial project of HBP’s submitted projects is for the revitalisation of underground and surface areas. The company wants EU taxpayers to finance what it should be doing anyway: according to its 2017 annual report: “After termination or permanent cessation of operation in the main mining works, the Company is obliged under the provisions of the Mining Act to recultivate the lands affected by mining activities and to destroy the main mining works. In accordance with obligations under this Act, the Company creates reserves for the reclamation of land affected by the mining and related projects, for refundation of damages and for the purchase of real estates, for the disposal of the main mining works and the rehabilitation of buildings in the areas affected by the mining.”

At the same time, HBP is still working on opening a new mining field after 2023, when the first phase of transformation in the Trencin region ends.