Blog entry

Serbia’s district heating utilities approaching breaking point due to gas import dependence

Serbia’s warning sign

Rather than racing ahead with costly new commitments, however, the region’s governments should look closely at Serbia’s district heating sector, which is approaching breaking point due to its reliance on imported gas.

This increasingly chronic problem is the clearest example in the region so far of the risks associated with gas-dependent heating systems. Today, gas accounts for around 78% of fuel used in Serbia’s district heating sector, with around 90% of supplies imported. This has resulted in financial instability for heating companies, often driven by sharp fluctuations in international gas markets rather than domestic energy policy.

Financial exposure revealed

Even with significant overemployment in the sector – estimated at around 15% of total costs, with staffing levels far exceeding operational needs – fuel costs dominate. In 2024, the latest year for which data is available, fuel costs accounted for 60.5% of total district heating expenditure, leaving utilities highly exposed to fluctuations in imported gas prices.

The consequences for the sector’s financial performance are devastating. In 2024, Serbian district heating companies recorded combined losses of EUR 22.3 million, while liquidity shortages reached EUR 189 million. In practical terms, nearly EUR 200 million in working capital is missing from the system.

And the trend is worsening. Financial data shows that Serbia’s district heating sector has experienced a steady decline in performance over the past eight years. In 2024, out of Serbia’s 51 district heating utilities, 27 operated at a loss, while 24 reported positive financial results. Compared to 2023, total losses almost tripled, while 15 utilities have accumulated losses exceeding the value of their capital.

One of Serbia’s last coal-fired district heating plants, in Kragujevac, was replaced by a gas installation in October 2022, with financing from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Just two years later, Kragujevac recorded the largest financial loss of any district heating utility in Serbia, amounting to EUR 10.3 million in 2024.

This highlights the financial risks of new investment in imported fossil gas, where optimistic feasibility assumptions carry a high risk of leaving utilities with losses and long-term debt. These developments should raise concerns across the Western Balkans, where the push for new gas infrastructure continues.

Regional policy risks

Montenegro is still pursuing a government-to-government (G2G) initiative on infrastructure, including plans for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Bar and three associated gas plants. Albania is also progressing with a planned LNG terminal and at least one power plant.

Serbia is expanding its domestic gas network and planning new interconnectors, with new gas plants foreseen in Niš and Novi Sad, while North Macedonia is building a new gas interconnector with Greece and planning additional gas-fired generation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also advancing the Southern Gas Interconnection with Croatia, whose planned capacity would be six times higher than current gas demand. The project relies on outdated demand and cost assumptions, increasing the risk of stranded assets and underutilised infrastructure.

However, new pipelines and gas plants do not eliminate dependence – they create it. Unlike renewable energy sources, almost all gas consumed in the Western Balkans must be purchased on external markets, exposing consumers, public budgets and utilities to price volatility and supply disruptions. This is particularly relevant for Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo, which are currently almost entirely gas-free, as they are not connected to international gas transmission networks.

Even for the three Western Balkan countries that do have gas import infrastructure – Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – the central energy security question is not how to safeguard additional gas supplies, but how to reduce the need for imported gas.

Alternatives and resilience

Serbian experts and heating utilities recently addressed this pressing issue at a panel discussion that deserves close attention across the region. They argue that investments in geothermal energy, solar thermal systems, heat pumps, energy efficiency and seasonal heat storage offer a more sustainable model – one based on domestic resources, lower exposure to global commodity markets and greater resilience to price shocks.

At a time when Europe is moving towards electrification and reducing fossil fuel consumption, Western Balkan countries face a stark choice: continue investing heavily in infrastructure that deepens dependence on imported gas, or prioritise renewable-based technologies that strengthen energy security and reduce long-term economic vulnerability. The financial condition of Serbia’s district heating sector suggests that the cost of choosing the first option is extremely high – and likely to result in a dead end.

Spending without substance: Czech flagship industry programme fails to track climate impact

With more than CZK 81 billion (EUR 3.3 billion) at its disposal, the Operational Programme Technologies and Applications for Competitiveness (OP TAC) is designed to help companies innovate, strengthen their technological capacity and reduce their energy intensity. In practice, however, the OP TAC’s evaluation framework remains heavily skewed towards monitoring the pace of spending rather than assessing whether the money is actually delivering meaningful results. Without rigorous, transparent monitoring of outcomes, it’s impossible to determine whether the billions in public funding are serving their intended purpose.

Why OP TAC matters in the Czech context

OP TAC is part of a broader ecosystem of national level programmes through which the Czech Republic channels EU cohesion policy funding. These operational programmes cover a wide range of areas, including the environment, transport, employment, research and regional development.

The programme stands out not because its design is unique, but because it plays a central role in supporting the competitiveness and decarbonisation of Czech industry. It’s also one of the largest programmes in terms of budget and among the most significant for the country’s long-term energy transition.

The Centre for Transport and Energy, a Czech-based Bankwatch member group, focuses closely on OP TAC because we have a direct seat at the table. Through our membership in the programme’s monitoring committee – the only seat reserved for civil society among its 42 members – we have gained a unique, first-hand insight into how the programme is being implemented, what information is being shared and where the gaps lie. This insider perspective allows us to monitor the programme’s functioning in a way that wouldn’t be possible in operational programmes where civil society has no representation.

Chasing spending targets, ignoring real-world impact

Throughout the work of the monitoring committee, the same issue resurfaces: the programme’s actual impact is impossible to assess. Discussions tend to revolve around financial absorption, the number of calls launched, the volume of applications submitted and the amount of funding approved. Meanwhile, outcome and performance indicators – the metrics that show whether the programme is achieving its goals – receive only marginal attention.

This imbalance was once again evident at the committee’s most recent meeting in March 2026. Despite managing billions intended to support innovation, energy savings and circular economy measures, the programme’s real-world impacts remain largely secondary in the monitoring process.

Yet the European Commission is clear: EU Member States must not only report on how quickly they spend EU funds, but also systematically monitor indicators and regularly assess the programme’s concrete results and achievements. Financial performance alone is not enough.

Environmental indicators must not be sidelined

Within the monitoring committee, the Centre for Transport and Energy has consistently argued that environmental indicators must be treated as a core part of programme evaluation. These include:

energy savings;

greenhouse gas emission reductions;

renewable energy deployment; and

circular economy outcomes.

We have repeatedly called for these indicators to be systematically included in the materials prepared for the committee, accompanied by short explanations of key trends and developments. So far, however, these proposals have been rejected, often on the grounds that there is ‘insufficient interest’ among committee members in receiving such information.

This is particularly concerning given that the European Commission itself explicitly highlighted the need to strengthen the use of indicators within monitoring committees. The reluctance to integrate environmental data into regular reporting undermines the committee’s ability to fulfil its oversight role.

Buried data, blind oversight

What makes the situation even more problematic is that the data is already available. Internal documents prepared by the Ministry of Industry and Trade include indicators on energy savings, greenhouse gas emissions, renewable energy capacity and the volume of waste used as secondary raw material, along with corresponding targets and commitments.

However, this information appears only occasionally, often as supplementary material and only upon request. It’s not integrated into the regular monitoring cycle, nor is it presented in a way that allows committee members to evaluate progress or identify shortcomings. For a programme of this scale and importance, such an approach is inadequate.

Closing the accountability gap

The operational programme manages more than CZK 81 billion intended to support innovation, energy efficiency and circular economy projects. Without systematic monitoring of indicators, it’s impossible to determine whether these funds are delivering the intended outcomes. The monitoring committee, whose role is to oversee the programme’s implementation, cannot act as a guarantor of accountable public spending if it lacks access to the data needed to evaluate performance.

If the programme is to be evaluated credibly, it’s not enough to track how many billions have been allocated or disbursed. What matters is whether the programme is delivering tangible results and measurable impacts. This evidence based assessment should be one of the committee’s core responsibilities – one it has so far been unable to fully discharge.

Strengthening the monitoring of indicators is not a bureaucratic exercise. It’s essential for ensuring that public money is spent effectively, that environmental goals are met and that the Czech Republic’s industrial transformation is grounded in real progress rather than optimistic assumptions. As long as indicators remain sidelined, the programme will continue to operate in an accountability vacuum, and the opportunity to steer the programme towards meaningful impact may be lost.

A new chapter for the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism?

For years, civil society organisations have warned that the current policy falls short of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and international best practice. The hard truth is that the mechanism has failed to deliver. It has simply been unable to achieve its mission independently, efficiently, or in a meaningful way for the very people it is supposed to protect.

Yet people continue to turn to the EIB-CM to raise concerns about EIB-financed projects. According to the EIB-CM’s 2025 annual report, 21 admissible complaints were registered that year. Despite deploying approximately 90% of its financing within the EU, 88% of these complaints came from outside the EU. The vast majority of these complaints were submitted by individuals seeking redress for the negative impacts of projects on housing and land, living conditions and livelihoods (mostly related to resettlement), as well as inadequate stakeholder engagement.

While we welcome the EIB’s recent consultative efforts and have actively taken part, consultation alone isn’t enough. Together with a coalition of partner organisations, we’ve put forward a number of recommendations to improve the mechanism. If the EIB Group wants to uphold its reputation for sustainability and accountability, it needs to turn these recommendations into reality.

When accountability fails

Our experience shows that numerous complaints from local communities and civil society organisations have not been adequately addressed, while the institutional response to EIB-CM findings has frequently been insufficient, resulting in ongoing harm to affected communities.

One notable example is the expansion of Budapest’s Liszt Ferenc International Airport, which the EIB agreed to finance in 2018. The project aims to increase passenger traffic by 50% over eight years. Residents living near the airport, supported by Friends of the Earth Hungary (MTVSZ), filed a complaint alleging inadequate public consultation and raising concerns about the project’s environmental impacts, including its contribution to climate change, increased air and noise pollution, and wider social impacts on affected communities.

In 2021, the EIB-CM concluded that the project failed to comply with both EU environmental legislation and the EIB’s own environmental and social standards, issuing a series of recommendations. Yet these recommendations have still not been fully implemented, despite the Bank being required to do so within 24 months of the conclusions report.

Another example concerns the construction of the Corridor Vc motorway south of Mostar in Bosna and Herzegovina, financed jointly by the EIB and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). In 2017, affected residents filed a complaint about the project’s environmental and social impacts. The EIB-CM initially concluded in 2019 that there were no instances of maladministration.

The complainants subsequently submitted an updated complaint to the EIB-CM and, shortly after, with the EBRD’s Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM). In autumn 2021, the EIB-CM again found no shortcomings in the route selection process or public consultations.

However, in early 2024, the IPAM reached the opposite conclusion, finding that the route selection process had not complied with the EBRD’s Environmental and Social Policy. It recommended a new alternative alignment analysis along with a proper environmental and social impact assessment. Regrettably, many of the underlying issues, including the flawed route selection, remain unresolved. As a result, several new complaints have already been submitted to the IPAM in 2026.

Promising reforms

The draft Complaints Mechanism Policy contains several welcome improvements and addresses some long-standing expectations regarding the EIB-CM’s independence. In particular, we welcome the explicit recognition that the EIB-CM has a mandate to ‘facilitate access to remedy to address the negative environmental and/or social impacts of EIBG Projects’. However, the review should go much further. The revised policy must strengthen the EIB-CM’s independence from the Bank’s operational services, increase its capacity to facilitate effective remedy, and improve transparency and predictability.

Closing the gaps

First, although the draft policy designates the Head of the EIB-CM as the guarantor of the EIB-CM’s independence, it contains no meaningful safeguards governing how the Head or staff are appointed, assessed or protected from conflicts of interest. In this context, introducing clear rules on recruitment, post-employment restrictions, and conflicts of interest would align the EIB Group with international good practice and the policy provisions of peer accountability mechanisms at other multilateral development banks.

Second, the EIB-CM’s standing within the EIB’s unique governance structure should be strengthened. The draft policy should clearly define the responsibilities of both the Management Committee and the Board of Directors in ensuring that the EIB Group fulfils its remedy mandate. The Board approves loans under the condition that they comply, or will comply before signature, with the EIB Group’s Environmental and Social Policy.

Yet, despite serving as the institution’s ultimate decision-making body and legally accountable for the projects it approves, the Board currently has no role in authorising development of corrective actions where the EIB-CM finds non-compliance and management disagrees to develop corrective actions. The policy should therefore allow the EIB-CM to refer such cases to the Board for a final decision.

Third, complainants should be consulted much earlier in the process and not be omitted from discussions between the EIB and its clients when corrective actions are being developed. The views of complainants are central to designing measures that reflect realities on the ground and effectively address verified harm. Transparency should also be a guiding principle throughout the process. Complainants should receive the final compliance conclusions report before corrective measures are developed, enabling them to prepare and engage in consultations.

Finally, the EIB-CM’s institutional learning function should not be overlooked. One of its most important roles is to translate case-specific findings and dispute resolution experience into lessons that improve the EIB’s policies, project due diligence, and lending conditions. In line with the EIB Group Evaluation Policy, the Board of Directors should be required to consider the EIB-CM’s reports systematically, use their findings to inform decision-making, and hold the EIB Group accountable for implementing the recommendations.

Building renovation in Latvia will cost EUR 32 billion: Impossible target or unavoidable necessity?

The national building renovation plans must outline how the requirements set out in the revised Energy Performance of Buildings Directive, adopted in 2024, will be achieved. But progress has been slow. So far, only 15 Member States have submitted their plans, with infringement procedures initiated against the remaining countries, including Latvia. The first draft of Latvia’s national building renovation plan has been shared with stakeholders and is expected to be submitted to the Commission shortly. The plan outlines a trajectory for renovating residential and non-residential buildings in order to fully decarbonise the building sector and contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

Although the plan is still in its initial, semi-completed stage, it lays out a potential scenario for the number of buildings that will need to be renovated each year until 2050. It also estimates the amount of public and private funding required to achieve this objective.

Massive investment at stake

The estimated investment required to meet the renovation targets for Latvia’s building stock by 2050 stands at a staggering EUR 32.33 billion. This is an enormous sum for a country whose annual GDP is approximately EUR 43 billion – a figure set to rise even further when taking inflation into account. To date, only around 4% of apartment buildings in Latvia have been renovated, despite at least 26,600 buildings requiring renovation. At this current pace, it would take around 150 years to fully decarbonise Latvia’s building stock.

The goals set at the EU level are clearly ambitious. This is true not just in monetary terms, but also logistically. According to Latvia’s draft plan, a severe shortage of construction labour is expected as the country attempts to renovate 98,000 residential buildings and 39,000 non-residential buildings within the remaining 24 years. Unsurprisingly, discussions are taking place regarding the utility of creating a plan with such targets when it remains completely unclear how they can actually be achieved.

Mobilising on all fronts

Given the existential nature of the climate crisis, Latvia’s building renovation plan must align with the 2050 climate-neutrality goal. However, achieving this requires a massive mobilisation of collective effort.

While many procedural improvements can be made at the national level to speed up delivery, a dedicated EU-level financing programme for building renovation is also vital. Such a programme should pool funds from various sources – including joint loans and revenues from polluting activities – given the extreme difficulty of mobilising such vast sums through the national budget alone.

A short-sighted response to the implementation of these seemingly unrealistic goals would be to argue for lower EU renovation targets. Building renovation serves a range of critical purposes beyond reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It extends the technical viability of buildings, improves the safety of residents, reduces dependence on imported fossil fuels, strengthens local economies and lowers vulnerability to global energy shocks. Renovation is also essential for adapting buildings to increasingly frequent extreme weather conditions linked to climate change, including heatwaves and severe storms.

Crucially, renovating the extensive building stock built in Latvia during the Soviet era – where economically justifiable – is a massive ask, regardless of the 2050 climate-neutrality goal. Multi-apartment residential buildings constructed during the Soviet occupation account for 72.2% of the total floor area for this type of housing. Some of these buildings have already reached the end of their service life. Without renovation, a housing crisis is inevitable.

Redefining the economic picture

Building renovation planning should also be considered in the broader context of reliance on imported fossil fuels. Policymakers must account for both the costs of this dependence and the economic benefits of reducing these imports. In 2025, the EU spent approximately EUR 396 billion on fossil fuel imports, equivalent to around EUR 880 per capita.

By comparison, the European Commission estimates that the transition to a clean energy system will require EUR 660 billion in public and private funding annually by 2030. Evidently, the bulk of the investment required to shift to clean energy by 2030 will be close to the amount currently spent each year on imported fossil fuels.

Unlike spending on imports, however, energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies represent a permanent investment in the local economy. According to the International Energy Agency, the EU saved EUR 51.4 billion in 2025 alone simply by reducing fossil fuel imports.

These indirect benefits should be estimated and projected in monetary terms at a national level to understand the true, long-term economic picture and prioritise building renovation accordingly.

A shift in public sentiment

To add some positive news, the historically sceptical public attitude to apartment building renovations in Latvia is changing course, as demonstrated by the overwhelming demand for support under a recent EU-funded programme launched by the Ministry of Economics. Following the scheme’s launch in April 2025, the entire available budget of EUR 173 million was reserved within a record six weeks, with the rapid uptake partly driven by simplified administrative procedures.

The programme received 413 applications, of which 387 remain active. However, the existing budget is only enough to cover roughly 100 projects. To fund all the eligible renovation projects, including those currently on the reserve list, an additional EUR 290 million is urgently needed. To this end, the Ministry is now scrambling to secure extra funds, exploring options such as reducing the intensity of financial support to extend assistance to a larger number of buildings, and a potential EUR 100 million international financing loan, which would allow state agency Altum to provide financing.

Given these frantic efforts, however, and the overall lack of coordination at government level, building renovation clearly has yet to receive the urgent political attention and prioritisation it so desperately requires.

The Trump peace pipelines framework: a renewed threat to Western Balkan decarbonisation

Most Western Balkan countries are known for their heavy coal use and slow decarbonisation, but the region has at least one advantage compared to its EU neighbours: low or no gas dependence.

In 2024, fossil gas still made up 20.6% of the EU’s gross available energy. But in the Western Balkans, most gas-dependent countries are Serbia (14.3%) and North Macedonia (11.6%). In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), gas makes up less than 3% of energy, with Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo not connected to international gas infrastructure. This is a strength to capitalise on, not a disadvantage to be remedied.

The United States has for years lobbied southeast European governments to build new import infrastructure like the Greece to North Macedonia interconnector, LNG terminals in Montenegro and Albania and the southern gas interconnection between Croatia and BiH. And for a long time, EU policy encouraged them, promoting gasification even in the gas-free countries.

But as the EU gradually moves away from promoting gas, US policy has doubled down on it. Fossil gas projects are no longer eligible for priority status under the Energy Community Treaty or for EU funding in the region, but overt US pressure on the Western Balkan governments to build new gas pipelines has ramped up during Trump’s second mandate.

At the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Dubrovnik in April, all eyes were on the inter-governmental agreement between BiH and Croatia on the southern gas interconnection, which hit the headlines due to the appointment of a Trump-linked company, AAFS, as project promoter.

AAFS was only founded in 2025, its ownership structure is not public, it has no track record and is represented by lawyers who campaigned on Trump’s behalf to overturn the 2020 U.S. election results. A special law appointing AAFS was passed in record time by the Federation of BiH Parliament in April 2026, bypassing the mandatory tender and concession-granting procedures, and allowing AAFS to use public land without paying expropriation fees.

At the Dubrovnik summit, the U.S. government also announced a vaguely-defined ‘Trump peace pipelines framework’, which aims to ‘advance strategic energy infrastructure projects across Central and Eastern Europe, expanding the region’s capacity to import U.S. LNG’. The U.S. has also initiated a series of agreements with Western Balkan governments, and the government’s May 2025 Report to Congress on United States Policy to Promote Regional Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans clearly prioritises gas infrastructure and sales.

New import infrastructure could triple the countries’ consumption – or become stranded assets

The fact that Europe is in its second oil and gas crisis this decade seems to have escaped the region’s governments, who are actively planning gas pipelines, power plants and LNG terminals that could collectively triple their 2023 gas consumption. These would either entrap the countries in costly dependence on US LNG imports, or end up as stranded assets.

Albania relies on hydropower and solar for its electricity, as the two floating oil-fired units moored at Vlora since 2022 barely generate any power. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline passes through the country to Italy, but so far no exit point has been built on Albanian territory. Yet Albania plans to transition towards fossil fuels.

It is planning at least two gas power plants – at Roskovec and Vlora – an LNG terminal, and a distribution system in Korca. Works started earlier this year at Roskovec despite permitting irregularities and a lack of financing. And in April, Albania signed a 20-year framework agreement to buy US LNG – worth no less than USD 6 billion – and a memorandum to develop the Vlora plant.

Bosnia and Herzegovina mainly uses gas to heat Sarajevo, but in the last two years the Federation entity’s ambitions have grown. Its government is mainly concentrating on the southern gas interconnection, but has also revived plans for two more pipelines from Croatia, added 85 kilometres to the southern gas interconnection plans, and started planning three gas power plants.

The Republika Srpska entity has made no secret of its plans to keep using Russian gas and building a new pipeline from Serbia. But it has recently signed an agreement for a pipeline within Republika Srpska, from Šepak to Novi Grad, that would connect to the old existing import pipeline.

Kosovo is the only country in the region whose energy strategy rightly rules out building a gas pipeline. But even there, the government has left open the option of teaming up with a neighbouring country to build a gas power plant.

Montenegro’s national spatial plan, after massive controversy around plans for a U.S.-backed LNG terminal at Bar, does not include the terminal or associated power plant. But after its adoption, in September 2025, the Prime Minister signed a memorandum with Japan’s JERA for a feasibility study for an LNG terminal and power plants. A planned US-Montenegro agreement has already met with strong resistance from civil society and people living near the planned LNG terminal.

North Macedonia announced the start of works on the gas interconnector from Greece last year, although expropriation is not yet completed and several legal issues are outstanding. It also plans to build at least two more gas power plants, and in 2025 signed a memorandum with Turkiye’s Kazancı Holding to build unspecified gas plants and distribution grids. In April 2026, the government signed a memorandum with the U.S. for ‘improving the security’ of the gas supply, and in June, a grant agreement was signed with the World Bank to support the preparation of project documentation for the planned gas power plant at Bitola.

Serbia’s difficulty in securing its gas supply has not put its government off steadily expanding the country’s gas network, and signing an agreement with Azerbaijan for a 500 megawatt gas power plant in Niš. It also plans a new plant in Novi Sad. The World Bank is also considering financing for a gas project that includes new pipelines within Serbia.

In addition to long-term infrastructure lock-in and the climate impacts of gas, these plans don’t make economic sense. None of them have up-to-date, public feasibility studies, and they would end up either as stranded assets or heavily subsidised by taxpayers. Permitting, expropriation and construction could easily take a decade and the infrastructure alone would cost billions, even before the costs of gas are included. Even if some of the planned projects do not go ahead, the region does not have money, human capacity or time to waste on such costly distractions.

Will the U.S. put its money where its mouth is?

Previous U.S. efforts to push gas in southeast Europe were limited by its lack of willingness to pay for infrastructure construction. However, with the EU halting such funding, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will use domestic sources like the Development Finance Corporation, or multilateral banks where it has strong influence, to finance gas build-out. The recent announcements of potential World Bank financing for two gas projects do not bode well, and suggest that the latter may already be happening.

The way forward

The Western Balkan countries can still avoid high levels of gas dependence if we act now. Appropriately-sited solar and wind generation, supported by existing hydropower, strong grid connections and battery storage, is much more cost-effective for electricity generation, while heat pumps, geothermal, and ambient or leftover heat avoid import dependence for heating and cooling. Instead of falling into the decades-old trap of gas dependence, Western Balkan governments finally need to increase energy efficiency and focus on electrification of the heat and transport sectors.

When citizens speak: Lessons on energy poverty from the Romanian town of Petroșani

Last year, 28 residents of Petroșani came together to discuss something most of them experience every day but rarely raise in public: the struggle to keep their homes warm. The result was a citizens’ forum that cut through statistics and policy language to reveal something far more important: the lived reality behind energy poverty and what meaningful support could look like when shaped by those directly affected.

The situation on the ground

Petroșani illustrates what can happen when a regional economy built entirely around a single industry collapses. Following the insolvency of the town’s local energy conglomerate, mines began to shut down, jobs disappeared and many residents moved away. Those who stayed are now living in buildings constructed between the 1950s and 1970s, with crumbling roofs, draughty windows and heating systems that were never designed to be efficient or affordable.

Energy poverty here is not an abstract policy concept. It’s a daily negotiation over which essential needs can be sacrificed. One participant described living on the top floor of a building where the ceiling freezes in winter and rainwater leaks into the apartment during heavy downpours. The home is damp and cold, the windows have never been replaced, and heating is only available when there’s enough money to buy firewood. Unfortunately, these are not isolated cases – they’re the norm.

The many layers of energy poverty

What made the forum particularly valuable was not just what participants shared, but how their experiences reflect the broader reality of energy poverty. It’s not simply about high energy costs; rather, it’s the result of multiple factors stacking on top of one another: low incomes, ageing buildings with poor insulation, limited job opportunities, and an administrative system that’s often difficult to navigate and slow to respond.

In many households, a significant share of income goes directly towards utility bills. While heating assistance schemes exist, participants described them as either insufficient to meet their actual needs or difficult to access in practice due to bureaucratic hurdles and outdated eligibility criteria. The frustration expressed was not only about material hardship, but also about the gap between people’s needs and the institutions meant to respond to them.

Barriers to collective action

A key issue raised during the forum, and one well known in policy discussions, is the role of homeowners’ associations. These are a prerequisite for accessing most public funding for building renovations or energy-efficiency programmes.

In Petroșani, however, very few apartment blocks have functioning associations. Participants’ experiences confirmed how complex and burdensome the process of establishing one can be, requiring time, financial resources, legal knowledge, and agreement from all residents, including those who have already left town.

One resident explained that, without an association, neighbours must go door to door whenever anything needs to be done in the building, and that setting up an association took an entire year.

Depopulation further complicates the situation, as vacant apartments make collective decision-making difficult, while the costs and responsibilities fall on those who remain. These barriers are not new, but the experiences of these residents make it clear how administrative requirements can become real obstacles in practice.

What people actually want

Despite the challenges, participants were constructive and forward-looking. They expressed strong support for solutions such as solar panels, thermal renovation and other green technologies. There was a general openness to change and a clear understanding of its benefits.

At the same time, participants highlighted the need for stronger and more accessible connections with public institutions to make these solutions achievable. Their proposals were practical: a single point of contact for energy and housing matters, support in setting up and managing homeowners’ associations, neighbourhood-level renovation programmes instead of piecemeal interventions, and better public information delivered not only online but also in person for those less digitally connected.

Many participants viewed renewable energy as part of the solution, arguing that solar panels could reduce both pollution and household energy costs. What clearly emerged from the discussions is that citizens are not simply passive beneficiaries of policy; they’re ready to engage if given the tools and support to do so.

Lessons for Romania’s energy transition

While the challenges in Petroșani are shaped by its post-industrial history, energy poverty is not limited to such communities. Across Romania, households are struggling with a similar combination of low incomes, inefficient buildings and limited access to support mechanisms.

This makes energy poverty not just a local issue, but a systemic one. Addressing it requires more than financial support alone: it calls for policies that are accessible, coordinated, and grounded in peoples’ lived realities.

As the experience in Petroșani shows, solutions already exist. Yet their impact depends on whether institutions can truly reach the people they’re supposed to support. Strengthening this connection will be critical, not just for addressing energy poverty, but also for shaping a transition that is fair and inclusive across Romania.

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