Blog entry

Kosovo becomes the first Western Balkan country to stop promoting new hydropower

Earlier this month, the Kosovo parliament approved a new Energy Strategy up to 2031. Given how painfully outdated the previous strategy was, the new one is a crucial step in defining Kosovo’s energy plans.

Among others, it plans 1320 MW of new renewable energy generation until 2031, to add to 297 MW of existing capacity. The new additions should consist of around 600 MW wind, 600 MW of solar photovoltaics, 20 MW of biomass and at least 100 MW of prosumer capacity. It does not clarify the type of biomass, but caution will need to be exercised even for 20 MW, as Kosovo has reportedly already lost 7600 hectares of forest in the last 20 years.

No new hydropower planned

After years of conflicts over hydropower e.g. in Deçan and Shtërpcë/Strpče, the Strategy clarifies that ‘Due to environmental aspects, the Energy Strategy does not promote the construction of hydropower plants.’

This makes Kosovo the first country in the region to stop promoting new hydropower plants – a welcome statement that paves the way for the government to focus on speeding up solar and wind development and intensify its energy saving efforts.

This is important, as – in addition to the notorious Kosova e Re coal power plant – previous governments lost more than a decade promoting hydropower plans that were both damaging and to a large extent unrealistic, given Kosovo’s limited hydropower potential.

In 2009 the country had only 45.8 MW of installed hydropower, but in 2013 the then government planned a totally unrealistic additional 240 MW of hydropower below 10 MW and 305 MW of large hydropower by 2020.

Despite strong support from a feed-in tariff scheme that favoured hydropower over solar and wind, by the end of 2021, Kosovo had 132 MW of installed hydropower capacity. The plants generated less than five per cent of its electricity – and that in a relatively good hydrological year. They have also caused widespread damage including dry riverbeds, excessive logging and polluted drinking water. After this experience, it’s reassuring to see that the government has learnt this lesson and is ready to move on.

Energy crisis mars coal phase-out ambitions

The government’s plans for solar and wind are ambitious compared to Kosovo’s past progress – though quicker action is still needed. The Strategy pledges to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, but uses the same date for coal phase-out. But in reality, the country’s notoriously polluting lignite power units will have to close much earlier, due to their age.

Despite positive plans to phase in carbon pricing starting from 2025 and to use the proceeds to start a Just Transition Fund, the Strategy hesitates to commit to clear closure dates for the oldest units.

No doubt stung by Kosovo’s recent energy crisis, it plans modernisation works at both units of Kosova B, as well as at one or two of Kosova A’s three functional units: ‘One of the Kosovo A units will be refurbished by the end of 2024, while the decision to refurbish or phase out the second unit will be made in 2024 at the latest’. The Kosova A unit or units would then be used as a strategic reserve after that. The only concrete closure date mentioned is that one unit of Kosova A would be closed in 2026, after the other two have been modernised.

In 2021, 93 per cent of Kosovo’s electricity still came from lignite, so upgrades to Kosova B are inevitable for now. But Kosova A’s remaining units came online in 1970, 1971 and 1975 respectively, making them 53, 52 and 48 years old.

In addition to Kosova A’s age, there are three potential problems with this plan. First, the estimated cost of the required investment at Kosova A is EUR 120 million per unit, and that’s in addition to nearly EUR 97 million each needed for the two units of Kosova B. It’s not clear where Kosovo will be able to find these funds.

Second, it is already March 2023, so there is almost no chance of the first Kosova A retrofit being completed by the end of 2024. Yet the annex to the Strategy shows that this would be crucial to the feasibility of the works. With the introduction of carbon pricing, the utilisation rate of both the lignite power plants decreases significantly from around 85 per cent in 2026 to around 19 per cent in 2031, so the later the modernisation is done, the less power they will actually be able to sell.

Given the EU’s intention to introduce Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) payments in the power sector from January 2026, there is no real option for Kosovo to delay carbon pricing either, so it is unlikely that renovating any of the Kosova A units will be feasible in reality.

The third issue is the strategic reserve. Presumably the idea would be to pay the Kosova A units to be ready for action when needed. However, from 1 July 2025 it will no longer be allowed to have coal units as part of such capacity mechanisms in Energy Community Treaty countries, including Kosovo, due to the recent adoption of the EU’s internal energy market regulation. It’s unclear whether this has been considered in the Strategy.

Double gas dependence

The Strategy includes the option of buying a share in gas power projects in neighbouring countries to avoid the cost and time delay of building a gas import pipeline to Kosovo. It assumes two plants, with Kosovo’s participation costing EUR 100 million each. According to the Strategy’s annex, Kosovo would buy gas via long-term power purchase agreements.

While these plans do indeed sound modest compared to the megalomaniac proposals from a recent EU-funded Kosovo gasification study, they still risk distracting Kosovo with high-cost and unreliable fossil fuel projects, instead of concentrating on decarbonisation and energy savings.

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has once again underlined that increasing reliance on imported fuels — especially from corrupt and authoritarian regimes like Azerbaijan’s — makes no sense. But an arrangement to build plants jointly with neighbouring countries brings additional dependence, as it relies on that country’s competence in permitting, financing, building and operating the plant – which can’t be taken for granted.

The mention of power purchase agreements also rings alarm bells, as it was exactly such an arrangement that ultimately caused the demise of the Kosova e Re coal power plant project. There is a very high risk that such an agreement would be illegal under Energy Community state aid rules, and that it would lock Kosovo into buying power that it could have got cheaper from somewhere else.

The upcoming National Energy and Climate Plan can address these issues

Kosovo deserves recognition for updating its energy policy goals, as its peers Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia have yet to do so. Still, outstanding issues such as the coal phase-out and gas plans, as well as a lack of clarity about district heating investments, need to be addressed.

Luckily, there is another opportunity for this, as by June this year, Kosovo – like other Energy Community countries – has to submit a National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) to the Energy Community Secretariat, detailing how it will meet its 2030 greenhouse gas reduction, energy savings and renewable energy targets. There is no time to lose in moving forward with no-regret actions such as adopting a new renewable energy law, but the NECP represents a second chance to tackle the remaining issues.

EBRD funds channelled to Kremlin affiliates: Why the purchase of Tbilisi metro cars from a Russian company should not proceed as planned

Links with the Kremlin and Russia’s defence industry

Metrowagonmash is part of Transmashholding, whose shareholders Russian oligarchs Iskander Makhmudov and Andrey Bokarev – are closely linked with the Kremlin and its defence industry. In 2015, Bokarev and Makhmudov became two of the largest government contractors in Russia. Until 2017, they, along with Russia’s current deputy defence minister Alexei Krivoruchko, also held shares in JSC Kalashnikov Concern, which manufactures around 95 per cent of Russia’s guns.

After leaving Kalashnikov, the partners continued to provide engines for Russian warships through Metrowagonmash’s sister company, as evidenced in the company’s 2018 and 2019 annual reports. In 2021, Transmashholding tried to expand its capabilities in motor production by acquiring Bergen Engines from Rolls-Royce. Citing security risks, the sale was blocked by the government of Norway. In a statement issued on 23 March 2021, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security of Norway said: ‘The engines they [Bergen Engines] produce would have had great military strategic importance for Russia, and it would have strengthened Russia’s military capabilities in a way that would clearly be at odds with Norwegian and allied security policy interests.’

Notably, Andrey Bokarev was among the billionaires and tycoons that met Russian president Vladimir Putin on the day Russia attacked Ukraine. After the invasion, both Makhmudov and Bokarev were sanctioned by Ukraine, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

The unexplained backtracking of the EBRD and Tbilisi City Hall

The Tbilisi Metro Project, which is co-financed by the Green Climate Fund, received finances from the EBRD in 2020 and the Russian supplier was selected in a two-tier tender in 2021. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed the context and stalled the official procurement procedures with Metrowagonmash.

In March 2022, the EBRD suspended a transfer to the Russian company due to the risk of sanctions. In November 2022, the mayor of Tbilisi announced that the municipality and the EBRD had decided to terminate the contract and were in contact with alternative suppliers. Yet in February 2023, a Tbilisi City Hall representative said that Metrowagonmash would remain on as the supplier, as it provided the most affordable tender proposal. The mayor of Tbilisi also stressed that he was forced to keep the existing agreement to avoid the imposition of fines and financial sanctions on the state – although it is not clear who would impose these. The company has agreed to supply 44 wagons (11 sets) at a cost of EUR 49.2 million. According to City Hall, the original agreement was renegotiated with an added provision that payment to the company will only go ahead once the metro cars are received.

We urge the Bank to terminate the contract with Metrowagonmash and find an alternative supplier for the project.

Despite our multiple attempts to obtain more information, the EBRD has not yet responded to our queries about the project.

Bankwatch and Green Alternative call on the EBRD to clarify:

why it reversed its decision to suspend payment to Metrowagonmash;
why it stands behind its decision to retain Metrowagonmash, whose sister company supplies engines to Russia’s Ministry of Defence and whose parent company’s shareholders are sanctioned by the UK, as a supplier for the project;
whether it has assessed the risks associated with the project’s main supplier and with the supply chain in accordance with EBRD’s Environmental and Social Policy;

whether it has fully considered the direct or indirect involvement of the main supplier in the armed conflict through its activities and connections and, furthermore, how this might increase environmental, social and human rights risks;
whether it is aware of any financial losses, sanctions or fines likely to be imposed on Tbilisi City Hall if the contract is to be terminated and by whom.

Let us not forget that in April 2022, the EBRD Board of Governors decided to deny the Russian Federation access to the Bank’s resources with immediate effect. In addition, the Bank noted that it ‘avails itself of all rights to suspend or cancel further disbursements of funding on existing projects’.

The EBRD prides itself on the support it provides to Ukraine amid the war. But actions that might enrich Russia’s wartime coffers undermine and taint this effort. They also cast doubt on the EBRD’s commitment to Ukraine and call into question the future status of ongoing projects with Russian suppliers.

Providing metro cars to Tbilisi should not present a moral dilemma either for Tbilisi residents or for European taxpayers.

How renewable energy could reinvigorate Romania’s slumbering district heating sector

The inefficiency of the old district heating systems raises a different set of concerns among different stakeholders. For residents, it’s the lack of heat and hot water, caused by frequent system breakdowns, not to mention the ever-increasing bills. The inhabitants of cities with heating systems such as Bucharest, Timișoara, Craiova etc. frequently run out of hot water and heat. For us environmental activists, it’s the increase in CO2 emissions and other pollutants, despite district heating being less polluting than individual heating units taken together. And for debt-laden municipalities unlucky enough to administer a coal or gas-based thermal power plant, it’s the high prices of CO2 emission allowances and the losses they have to cover with money from the public budget. But a range of modern technologies based on renewable energy, already proven throughout Europe, could breathe new life into Romania’s district heating systems.

Over the past 30 years, the number of district heating systems in Romania has been decreasing. According to Challenges and opportunities for the centralised thermal energy supply system in Romania, back in 1996 and 1997, 308 Romanian communities were connected to district heating networks. By 2021, this number had fallen to 50.

This decline can be linked to inefficiency due to the hot water losses in the heat transportation grid, which it is itself the result of a lack of modernisation of these systems; economic problems associated with the non-payment of bills by some consumers; and frequent breakdowns resulting from, in most cases, technologically outdated facilities.

The Romanian governments decided, during the past three decades, to allocate funds to ensure the continued operation of district heating systems. Only recently, a sum of RON 41.3 million (EUR 8.39 million) was earmarked for 2020 and RON 310.4 million (EUR 63.09 million) for 2021.

Evolution of the number of homes connected to district heating systems

	Year
Region	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
North-East Region	90,078	81,073	78,261	72,246	69,061
South-East Region	121,393	105,005	99,079	90,105	77,213
South Region	82,248	79,703	79,220	78,185	76,837
South-West Region	123,147	119,726	119,018	116,990	113,271
West Region	96,740	95,577	94,087	89,085	78,231
North-West Region	95,527	94,128	93,272	94,172	93,266
Central Region	12,279	11,271	16,326	15,932	15,591
Bucharest/Ilfov Region	562,027	561,213	561,058	559,861	558,738
Country	1,183,439	1,147,696	1,140,321	1,116,576	1,082,208

Source: National Authority for Energy Reglementation (ANRE), Raport privind starea serviciului public de alimentare cu energie termică în sistem centralizat pentru anul 2021

The disappearance of the district heating systems combined with the increasingly low quality of existing heating services has led to the mass disconnection of households from this district heating source. Many people have been forced to find quick solutions based on what they can afford and without necessarily weighing up the pros and cons of their choices. While some have switched to individual heating fuelled by wood-fired boilers, unfortunately most have opted for fossil-gas boilers.

Bucharest, Romania’s most crowded city, has the largest number of active district heating systems. However, they are not available in all areas, and the resulting differences in air quality are evident. For instance, Bucharest’s Sector 1, where a significant number of properties and buildings are not connected to a district heating system, has recorded three times more carbon monoxide pollution than Sector 3 has.

Modern and efficient heating systems, especially those that rely on renewable energy sources (geothermal systems, photovoltaic panels, solar panels, heat pumps, etc.) come with many benefits. Unlike individual heating systems, those supplied by clean energy sources run more efficiently, reduce pollution, maintain a secure supply and help cut down on total costs.

Yet, so far, Beiuş is the only city in Romania heated exclusively by geothermal sources. Since 1998, a nearby thermal plant has been providing geothermal water extracted from depths of 2,500 to 3,000 metres. This district system distributes a thermal agent for heating as well as hot water for consumption, supplying 103 apartments in condominiums, schools, kindergartens, churches and public institutions.

Indeed, there is a vast, untapped potential for sustainable district heating throughout the country. The town of Motru is one promising example. According to a November 2022 study commissioned by Bankwatch Romania, a lignite-fired plant that has been feeding the local district heating system could be replaced by heat pumps powered by solar panels. Of all the scenarios examined, heating based on renewable sources proved the most sustainable.

In Bucharest’s City Hall, studies on the feasibility of installing heat pumps that would serve homes connected to the district system in the north of the city are being discussed.

Last year, in 2022, the local council of Sector 1 advanced a ‘heating from the sun’ solution, which would see solar panels and heat pumps installed in blocks where heating services are not up to scratch. Although the formal proposal by the mayor of Sector 1 was not adopted, the administration of Sector 3 subsequently announced their intention to launch a similar initiative.

Bucharest City Hall is responsible for heating the city of Bucharest. As such, it should consider the use of renewables like solar, geothermal and wind energy as realistic options, and should initiate feasibility studies to find the best sustainable solutions. The continuous development of the municipality and the increasing distance of consumers from sources of production can only result in further technological heat losses. Priority must be given to the diversification, improvement and augmentation of renewable thermal energy production. How efficiently these goals are met will depend on the rehabilitation and modernisation of the heating grid.

Overall, Romania still has a decent number of functioning district heating systems. But it is very important that these systems not only remain functional, but also switch to production from renewable energy sources.

Feasibility studies for the modernisation of district heating systems should also be encouraged in order to determine the most sustainable option, whether it be heat recovery from industrial systems, photovoltaic panels, heat pumps, geothermal sources or wastewater heat.

Responsibility also falls on international financial institutions that finance these district heating projects to invest in renewables to the highest extent possible. Even with a minimum 20 per cent output, a district heating system will supply hundreds of thousands of inhabitants while delivering positive benefits for the environment and people’s health.

Successful renewables acceleration needs more public participation, not less

2022 was a record year in both the solar and wind sectors in the EU, with fifteen gigawatts of new wind capacity installed – a third more than 2021. Solar fared even better, with 41.4 gigawatts installed – no less than a 47 per cent increase compared to the previous year.

These successes show that the EU is capable of ramping up renewables installation, but continuous efforts are clearly needed to overcome its fossil fuel addiction and achieve sustainable decarbonisation.

In addition, the increases are patchy. In the not-overly-sunny Netherlands, solar generation grew by 51 per cent in 2022 alone, making up 14 per cent of electricity generation. Meanwhile in Croatia, it languished at 0.43 per cent.

There are many reasons why solar and wind deployment is not going fast enough in some countries. Obstructive spatial rules are still a problem for wind power in Poland and Hungary. Many countries lack enough administrative staff for permitting procedures, and support schemes have not always been consistent, resulting in stop-start development. Failure to adequately consult the public about project plans also results in resistance and lengthy court battles in some cases.

Using a sledgehammer to crack a nut

Pushed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine to speed up renewables deployment, in May 2022 the European Commission put forward its REPowerEU package, which included controversial changes to the Renewable Energy Directive.

But Directives take time, so, using a fast-track procedure that bypasses the European Parliament, on 22 December, the Council adopted Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 to speed up renewables permitting.

The Regulation includes useful provisions to speed up small-scale solar and heat pump deployment, but these are seriously undermined by gratuitous clauses which breach EU environmental legislation and circumvent public consultation requirements.

For example, if Member States have defined specific renewable energy zones, individual renewable energy projects – even highly damaging ones such as hydropower and forest biomass plants – can move forward without undertaking project-level environmental impact assessments, as long as a more general ‘strategic environmental assessment’ has been undertaken.

This clashes with the EU’s existing rules on environmental impact assessment and means that the public won’t have to be consulted about individual projects in renewable energy zones, which is both illegal and counterproductive.

Not only EU law, but also the Aarhus Convention guarantees the right for the public to participate in decision-making on projects that may have significant environmental impacts. A strategic environmental assessment can in no way be a substitute for a project-level assessment, as it contains much less detail.

This won’t end well. EU law is already flexible enough to ensure that projects with low impacts do not undergo an environmental impact assessment. So this change will benefit projects with more serious impacts.

Our experience shows that there is nothing more guaranteed to irk people than the feeling that decisions are being taken behind their backs – a fact likely to increase legal challenges against renewable projects, rather than speeding them up.

Environmental safeguards and public participation must be improved, not bypassed

The Regulation leaves a lot of flexibility to Member States in how and whether to apply certain parts of it. The sections on small-scale solar and heat pumps are a must, but other sections are not necessarily. We have therefore produced a position paper providing our views on how the Regulation should be implemented.

Member States must not weaken their environmental standards. Even before the Regulation was adopted, environmental safeguards were not properly applied in many countries and need to be improved, not further eroded.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU specifically states that EU environmental law does not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures, as long as they are compatible with the EU treaties. So governments surely cannot be penalised for merely upholding existing EU environmental law.

At the same time, unnecessary delays caused by political obstruction, lack of administrative capacity or having to submit documentation on paper, instead of electronically, urgently need to be tackled – issues which the Regulation does not address.

The biodiversity and climate crises must be tackled together

A balance must be struck between speeding up sustainable forms of renewable energy, applying EU environmental law and preventing legal uncertainty.

Increasing the share of renewable energy cannot come at the cost of action to protect our increasingly beleaguered nature, otherwise we have achieved nothing. Biodiversity is not an optional extra, we need it for everything: for clean water, food, oxygen and climate regulation, medicines and much more besides.

Using renewable energy can help us to protect nature, but only if done thoughtfully. We have to use low-impact technologies and locations, carry out appropriate environmental assessments and properly include the public in decision-making if we want to make a success of the sustainable energy transition.

Read more: Our position paper can be found here

Illiberalism alert: draft law to shut down civil society awaits vote in the Romanian senate

I’m writing this text as I return from a meeting of lawyers specialised in environmental law from across central and eastern Europe. The irony! While countries like Bulgaria are preparing a dedicated climate law, with vibrant participation from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and in the Czech Republic civil society won a court case against their government for not having ambitious enough climate change mitigation targets, in Romania politicians can’t think of enough ways to restrict NGOs’ rights to justice and even free association.

The draft law submitted at the end of November 2022, ironically initiated by a group of members of parliament from of the liberal party, aims to amend the law on the functioning of associations and foundations and would add restrictive conditions to NGOs’ otherwise legal right to challenge an administrative act in court (for example, environmental or construction permits) by:

Introducing the financial liability of the members of the board of directors for any damage caused to third parties if the action is rejected by a final court decision. It is worth noting that there is no individual liability of a representative of the public administration, for example, in the case of a final decision that finds an administrative act illegal.
New conditions are introduced for an organisation to be ‘entitled’ to challenge an administrative act in court: the organisation must be at least two years old, it must prove that ‘the association has actively pursued the goals mentioned in the statute that are related to the contested administrative act’ and it must put forward a deposit (like a guarantee) of one per cent of the investment value (maximum RON 50 000 / EUR 10 000).
The draft law also suggests prohibiting a person from being a member of the board of directors of an organisation if in the last five years they were a member of the board of an association that was dissolved by court decision.
The draft law proposes that these measures have a retroactive effect, in the sense that they also apply to pending cases in court.

The proposed changes cover any court action that organisations take, including bringing authorities to court for breaches of the law, such as failing to comply with regulations on transparency and public participation.

The proposal raised serious concerns with the Economic and Social Committee and the Superior Council of Magistracy, neither of which gave a favourable recommendation for adoption.

However, this hasn’t stopped the members of the senate from introducing even further amendments that, if adopted, would mean nothing else than the dissolution of hundreds if not thousands of NGOs. Concretely, the project initiator perfected his assault on civil society by introducing an amendment (number 7 on the list) by which the organisations which receive funding through the ‘3.5 per cent income tax mechanism’ must disclose the names of the individual private donors, under the sanction of dissolution. This sponsorship mechanism allows any employee to choose where to direct 3.5 per cent of their 16 per cent tax on income every year. If they don’t choose, the state takes it anyway and distributes it totally non-transparently to the church, the army or some unknown NGOs of public utility. The problem is, the receiving beneficiary (i.e. the NGO who was chosen as recipient of the funds from this 3.5 per cent tax) has no control over the source of money, as the fiscal authorities transfer the funds from the state budget to the NGO’s account, providing only the town where the individual donor was based. So, in practice, meeting this requirement alone would be impossible and hence reason to dissolve an organisation.

The proposed changes are a clear attempt to weaken the ability of civil society to exercise its mission to protect the public interest and are closer in line with totalitarian regimes than with European democracy and the rule of law.

When the draft law was first submitted to the parliament, 160 organisations and groups of citizens wrote to the initiators of this law and requested that they withdraw their signatures from this document. To no avail.

Today the law was up for a vote in the plenary of the senate (the first chamber of the parliament), but they voted for the proposal to be sent back to the committee dealing with judicial matters for further analysis. It will feature on the plenary’s agenda again in a week. Once the law passes the Senate, it will go for further debate and a final vote in the second chamber. This can last as little as a month. During this time, the ombudsman, the president or any political party can (and should) bring this law to the Constitutional Court and challenge its flagrant breaches of constitutional principles.

Attempts to intimidate civil society are not new, neither in the region nor in Romania, although Romania’s parliament is displaying an energetic escalation in such efforts as of late. From the not-so-veiled accusations that environmental NGOs are to blame for the increased price of electricity and gas in late 2021, to blunt attempts to dissolve them altogether, many politicians appear determined to do whatever it takes to clamp down any form of public scrutiny. But this is only making us more united and more determined to fight any threat to a clean environment and a sustainable future.

EBRD: Everything is peachy, just trust us!

In January, Bankwatch published a blog post about the North Macedonia Regional Gasification Project, which involves building a major new fossil gas import pipeline from Greece. We also sent comments on the environmental studies for the project published by the EBRD, seeking a justification for the substantial expansion of fossil gas consumption for a country that has, fortunately, so far not been heavily dependent on large imports of gas – unlike many central European countries.

The EBRD was quite swift in its response (see document). They are very confident, stating that ‘expectations are that gasification will lead to significant reductions in air pollution, and GHG emissions, by enabling the switch to cleaner fuels in populated industrial areas of the country‘ and ‘[c]arbon lock-in risks have also been assessed from technical, economic and institutional perspectives. Overall, our conclusion is that these gas investments are unlikely to displace low carbon alternatives or to prevent or delay the introduction of renewable energy or low carbon solutions.’

However, none of these claims were substantiated by any figures or verifiable data.

Following this letter, this week we had a meeting with EBRD representatives, in which they reassured us that a more detailed justification would be disclosed in the Board Report that is available for the project after its approval by the Bank (however, only for public sector projects like this one).

Those familiar with the Aarhus Convention (which the EBRD refers to in its Access to Information Policy) know that environmental information should be disclosed before a decision is made, not after it, so the public has a chance to engage in meaningful dialogue.

But is the EBRD disclosing such information? We have looked at how the Bank handled the disclosure in a previous similar case.

In 2020, the EBRD approved an EUR 80 million loan for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) in Cyprus. Still, in the Board Report they redacted nearly all environmental information. The only such information that remains is the project’s direct CO2 emissions, which are expected to be 15 to 20 kilotonnes of CO2. This emissions estimate does not include emissions produced by actually burning the gas, just those created by running the plant as well as by gas leakages. The rest consists of general statements about the climate and other benefits of the project. But for the public, there is no way to verify this, as they have not disclosed their baseline data, targets or deadlines.

Extract from the EBRD’s Cyprus LNG FSRU Board Report

This is a ‘smart’ way for the EBRD to avoid accountability and make sure that it can continue to promote its Paris ‘alignment’ while actually financing fossil fuels, without anyone outside the bank being able to verify or monitor the actual implications of its investments.

Bankwatch has already approached the EBRD to request data and information that would substantiate its bold claims. If it comes up with something, we will be happy to share it – most importantly with the public in North Macedonia, as they will be the ones paying for this project in the end.