Blog entry

Open days on the Corridor Vc Prenj tunnel: a promising new public engagement tool?

Public sector company JP Autoceste is currently planning the most difficult and expensive section of the Corridor Vc motorway – a 10-kilometre tunnel through the Prenj mountain and its approach roads, costing an estimated EUR 1 billion.

No-one knows exactly what awaits the builders inside the karstic mountain, and the sections approaching the tunnel would run through inhabited areas near Konjic and biodiversity-rich sections like the Bijela valley Emerald site and Klenova draga, a rocky valley home to golden eagles. The exit on the Mostar side would also run above the quiet village of Podgorani, condemning the locals to noise and pollution.

Both the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and European Investment Bank (EIB) are considering financing the project, and the EBRD is currently holding a public consultation period on the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), until the end of June.

From 5 to 7 June, the EBRD and JP Autoceste also organised open days in Konjic, Jablanica and Mostar to better familiarise the public with the plans. Bankwatch went along to the Mostar event to better understand both the project and the open days format.

A useful tool for discussing project specifics

The event was held at the cultural centre in Potoci, a village north of Mostar, suitably near to the project site. Several representatives attended from JP Autoceste, the EBRD and the Enova consultancy who worked on the ESIA study. This made it possible for the public to discuss a range of issues like routing and design, land acquisition, and other environmental and social impacts, and to examine the route in detail with the project designers.

Local authority representatives had also made additional efforts to inform people about the event. Although some people could not attend during working hours at all, the time frame of 09:00-17:00 allowed at least some flexibility. Around 25 members of the public dropped by in Potoci – a relatively small proportion of those potentially affected, but a very decent start considering the relatively rural setting and unfamiliar format.

Since discussions could run in parallel, people could get detailed individual answers to their questions and comments without undue time pressure. The format also seems suitable for less outgoing people who would hesitate to speak up in front of a wider audience.

Not a replacement for plan and project-level consultations

The open days format looks like a promising engagement tool to complement public consultations, but shouldn’t be seen as a replacement. These events are more informative than consultative, and are difficult to record accurately. People’s inputs are dispersed throughout the day and they talk with various project representatives, so even with good organisation, the chances of something being missed in the minutes are high.

The Prenj events also took place at a stage when the main features of the motorway, such as the routing, had already been adopted as part of the project-level spatial plan, and only minor adjustments can take place. This can be useful, but only if also preceded by earlier consultations when all options are still open.

Lack of routing-level public consultations may boomerang again

Such early consultations did not happen for this project. The Federation of BiH legislation required public consultations on the spatial plan, but they were held only in 2011 when the planned route from Konjic to Mostar was vastly different from the one that was later adopted. It was shortened in 2016 to go via the Prenj tunnel, rather than running along the mountain, and the Federal parliament adopted the spatial plan in 2017 without soliciting public input on the changed sections.

Consultations on the Federal-level environmental assessment for the project were held in 2018 and 2023, but as the route had already been decided on, they were not meaningful. The same applies to the currently ongoing EBRD ESIA consultation. Even now, it is hard to understand how the routing decision was taken and whether the currently planned variant is the least damaging one possible.

A similar situation south of Mostar has led to an impasse in which many residents oppose the route, and some have resisted the expropriation of their properties. People don’t understand why the motorway has to run over their land and houses, when a seemingly better option on the Podveležje plateau is available. The EBRD’s accountability mechanism has confirmed that the routing decision was not taken transparently and recommended a re-examination, but the Bank staff are reluctant to insist on it.

The EBRD and EIB have a chance to learn from this and insist that the routing decision for Prenj is revised. The spatial plan adoption process was not done according to the law and needs to be overturned. The route then needs to be publicly consulted, based on a clear overview of the pros and cons of each option. Such a process would take some time, but could have been completed long ago if it had been done when people near Mostar first raised their concerns.

High-risk projects need solid foundations

With the open days, JP Autoceste has taken a step forward in improving its communication and building more open relations with project-affected people, but the question remains whether it will be enough without leaving options available for route changes.

It is for the Federal authorities to decide on what options are open, but the EBRD and EIB can make it a condition of their financing. However, the EBRD’s publication of the project ESIA for consultation suggests they are skipping this stage again, risking another backlash. Lack of early stage consultations may negatively impact implementation and result in increased costs for an already extremely expensive project, which in the end will be paid by the public. If the EBRD and EIB are truly interested in improving the lives of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s people, they need to ensure that everything possible is done to avoid this.

This billion-euro project with a 10-kilometre tunnel in karst terrain is risky enough, without further delays caused by improper consultations during the planning stages. Open days are welcome, but they need to be built on more solid foundations.

‘Delivering Impact Together’ … unless things get complicated: EBRD Annual Meeting marked by shrinking civic space

Focus on human rights intensifies at EBRD Annual Meeting

The European Bank for Reconstruction (EBRD)’s 33rd Annual Meeting in Yerevan was overshadowed by escalating human rights issues in several member countries. Civil society representatives from Georgia, protesting the newly introduced ‘foreign agent’ law aimed at repressing civic freedoms, expressed their fears about their government’s assault on democracy. Echoing these concerns, representatives from Kyrgyzstan highlighted the recent approval of similar regulations in their country, while representatives from Armenia sounded the alarm on multiple strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) filed by mining companies aimed at silencing environmental activists.

The EBRD claims to be committed to fostering economic progress and sustainable reconstruction in countries that uphold the principles of multi-party democracy, pluralism, and market economics. But critics argue that the bank’s actions don’t always match its words. Mariam Patsatsia, a community support coordinator at Georgian non-governmental organisation Green Alternative, highlights this discrepancy: ‘The EBRD’s commitment to its stated goals is inconsistent, resembling more of a pendulum swing than a steady progression. Georgia is a prime example of this. Having once represented a beacon of democracy in the region, it now risks collapsing into full-fledged autocracy. We hope to see the EBRD not only recognise the risks posed by these detrimental changes but also be prepared to respond effectively.’

During their meeting with civil society, the EBRD President and Board of Directors publicly recognised this lack of civic space as a significant risk and reaffirmed the importance of meaningful civil society engagement. Reflecting on these issues, several board members displayed a willingness to find solutions to how the EBRD can better address retaliation risks and improve its approach to public participation.

At the Independent Project Accountability Mechanism (IPAM) sessions, one of the key presentations centred around the EBRD’s irresponsible withdrawal from the controversial Amulsar gold mine project in Armenia. In bilateral meetings with the Board of Directors, Armenian civil society representatives stressed the need for the EBRD to redress the harm caused by the project and to enhance its environmental and social safeguards. Their request for the bank to incorporate these lessons and prevent similar issues in future investments was met positively by members of the board.

Pressure mounts on EBRD to stand up for human rights

On the eve of the Annual Meeting, 60 civil society organisations released a joint statement offering straightforward recommendations on how the bank can effectively respond to increasing human rights risks. These action points include increasing the transparency of projects promoted by public-sector clients, proactively engaging with rights holders to inform due diligence and verify information provided by clients, assessing retaliation risks and developing an effective response mechanism, and committing to a shared responsibility to redress the harm caused by problematic investments. Their message was delivered to the EBRD President and relevant stakeholders during the public consultation session.

While the EBRD has made concerted efforts to promote human rights by introducing different initiatives such as the Civil Society Steering Committee, the Just Transition Initiative, and the Better Work Uzbekistan programme, as well as advocating for policies that promote a safe space for civil society, much more needs to be done at the project level to safeguard human rights.

There’s a clear mismatch between the EBRD’s aspirations and how projects are actually implemented on the ground, particularly when it comes to retaliation prevention and response (as seen in the Indorama project in Uzbekistan), seeking and considering stakeholder feedback (as in the Corridor Vc project in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and redressing the harm caused by problematic projects (as in the Amulsar project in Armenia or investments in grain and poultry producer MHP in Ukraine). To prevent these abuses from happening again, the EBRD must put its top-level commitments into action by strengthening its human rights due diligence and updating its policies.

Sustainable infrastructure must be inclusive

The EBRD prides itself on its approach to the green economy, exemplified by its flagship Green Cities initiative, and is currently developing a new sustainable infrastructure strategy for the transport and urban sectors. At meetings with the President, Board of Directors and senior bank management, civil society participants provided constructive input on how to make EBRD investments in these sectors more inclusive and sustainable. Bankwatch has documented a critical mass of cases demonstrating the challenges facing EBRD projects on the ground, the need to adopt circular economy principles, and the urgency of decarbonising these sectors.

A key concern raised by civil society participants was the need for the stronger integration of gender considerations into transport projects and municipal services. They stressed the importance of incorporating the EBRD’s measures and existing good practices into its investments to ensure women have access to reliable, safe and affordable public transport, which is crucial for supporting their role as carers and providing a gateway to economic, educational, and other opportunities. They also called for women and other vulnerable groups, such as people with disabilities as well as young and older people, to be included in the planning and design of projects that impact their daily lives.

Rebuilding Ukraine: Smaller municipalities need more support

In the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EBRD was prompt in establishing new programmes. Yet, despite being the main financial supporter of Ukraine’s reconstruction and development, the EBRD has failed to change its skewed approach to financing Ukraine. The fact is that the EBRD continues to primarily support large-scale projects overseen by corporate enterprises, agricultural holdings, and major cities. Notably, there are no projects in its Ukrainian portfolio specifically aimed at supporting smaller municipalities.

Given its recent capital increase, it’s imperative that the EBRD overhauls its approach to financing Ukraine. Efforts should be directed at preserving environmental standards and addressing modernisation, recovery, and reconstruction needs at the local level.

New Agribusiness Strategy: An opportunity to transform agri-food systems

With the EBRD set to review its Agribusiness Strategy this year, Bankwatch’s recommendations were well received by the bank’s leadership. Although EBRD investments in the agribusiness sector between 2019 and 2023 helped increase agricultural production in its countries of operations, they failed to adequately address the challenges of food security and sustainable agribusiness.

In Bankwatch’s view, the EBRD has the potential to transform agri-food systems through targeted investments and policy dialogue, implementing climate and circular-economy solutions, and enhancing environmental standards.

Reporting neglects human rights impacts

Last year, Bankwatch published a ‘forgotten annex’ to the EBRD’s 2022 Sustainability Report, highlighting a number of cases involving human rights violations in EBRD investments that were omitted from the official report and received no mention in the environmental and social performance documentation for these projects.

Once again this information is notably absent from the 2023 Sustainability Report, which largely focuses on the EBRD’s efforts to ‘green’ the energy sector, industries, the financial system, and cities through direct investment, technical assistance, and policy dialogue

Nina Lesikhina, policy officer at Bankwatch, highlights this significant transparency gap in the EBRD’s reporting: ‘None of the EBRD annual reports contain project-level information on environmental and social performance. In 2023, the Bank supported 464 individual projects, but we have no ex post evaluation information on the impacts of these projects, as implemented. Nor do we have any publicly available aggregated data, for example, on the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement, measures to reduce gender-based violence and harassment, or grievance redress mechanisms at the project level. The EBRD commits to upholding these standards and should report on them.’

The EBRD’s draft 2024 Environmental and Social Policy affirms that the bank will report annually on the environmental and social risks and impacts linked to its projects. Therefore, Bankwatch calls on the EBRD to ensure that all of its aggregated project data are carefully collected, analysed, and documented in its annual Sustainability Report. The EBRD must demonstrate that its investments not only bring green benefits but also uphold human rights as an ultimate development goal.

Can Ukraine’s EU-backed recovery plan deliver on its green promises?

EUR 50 billion in EU funding has been earmarked for Ukraine to implement the reforms detailed in the Ukraine Plan. These measures must align with the Ukraine Facility Regulation and the goals and policies of the EU, ensuring not only a return to pre-war conditions but also contributing to a more sustainable approach to the development of Ukraine and its integration within the EU. Although the plan was endorsed by the European Commission in April and approved by the Council of the European Union in May, future periodic evaluations will determine whether or not these criteria have been met.

It’s particularly important that the Ukraine Plan adheres to the provisions of the regulation on meaningful stakeholder engagement, the allocation of funds to subnational authorities, as well as the principles of ‘do no significant harm’ and ‘leave no one behind’. Additionally, the plan and overall financial framework within Ukraine Facility must ensure that at least 20 per cent of the overall proposed investment budget is allocated to climate, environmental, and green transition measures, including biodiversity conservation. For this reason, adherence to these requirements is essential if Ukraine is to receive further financial support.

We’ve taken a close look at the environmental aspects of the plan, particularly the measures outlined for safeguarding the environment during reconstruction efforts.

Green shoots of recovery?

The Ukraine Plan takes several positive approaches to the reconstruction of the country, such as emphasising energy and resource efficiency during the construction and renovation of buildings. Additionally, it prioritises the restoration and modernisation of municipal infrastructure, such as heating, water supply and drainage systems, while supporting the production of green building materials in line with EU standards.

Ukraine’s planned energy sector reforms aim to improve the legal framework for the development of renewable energy sources, increase the efficiency of centralised heat supply systems, enhance energy efficiency in public buildings, and promote the domestic production of energy equipment.

These measures are vital, particularly given the findings of a recent study on the climate impacts of the first 18 months of Russia’s war in Ukraine. It reveals that the prospective national rebuild could potentially increase greenhouse gas emissions by over 50 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). However, a more sustainable approach to reconstruction involving energy-efficient technologies would reduce this figure significantly over the long term.

Ukrainian non-governmental organisations Ecoaction and Ecoclub have been actively involved in shaping the government’s reconstruction plan from the outset, offering valuable recommendations, particularly for the energy sector. Encouragingly, some of their suggestions have already been incorporated into the plan, which bodes well for a future collaborative approach.

The plan also signals positive developments for the agricultural sector, with a strong emphasis on sustainability and green initiatives. Notably, the plan prioritises small and medium-sized farms, representing a significant shift from previous policies, which disproportionately favoured large agricultural enterprises. This focus on smaller farms, known for their less environmentally harmful practices, is a welcome change.

The planned reforms also include developing advisory services and promoting the transition to products with higher added value. If implemented effectively, these measures have the potential to foster more sustainable farming practices and contribute to a greener, more resilient agricultural sector in Ukraine.

While the Ukraine Plan addresses the issue of climate change with a focus on state and international climate policy, including the establishment of a Scientific Expert Council on Climate Change and a commitment to preserving the ozone layer, its lack of emphasis on carbon pricing mechanisms, particularly the EU Emissions Trading System, is a cause for concern.

Although adaptation to climate change is mentioned in the agriculture section of the plan and in relation to national legislation, it lacks a dedicated chapter. This is a crucial oversight, as communities are already developing and implementing recovery plans. To support their efforts, national policy must seamlessly integrate with local policies, providing a clear framework that prioritises climate adaptation.

Contradictions and inconsistencies

Although the Ukraine Plan acknowledges the importance of biodiversity conservation, the focus is limited to forest management at the expense of a more comprehensive approach. It’s encouraging to see that the plan outlines the development of a National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan aimed at increasing the protection of nature conservation areas and restoring ecosystems damaged as a result of the war. However, there is no mention of the biodiversity strategy in the list of reforms, and specific targets for increasing the size of these protected areas are notably lacking.

The plan proposes legislative changes to preserve forests and combat deforestation and degradation. However, it also aims to increase wood production significantly over the next decade from 15 to 25 million cubic metres, which is hard to reconcile with a commitment to preserving forests and the EU’s stern measures on deforestation-free products. The Ukraine Plan’s forest management strategy should focus on addressing environmental concerns, particularly the prevention of forest degradation, as outlined in the EU Deforestation Regulation.

Another contradiction arises in the energy sector. The plan’s stated goals of decarbonisation, decentralisation, and efficiency are completely at odds with its hopes for a ‘nuclear energy renaissance’. The development of nuclear energy is neither financially stable nor economically profitable. Over the past 30 years, new nuclear power plants have consistently encountered cost overruns and significant delays worldwide. Nuclear generation directly opposes energy decentralisation by contributing to even greater centralisation of the energy system, jeopardising energy security for decades to come.

Considering the recent loss of almost all of the country’s coal generation due to Russian shelling, cheaper and faster energy solutions are now desperately required. Instead, distributed generation from renewable energy sources offers an immediate and cost-effective solution that can empower individual communities and consumers. Ukraine has no time to wait for nuclear units.

Fertile ground for improvement

With global and domestic temperatures continuing to rise each year, the plan fails to incorporate measures that target the impacts of the climate crisis on communities. While the plan addresses climate adaption at the national level, it omits any strategy for tackling the consequences of climate change at the local level.

Agriculture is a sector acutely vulnerable to the effects of the climate crisis. But the only adaptation solution mentioned in the plan is irrigation, with reference to its positive impacts on the environment. Yet, this sole measure is nowhere near enough. The plan needs to adopt a joined-up, holistic approach to climate change adaptation that meets the diverse challenges posed by droughts, floods, and other climate-related events.

Surprisingly, for all its focus on small and medium-sized farms and adopting a green approach to agriculture, the plan fails to address the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s extensive arable land. While acknowledging that 70 per cent of Ukrainian territory is arable, the plan neglects the long-term risks associated with this pattern of land use. Reducing arable land and increasing productivity in cultivable areas are crucial for sustainable agriculture.

However, this should not be misinterpreted as a justification for rejecting green measures. Enhanced productivity should be achieved through sustainable practices, not by intensifying the use of pesticides and fertilisers. The goal is to optimise production efficiency on existing arable land, not to expand it.

Sustainable future within reach

In conclusion, while the Ukrainian government’s recovery plan offers many positive steps, a closer look reveals contradictions and inconsistencies that conflict with the principles of a green recovery. The Council of the European Union already approved the plan, the monitoring and assessment of the plan’s implementation and its adherence to the Ukraine Facility Regulation and the EU’s climate and energy goals would be key in the next period.

The recommendations provided by advocacy organisations like Ecoaction, Ecoclub, CEE Bankwatch Network, and Transport & Environment – now in the hands of the Council and the European Commission – have the potential to put the plan on a more sustainable footing. Upon approval by the Council, vital financing and investments are expected to flow, allowing Ukraine to receive regular tranches for implementing the plan.

The original article in Ukrainian is available here.

You(th) have a say in shaping the EU’s just transition

Among the many inspiring speeches, Damjan Kozarov, a student from Greece, delivered a poignant reminder that the future of our planet rests in the hands of young people, calling for collective action to make sustainability more than just an idea – to make it a way of life, a legacy to pass on to future generations.

The young people’s powerful voices and impassioned pleas for green policies resonated deeply with all in attendance, including high-level representatives of the European Commission. They conveyed a strong sense of purpose and urgency, highlighting the importance of youth leadership in shaping a European future based on solidarity, inclusion, and sustainability.

The event also served as a fitting celebration and reflection on the achievements of the two-year EUTeens4Green journey. The initiative, spearheaded by the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO), was conceived as a way of empowering young people to embrace the transition goal of the European Green Deal – a climate-neutral economy that’s fair, sustainable, and leaves no one behind.

A key aim of the initiative was to address the many challenges faced by Europe’s just transition regions, not least the dreaded ‘brain drain’ that so often plagues regions in transition. As they embark on significant transformations, these regions are required to reshape not only their economies, but also their social structures and identities. And this is where schemes like EUTeens4Green can make such a difference.

Green innovation blooms across the EU

The success of EUTeens4Green, an initiative that saw EUR 10 000 in direct funding going to each of the youth-led projects in the just transition regions, has exceeded all expectations. We’ve seen the planting of hundreds of trees, new blossoming gardens, the establishment of installations like escape rooms showing the consequences of climate change, workshops on sustainability, art exhibitions, cycling festivals, and much more.

The official EUTeens4Green booklet, which lists all of the projects implemented in the 19 EU Member States over the past two years, showcases the creativity and transformative impact these initiatives have had not only on young people but also on their local communities. On the island of Crete, for example, a group of young people installed a green rooftop on their university campus, enhancing the beauty of their environment while delivering social and economic impacts associated with the low-carbon transition. Their initiative has helped foster a broader understanding of the interconnectedness between ecological responsibility and community well-being.

In the Czech Republic, a group of young people from the town of Šluknov on the German border set up the Young Friendly Region project. By promoting the natural beauty of their local environment, they’ve proved that this excluded location is actually a place where young people can live fulfilling lives, realise their dreams, and transform the future development of their region.

In Romania, the Ride a Bike 4 Green Life project promotes the daily use of bicycles and the benefits of adopting a healthy lifestyle. As a result, bicycle use has increased, and participants are now more aware of sustainable behaviours, envisioning a greener future and inspiring others in their community. The project’s success has led to plans for further cycling competitions and campaigns promoting other non-polluting forms of transport. These are just a few of the many inspiring projects that have been rolled out across the EU.

Empowering young people to flourish

One unique aspect of EUTeens4Green is that all of the grantees were given the freedom to come up with their own ideas and execute them from start to finish. On top of that, the streamlined selection process, tailored to suit different age groups, meant that none of the topics and methods were imposed ‘from on high’. On the contrary, participants were fully empowered to propose sustainable activities that made sense for the environments in which they live. In this way, EUTeens4Green is a great example of an initiative fully rooted in the local context, free from any political pressure from the Brussels bubble or national authorities.

It also demonstrates that empowered young people can positively affect their own lives and the lives of others. The already visible effects of EUTeens4Green show that entrusting young people with agency and the freedom to make their own decisions – as opposed to in a token way – nurtures their leadership skills, enables them to engage with diverse stakeholders in their communities, spark dialogue, and inspire others to take action.

Learning lessons for a more sustainable future

The impact of initiatives that provide both financial and administrative support for youth-led projects is undeniable. When allocating funds, the EU, along with national and regional authorities, should prioritise the needs of the younger generation and create tailored programmes that unlock their potential. This is especially true of the just transition regions, which have experienced a significant decline in the populations of their youngest and most talented citizens. For example, the traditional mining region of Jiu Valley in southwestern Transylvania in Romania has endured over two decades of poorly planned transitions, remaining in their home towns.

Thankfully, the Just Transition Mechanism has created an opportunity for Jiu Valley to reverse unsuccessful practices and create an attractive environment for its residents, including young people. Ten inspiring EUTeens4Green projects located in Romania, including Jiu Valley, have demonstrated that young people are determined to become actively involved in shaping the future of their regions, a sentiment echoed by Valentin Foger, a young participant from Spain, at the final conference: ‘We’re here, we’re unified, and we’re asking you to give us the tools to fight for our future!’

Sustaining the momentum of youth

Through their actions, these young EUTeens4Green ambassadors have ably demonstrated their creativity, problem-solving skills, and commitment to addressing the most pressing environmental and social challenges within their regions. That’s why building on the momentum established by initiatives like EUTeens4Green is so important. The EU must coordinate efforts to ensure that all of these ambitious people receive the necessary tools and support to implement their projects, ultimately making Europe greener, more inclusive, and more attractive to young people.

To ensure decision makers heed the lessons learned from EUTeens4Green and effectively involve young people in policymaking, the initiative has published a report – Empowering youth in Cohesion Policy: Lessons from EUTeens4Green. The report provides policymakers with comprehensive policy recommendations, including creating dedicated channels for youth engagement through youth councils, regular consultations and follow-up mechanisms, providing funding for youth-led just transition projects, developing youth-focused indicators to gauge success within the cohesion policy, prioritising educational and training programmes, and raising awareness and building capacity among young people.

Planting seeds for a better tomorrow

As emphasised during the conference, young people should continue ‘planting seeds’ in local communities to put more pressure on European, national, and regional institutions to address climate change and drive the green transformation across the EU. Given the multitude of crises affecting the world today, coupled with the ongoing distrust in politics, initiatives like EUTeens4Green are now more crucial than ever. Encouraging the perspectives of young people is also particularly important in the context of the upcoming European elections, where young voters will have the opportunity to exercise their rights and shape the future of their countries.

Amid a growing climate mess, a dash for Black Sea fossil gas

It’s been eleven straight months of unprecedented global temperatures. Over the past few months alone, a record heatwave baked much of Asia and extreme heat scorched the Sahel – both events revealing clear climate fingerprints.

At the same time, plans for massive new offshore gas production in Romania and Bulgaria have been advancing unabated. If these plans materialise, they’re likely to derail the energy transition in both countries, undermining EU efforts to tackle the climate crisis.

In Bulgaria, OMV Petrom, the Romanian subsidiary of Austrian fossil energy giant OMV, is seeking to resume exploration at the Han Asparuh offshore gas field. The project could pump 13 billion cubic metres (bcm) of fossil gas a year between 2030 and 2040, and 8 bcm a year by 2050. But the company would first need to register a discovery before its license, first granted in 2012, expires at the end of the year.

Since TotalEnergies withdrew from the project earlier this year, following Repsol’s exit four years earlier, OMV Petrom is currently the project’s only stakeholder. As Bankwatch previously revealed, the Bulgarian government has been actively seeking to acquire its own stake, but thus far without success.

Meanwhile, eager to push the gas project forward, Bulgarian authorities appear to be cutting corners. According to a recent report, plans are underway to ‘unite exploration and production licenses under one agreement’ in a bid to shorten the period between exploration and production. There are also plans to reduce the time it takes to carry out and appeal environmental impact assessments.

At the adjacent Neptun Deep field, also located in Romanian waters, OMV Petrom, together with Romanian state-owned company Romgaz, could begin drilling for gas even earlier. Set to officially start production in 2027, the project would see 100 bcm of fossil gas extracted over the next two decades. This would make Romania the EU’s biggest fossil gas producer. At a time when the country – and the EU as a whole – need to slash fossil gas use, Romania’s transmission system operator expects domestic gas consumption to grow significantly.

According to Romania’s energy minister, an agreement reached by the Council of the European Union in March urging EU Member States to continue coordinated demand-reduction measures until April 2025 is ‘more of a recommendation’. He confirmed Bucharest is intent on increasing fossil gas consumption, and to ensure demand grows, the Romanian authorities are now busy building new gas infrastructure, from power plants to distribution systems.

Although OMV Petrom is still awaiting a crucial environmental permit from the relevant authorities to go ahead with Neptun Deep, which could be issued any day, the future of both the Romanian and Bulgarian fossil gas projects remains uncertain. In Bulgaria, where fossil gas consumption is currently 3 bcm a year, any new fossil gas production would require a substantial increase in either domestic gas consumption or exports.

Yet, there is little appetite in Europe for long-term gas import deals beyond 2035. In fact, if the EU fully implements REPowerEU, its strategy aimed at weaning Europe off Russian gas imports, overall gas demand should halve by 2030. Therefore, given the estimated EUR 4 billion investment in each project, both of these ventures pose not only major climate risks but also economic risks due to the likely insufficient demand for all the gas produced.

Environmental impact

In mid-May, the Bulgarian environment ministry held transboundary public consultations over the Neptun Deep project. Local community members, representatives of non-governmental organisations, and officials from both countries were invited to the coastal town of Kavarna to discuss the implications of the offshore gas project. Yet, the discussion was mostly dominated by OMV Petrom representatives, with little intervention from local authorities. Civil society members, including Bankwatch, raised concerns about the project’s climate impact, the use of toxic chemicals, and the risk of accidents. But these concerns were largely brushed off by OMV Petrom representatives, who claim Neptun Deep will have no significant transboundary impacts. For their part, the Bulgarian authorities also expressed their agreement with the proposed measures.

Yet, both Han Asparuh and Neptun Deep pose direct threats to EU climate action. The environmental impact assessment for Neptun Deep makes the ludicrous claim that fossil gas drilling would generate ‘negative emissions’. However, this claim is based on the assumption that the gas extracted would replace coal in energy production, and that Romania’s operating coal capacity is three times higher than it actually is.

In reality, Neptun Deep’s climate footprint over its projected 20-year lifespan, including its associated pipeline infrastructure, could reach a staggering 209 million to 227 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e), primarily from gas combustion. This equates to around 10 million tCO2e per year, surpassing Romania’s current annual coal industry emissions (8.6 metric tonnes in 2022, and decreasing). These findings, taken from a recent report commissioned by Greenpeace Romania, raise serious concerns about the validity of the predicted Neptun Deep figures.

For several years now, civil society have been sounding the alarm over the two projects, their climate price tag and the toll they would take on marine wildlife. In Romania, since the offshore law enabling the Neptun Deep investments was approved in 2022, environmental groups have sent open letters to the Romanian parliament, and warned on multiple occasions of the project.

In late March, Greenpeace activists staged a direct action outside OMV Petrom’s headquarters demanding the cancellation of Neptun Deep. A month earlier, Greenpeace filed a lawsuit against the companies behind Neptun Deep and the local environmental protection agency that had approved the project’s onshore infrastructure for failing to assess the full scale of its environmental ramifications.

And it’s not only activists and non-governmental organisations. Three years ago this month, the International Energy Agency warned that, if the world is to reach net zero emissions by mid-century, there can be no more new oil and fossil gas exploration and production. Failing to do so vastly increases the chances of a full-blown climate chaos. And in a recent report, the OECD concluded that Romania should not approve new oil and gas explorations, since falling gas demand in Europe after 2030 might pose a financial risk for new projects (see page 108). Yet, policymakers in Romania and Bulgaria, much like the profit-driven fossil fuel industry, are evidently looking the other way.

European greenlight

If realised, the Neptun Deep and Han Asparuh projects would cement both Romania’s and Bulgaria’s dependence on fossil fuels for far longer than the world can afford. While the Romanian government intends to use most of the Neptun Deep gas domestically, there are plans to export Black Sea fossil gas to neighbouring countries, most likely to Hungary and Austria. Under the pretext of energy security, gas exports could mean entrenching the dependence on dirty, expensive fossil gas throughout the region.

To make matters worse, Neptun Deep is being enabled by EU money. While the drilling itself might not be directly in receipt of EU funding, the supporting infrastructure – namely, the pipeline connecting the rig to the national grid, without which the project cannot function – has already received over EUR 230 million via the EU’s Modernisation Fund and the European Investment Bank.

EU leaders have repeatedly been speaking of the need for the world to end fossil fuel subsidies. This was also one of the EU’s priorities for the UN climate summit in Dubai in November 2023. A month earlier, however, the then Hungarian President Katalin Novak reiterated Budapest’s intentions to buy fossil gas from Neptun Deep and called on the EU to finance it.

Sinking public money into any fossil fuel project is effectively stabbing the European Green Deal in the back. EU politicians and institutions should not endorse either Neptun Deep or Han Asparuh. Instead, they should call these projects out for what they really are: climate wrecking balls.

For now, the important decisions are set to be taken at the national level. Both the Romanian and Bulgarian governments need to acknowledge that pumping more fossil gas runs completely counter to the public interest and to immediately withdraw support for these planet-heating follies. In tandem, decision makers must prioritise sustainable energy for their citizens by investing in electricity grids, renewables, and energy efficiency.

This year’s Green Agenda Action Plan update must be participatory

In October 2021, the Green Agenda Action Plan was endorsed by Western Balkan leaders at the EU – Western Balkans Summit in Slovenia. It should have been a turning point for the region, finally laying out a broad-ranging plan to achieve decarbonisation, a circular economy, depollution, sustainable agriculture and protection of nature and biodiversity.

But for civil society groups, it left a bitter taste. They had been asking for inclusion in the process for months in advance, but the draft Plan was shared with them just two weeks before the Summit, preventing any meaningful consultation.

This, among other factors, contributed to the Plan’s poor quality. It contains too many actions – 58, of which most should be broken down into more manageable steps. They are poorly defined and difficult to measure, with only indicative deadlines, and in some cases no real clarity on who is responsible.

The first implementation report, published in October 2023, implicitly confirms these weaknesses. It is not able to clearly state which points have been completed, how this is measured, whether the progress made has been the result of the Green Agenda or would have happened anyway, and who is responsible for further action on points where no progress has been made. As a result, it is currently impossible for civil society groups or the general public to understand where implementation is really at.

Fortunately, updates to the Action Plan were built in from the start – by the end of 2024 and by the end of 2027. This year’s update therefore presents an opportunity to make up for lost time and produce a Plan that is more streamlined and focused, sets clear responsibilities, steps and deadlines, and clearly sets out how progress will be measured.

In order to try to ensure a more participatory approach this time, this week 30 environmental groups wrote to the RCC and European Commission to ask for a multi-stage consultation process, first collecting pre-draft inputs on how the existing Action Plan should be changed, then consulting two successive drafts of the updated one.

This would help to ensure a better quality Action Plan and to restore the trust between the RCC and civil society organisations which has been eroded in the last few years. If the European Commission and RCC are serious about the Green Agenda and about promoting public participation in decision-making in the region, they must lead by example.

The stakes are high, and we have no time to lose. Civil society groups support the goals of the Green Agenda, but at the moment we have no idea what the next steps in the process are and what the timeline is. We can only be effective in contributing to implementation and ensuring public buy-in if we are informed and consulted on time.

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