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Success: 391 hectares of Romanian forest saved in 2015


In December 2015 Bankwatch Romania received a special Christmas present when the Bucharest Tribunal decreed the final and irrevocable annulment [ro] of 27 deforestation decisions for 22 forest hectares in Gorj County. The case was brought by Bankwatch Romania against Oltenia Energy Complex (OEC) and the Forestry Guard Rȃmnicu Vȃlcea whose appeal has now ultimately been revoked, thus halting deforestations for the expansion of the Roșia coal mine.

According to the Forestry Law, only a decision from the Forestry Guard is needed if one intends to cut down a surface smaller than one hectare, but if the forest is bigger than 10 hectares a Government Decree is mandatory. Oltenia Energy Complex (OEC) attempted to avoid this law, slicing the land on which it intends to expand the Roșia lignite mine in parcels smaller than one hectare, thus obtaining 27 decisions for 22 hectares.

Therefore, OEC skipped a procedure through which it would have been mandated to study the environmental and social impact. But the company ignored the fact that the planned deforestations for the expansion of Roșia mine are actually much bigger, with an environmental permit for 159 hectares also being annulled at the beginning of last month.

Coal in the Balkans

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The final decision of Bucharest Tribunal came in the same month in which FERN, an European NGO for forest protection, published the study Double Jeopardy: Coal’s Threat to Forests (pdf). The authors show that at least 11.9 millions of forest lands, an area bigger than Portugal, are threatened due to coal exploitation. In Australia alone 1.3 million hectares are scheduled to be cut down which could lead to the disappearance of endangered species or surface waters. Indonesia intends to cut down 8.6 million hectares, or 9% of the country’s forests, with a devastating impact on indigenous populations.

The FERN Report also contains a case study on Romania, in which a clear disjunction emerges between folk wisdom, such as “Romanians are brothers to the forest”, and the fact that massive deforestations, a significant part illegal, have become habitual.

Local communities either don’t have the capacity to oppose mine expansion projects or are deluded by the jobs promised by OEC (even though the company employed half as many people [ro] starting with 2012 compared to 2009-2012). Severin Sperlea from the Runcurelu village expressed his regret this way:

“There used to be forests in this area. We had beautiful forests. Lands were full of trees: apple trees, pear trees, plum trees, cherry trees, vineyards. You always found some fruit to eat when you went to work in the field. Now they’ve gone because the mines have come.”

With this last decision in 2015, Bankwatch Romania could celebrate the saving of 391 hectares of forest through the annulment of deforestation decisions or environmental permits. Apart from the 27 deforestation decisions which allowed cutting down 22 hectares and the environmental permit for 159 hectares being annulled on December 7, two other environment permits for the expansion of the Pinoasa mine affecting 130 and 80 hectares were annulled on 17 February [ro] and 14 May [ro] respectively.

Health reports confirmed widespread over-exposure to toxic arsenic at Tsumeb smelter in Namibia

Following Bankwatch’s revelations about toxic pollutants at the Tsumeb smelter in Namibia, the smelter’s owner, Canadian mining company Dundee Precious Metals (DPM), contested our findings in Namibian news reports. Without substantiating its claims with facts, however, and in light of the results of local health surveys the company’s reassurances ring hollow and meaningless.

The Tsumeb smelter extracts arsenic and other compounds from copper ore, half of which coming from the Chelopech mine in Bulgaria. The smelting leaves behind the pure metal, but also highly toxic waste like arsenic trioxide. Bankwatch had warned that the smelter may be contaminating the local environment with these toxic substances both through evaporation during the production process as well as through contamination from the waste site.

In the Namibian Sun, a DPM’s spokesperson claimed that our blog post represented a “distorted and inaccurate view of [DPM’s] operations in Namibia”. The company cites a health study which “tested the urine of over 1 700 locals and found no unexpected elevations”, but doesn’t provide the study itself to support its claim. (Neither does DPM clarify what those expected elevations were and whether they can be considered safe – a crucial question, considering that already small amounts of arsenic trioxide can lead to multiple organ damage and death.)

The company even argues that “[…] there have been and are currently no significant health impacts from the smelter on workers and community members” – an assumption that is in dramatic disagreement with international standards of acceptable levels of arsenic intake.

Information available to Bankwatch shows that arsenic levels of Tsumeb workers have been way above safe limits defined by health institutions.

As we learned from the local community, health tests have been conducted by the government in three consecutive years since 2011. A preliminary report published in August 2013 (pdf) that summarises the findings from the 2013 survey states that “[r]ecent urinary arsenic concentrations confirm current widespread over-exposure at the plant”.

In its introductory notes, the report, prepared by the National Institute of Occupational Medicine (NIOH) and supported by the Ministry of Environment And Tourism Namibia, refers to findings from surveys in March 2011. At that time the average arsenic concentrations in the urine of DPM workers were at 251 micrograms per gram creatinine (251 μg/g). This is much higher than the maximum acceptable level set by a range of health institutions worldwide.

As a reference value for over-exposure the report uses the Biological Exposure Indices (BEI) set by different institutions. A BEI is a reference for recommended concentrations of hazardous substances. As the report notes, the South African BEI (defined by the Department of Labour) lies at 50 μg/g.

Since basic urine tests don’t distinguish between toxic and non-toxic forms of arsenic, the report notes that 50 μg/g should not be used as a threshold without more detailed tests, but that values above 100 μg/g “generally indicate excessive absorption of inorganic [i.e. toxic] arsenic (but may be explained by organic [non-toxic] arsenic […]).”

Whichever one of these levels is being consulted, the Tsumeb smelter workers average arsenic concentration was by far higher than any level that could be deemed safe.

Continued contamination at reduced capacity

Following the results of audits in 2011 into the Tsumeb smelter’s health and environmental impacts, Dundee Precious Metal had to reduce its capacity feed by half in 2012 and was ordered by the Namibian government to introduce technological improvements. The capacity restrictions were lifted in December 2013 after the government had accepted DPM’s upgrade measures.

However, as we found out during our visit to the Tsumeb community, a cloud of doubts hangs over the company’s promises to have cleaned up its operations – just as the cloud of white dust that could be seen hovering over the smelter.

And indeed, the 2013 survey produced equally disturbing results.

As the tables below show, of 1082 DPM employees at the time, urinary arsenic levels of above 300 μg/g were measured in all sections of the smelter except the Slagmill. 69% of the people tested exceeded the level of 100 μg/g.

The most affected 3.5% of cases even reached levels between 507 and 1357 μg/g.


Source: Preliminary Report on the Survey of Namibia Customs Smelter Workers, Tsumeb, Namibia, pg. 6-7

In the Republikein newspaper, DPM claimed in early December that the exposure to inhalable arsenic has been reduced by half in 2014. These claims have so far not been substantiated with publicly available documents, let alone with results from new health tests. But even if such reductions were achieved and effective, almost one third of the workforce would still be above the critical level of 100 μg/g. [1]

The 2013 health report states several times that more detailed analysis will be presented in a final report. If DPM’s claims about its success in reducing arsenic pollution are supported by this report, why is it not being made public? Does such a report exist at all? The people in Tsumeb that we interviewed during our visit had not seen or heard of it.

Unclear impacts on the town of Tsumeb; company and government remain silent

Even more uncertainty surrounds the impacts on the town of Tsumeb. The health reports Bankwatch had access to only covered DPM employees and former employees. But without evidence to the contrary, the information available so far and the situation we have found on the ground suggest that arsenic contamination in Tsumeb by the smelter is at least likely. With the smelter’s capacity not being restricted anymore, the arsenic trioxide generated by the smelter’s operations could turn into an environmental time bomb for Tsumeb.

As Bankwatch has described earlier, the production waste that includes the highly toxic arsenic trioxide is being stored in sugar bags at a dump-site located just a few hundred metres away from houses in Tsumeb (see photo).


A satellite image showing the close proximity of the dump site to residential houses in Tsumeb.

DPM claims it has an elaborate monitoring system to make sure no air and water contamination takes place and that the dump site is regularly being inspected by the Namibian government. Without substantiating these claims with facts, however, and in light of the health reports’ outcomes such claims sound hollow and meaningless.


A closeup of the Tsumeb waste disposal site. Clearly visible are the damaged bags containing residue from the smelter.

Nine months ago Bankwatch began requesting information from both Dundee Precious Metals and the Namibian government regarding the environmental permits of the Tsumeb smelter. Even though documents like the Environmental Impact Assessment and the Environmental Clearance Certificate should by law be publicly available [2], neither Bankwatch nor our Namibian partners Earthlife Namibia and the Legal Assistance Center were able to get access to them.

Until detailed information on the environmental performance of DPM’s Tsumeb smelter is available to others than those with a vested interest in the project, the continued poisoning of the town of Tsumeb is a possibility that cannot be ruled out.

Given the health impacts of substances like arsenic trioxide, such a risk should not be taken lightly, neither by Dundee Precious Metals nor by the government of Namibia.

Notes

1. This is based on the simplified assumption that the arsenic levels in the table above would now be half as high and thus all results above 200 μg/g in the table would now be above 100 μg/g.

2. As stated in the Environmental Management Act 7/2007 of the Republic of Namibia in Art. 17 (g) and (h) the Environmental Commissioner should maintain a register of the undertaken Environmental Assessments and the issued Environmental Clearance Certificates and “a copy of the record must be made available for public inspection at the office of the Environmental Commissioner during office hours” Art. 38 (3)

9 reasons why the EU’s bank is no climate leader


As declarations emerge from Paris about the billions and trillions of dollars needed to combat the affects of climate change, the world’s largest public lender, the European Investment Bank (EIB), is positioning itself as one of the pioneers in this effort. Together with other multilateral development banks, the EIB is posing as the vehicle to distribute these vast sums of money, and as the EU’s house bank, it has a guaranteed role to play in the bloc’s contribution to the fight against climate change, both within Europe and beyond.

But is the bank really fit for purpose? Can the EIB make a break from its history of financing fossil fuels and polluting forms of transportation after decades of cosy relations with the biggest culprits?

We look behind the façade and at the numbers and find nine reasons why the EIB is not the climate’s knight in shining armour.

 

1. Leader in climate finance … in five countries

According to an EIB evaluation (pdf), 70 per cent of the bank’s EUR 75 billion in climate finance between the years 2010 and 2014 was limited to just five countries: Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain.

A closer look at the bank’s projects from 2014 that are counted as climate action reveals an even more glaring imbalance. The 13 EU Member States in central and eastern Europe (CEE) collectively received less than one per cent (EUR 42 million) of the EUR 4.5 billion the EIB lent for renewable energy within the EU in 2014. Of the EUR 2 billion for energy efficiency, only EUR 148 million (7.4 per cent) went to the CEE region.

Overall, CEE countries received only 10 per cent of the EIB’s climate action lending in 2014 in spite of the energy intensities of their economies compared to the EU average. (Source: EIB climate action lending database 2013-2014 (xls))

 

2. Energy efficiency accounts for just two per cent of EIB lending

The European Commission has underlined the need to fundamentally rethink energy efficiency by introducing the Energy Efficiency First principle, i.e. to consider the potential for energy efficiency first in all energy related decisions. The EIB couldn’t be farther away from making this a guiding principle for its lending. As a cross-sectoral issue, energy efficiency measures constituted only 2.8 per cent of the EIB’s total lending in 2014. (Sources: EIB climate action lending database 2013-2014 (xls) for total energy efficiency lending; EIB 2014 Statistical Report (pdf) for the volume of signed loans.)

In spite of this, the Commission touts the bank as an important player for boosting energy efficiency investments in the EU. In its November Communication on the State of the Energy Union, the Commission proposed that the EIB-managed European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) helps Member States and project promoters boost energy efficiency schemes. If the EIB’s track record is anything to go by, energy efficiency is likely to be reduced to a footnote in the EFSI scheme.

 

3. Massive support for Europe’s car industry

Despite repeated calls to transform the global transport system away from private road transport, car manufacturers received a significant 11 per cent of EIB climate finance between 2010 and 2014.

As the EIB admits:

“Slightly over 40% of Climate Action RDI [Research, Development, Innovation] volume went to the German automobile sector. […] RDI operations on new RE [renewables] technologies are virtually absent from the Climate Action portfolio”.

Throwing more money at one of the most polluting modes of transportation is not the most effective form of climate finance. Adding insult to injury, car producers have actively circumvented and undermined the promised emission reduction efforts, which brings us to point four.

 

4. Generous EIB climate finance for the Volkswagen group

Since 2009 the EIB lent the Volkswagen group EUR 1.5 billion from its climate action programme to improve fuel efficiency and reduce emissions from its engines. Without more detailed information from the EIB about Volkswagen’s use of these loans, their contribution to emission reductions action is unknown.

 

5. One hand doesn’t know what the other is doing

While the EIB boasts about being a leader in climate finance, it still supports climate damaging projects with billions of euros. The EIB’s sustainability report (pdf) approximates that projects in 2014 resulted in 4.7 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions, the equivalent of putting 2.35 million new cars on the road.

For example, the construction of a 37 kilometre expressway adjacent to the Warsaw ring road in Poland is forecasted to contribute absolute emissions of 134 000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year. A gas extraction project in Tunisia will add another 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year.

 

6. EIB fossil fuel finance in European Neighbourhood countries

Between 2007 and 2014, the EIB provided EUR 3.2 billion for fossil fuel projects in sixteen countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Only EUR 780 million went to renewable and energy efficiency projects, the majority of which is located in just one country, Morocco.

For more, see the full infographic and executive summary of a study on EU financing in the energy sector of European Neighbourhood Policy countries.

 

7. Turning its back on the EU’s long term climate objectives?

In its new climate lending strategy approved in late September 2015, the EIB decided to drop a reference to the EU’s 2050 low-carbon economy roadmap. Despite bank statements repeatedly naming climate action a top lending priority since 2010, the new climate strategy fails to commit to EU decarbonisation goals.

 

8. EIB’s emissions standard for energy production lags behind

The EIB Emission Performance Standard (EPS) for the energy sector is currently set at a level of 550 g CO2/kWh. An EPS is a limit on the amount of CO2 that can be emitted by a power station. Conventional hard coal combustion results in the emission of approximately 850g CO2/kWh, while the most efficient gas power plants emit about 300g CO2/kWh.

During consultations on the EIB’s new climate policy, civil society organisations (E3G (pdf), WWF (pdf)) pointed out that this level is inconsistent with the EU 2050 climate target since it allows financing for infrastructure, like new oil-fired plants, with too high emissions to reach the 2050 target. Lying above the minimum level required (450 g CO2/kWh) to support the EU’s climate target the EIB’s EPS also lags behind similar standards introduced by the UK, the US and Canada.

This means that the bank may still finance fossil fuel-fired power plants that are less efficient than they could be.

 

9. Climate impact swept under the rug for one third of the EIB’s lending

Even though loans distributed through financial intermediaries, such as commercial banks and private equity funds, totalled 31 per cent of EIB lending in 2014, the bank still lacks a methodology to calculate the climate impact of this type of lending.

 

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Bern Convention Committee to decide fate of Balkan lynx and Boskov Most hydropower plant in Macedonia


At a meeting in Strasbourg from December 1-4, the Standing Committee of the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitat will agree on recommendations for the Government of Macedonia regarding hydropower developments in the Mavrovo National Park.

The forthcoming agreement by the Standing Committee is the tail end of an investigation into plans to construct at least sixteen hydropower installations in Mavrovo. In early 2013 a group of civil society organisations concerned about keeping the park intact and preserving an important habitat for the Balkan lynx filed a complaint with the Secretariat of the Bern Convention.

The current draft recommendations (pdf) ask the Macedonian Government to “suspend the implementation of the hydropower plants foreseen within the territory of the Mavrovo National Park”. They are based on a report (pdf) prepared after an on-the-spot appraisal this year in Macedonia by independent experts and observers.

A confirmation of the draft conclusions at this week’s meeting would greatly improve the chances for the Balkan lynx to remain in its territory, after being declared critically endangered by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN).

The draft recommendations also explicitly address international financiers, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and ask to suspend financing for projects in the territory of the Mavrovo national park. The EBRD approved EUR 65 million financing for the 68 MW Boskov Most Hydro Power Plant – a decision in breach of the bank’s own environmental policy.

The Boskov Most area in the Mavrovo national park in considered the core reproductive area for the Balkan lynx species whose mature population is estimated to count less than 50 individuals. The construction of the Boskov Most hydropower plant would likely cause great harm to the fragile population of this endangered species. The observers to the on-the-spot appraisal mission have stated in their report (pdf) that

“following the precautionary principle, the project as currently designed must be abandoned until the conservation status of the Balkan lynx population is brought back to a safe level and until when the Mavrovo National Park is no longer the only known core area of reproduction of this species.”

Non-governmental organisations involved in the case – Bankwatch’s Macedonian member group Eko-svest (who filed the complaint), Front 21/42 (an environmental lawyer organisation) and the Macedonian ecological society (biologists who have done GPS monitoring of the lynx in Mavrovo) – will be attending the Standing Committee’s meeting. They will ask delegates to adopt stronger recommendations that demand the cancellation of hydro projects planned by the Macedonian government and the EBRD.

Follow us on Twitter for updates from Strasbourg >>

 

Exporting toxic pollution from Europe to Namibia


While people associate Namibia with African wildlife, the gateway to its largest sanctuary, the Etosha national park in the northwest of the country has little to keep tourists there. The polluted air in the town of Tsumeb, home to exhausted open pit mines and a copper smelter, is something the 16 000 or so inhabitants have to live with and foreigners try to escape from.

Yet, it is not only the heavy air that has been of concern. The waste disposal site is piling up with arsenic that was left from the smelting of European ore and has caused fears of contaminated soil and water. It also raises questions about the intricate scheme of how European pollution is exported to the Global South with indirect help of public development money.

The Tsumeb smelter is an old trouble maker, created to process some of the dirtiest copper ore in the world. For years the air around the smelter is filled with fugitive emissions – from arsenic dust to sulphuric dioxide.


An old sign from a previous mining company in Tsumeb

Local people claim that some of their garden plants and crops are ailing from this pollution. And not only plants are affected. A health report tested the urine of a few hundred locals. The arsenic concentration in the urine samples was high – even for people living 60 km away from the smelter.

Development is not simply bought or built.

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Making a virtue out of necessity

The Tsumeb smelter belongs to Dundee Precious Metals, a Canadian company that operates and develops gold, copper and silver mines in Bulgaria, Armenia and Serbia. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provided the company with a EUR 20 million loan in 2005 and a USD 45 million revolving credit later in 2012 in order to increase the ore recovery at the DPM-owned Chelopech mine in Bulgaria among other things. With its higher yield, the Chelopech mine has for years kept the Tsumeb smelter economically going – half of the copper concentrate smelted in Tsumeb comes from Chelopech.

The Tsumeb smelter has a reputation of being among the few in the world capable of processing ore that is abundant in arsenic, a toxic compound dangerous to human health if not managed properly. It was a practical choice for Dundee to ship ore from Chelopech to Africa where environmental standards are more lax and refurbishment costs are lower. Back in 1988, the Bulgarian government had banned local facilities from processing the Chelopech ore because they were not able to handle the high arsenic concentrations without environmental consequences. (The alternative of cyanide leaching was rejected by Bulgarian society.)

Dundee acquired the Tsumeb smelter in 2010 with a special clause that exempts the company from any liabilities related to the environmental damage caused by the past owners. Adding to the dark legacy, the smelter has treated concentrates that contain twice as much arsenic as the ones processed in the past and the capacity of the smelter has more than doubled after technological upgrades, including the construction of new oxygen and acid plants.


Highly toxic waste stored in sugar bags.

Piling up the arsenic pollution

In Tsumeb the concentrate gets smelted under high temperatures to separate the copper from sulphide, arsenic and other compounds it contains, leaving just the metal behind. As a by-product of extracting arsenic from the ore, arsenic trioxide is produced and later sold by Dundee Precious Metals for the manufacturing of wood preservatives and herbicides. Since Europe and the USA have stopped using arsenic trioxide in the production of agriculture and wood treatment, Dundee sells arsenic to the smaller markets in South Africa and Malaysia and stores the excess at a hazardous waste site at the town’s outskirts.

The smelter is an important employer in the town and its vicinities, providing full time positions to 448 people and indirect jobs to as many as 1,466 subcontracted workers. Dundee also maintains a community fund.

Concerned about the payroll loss, locals think twice about whether to submit grievances. Despite the risks, locals dared to speak out and convinced the Namibian government to conduct an audit probing health and environmental impacts of the smelter. Finalised in January 2012, the audit concluded that the smelter was affecting negatively the environment and the health of the employees and the community. As a result, the government issued an order that the smelter needs to reduce its capacity feed by half and adopt technological improvements.

Pleased by the smelter upgrades, the government lifted the curtailment on the quantities of concentrate to be treated in Tsumeb in December 2013. Dunde Precious Metals claimed to have invested over USD 110 million into emissions improvements that have reduced both inhalable arsenic levels and arsenic contamination of the workers.

Yet, a site visit by Bankwatch staff in August 20015 revealed that the upgrades have likely not touched the hazardous disposal site. As visible from the photographs (below), the highly toxic arsenic trioxide is stored in sugar bags at a dump-site situated just a few hundred meters away from the Tsumeb houses. Although, lined on a non-permeable liner, the bags are unprotected from the wind and sun from the top. The site has been filled at accelerated rates and seems to be at the brink of its capacity, storing what looks like tens of thousands of tons of arsenic dust and other production waste piled in several layers already.


The Tsumeb waste dump where the highly toxic arsenic trioxide is being stored in sugar bags. Photos from three different years show how the site has filled up over time and is about to reach its limit.

Bankwatch staff has for months attempted to retrieve environmental documentation, including the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment to understand how Dundee manages toxic waste and prevents arsenic contamination among its workforce and the local population. Their repeated requests for a meeting with the smelter management have been turned down just like the requests for disclosure of documents to the company and the Ministry of Environment.

Tsumeb is a blatant example of a Western company exporting toxic pollution from Europe to a less restrictive developing country. The fact that European development finance is involved makes the EBRD shareholder governments complacent in the environmental wrongdoing associated with the mining industry. This should be sufficient reason for the bank to withdraw from financing ore extraction projects.