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[Campaign update] MEP Rebecca Harms criticises Ukrainian nuclear operator for its lawsuit against activists


This article first appeared in Ukrainian on radiosvoboda.org. It was translated and reprinted with kind permission.


The member of the European Parliament Rebecca Harms called Energoatom’s lawsuit against the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine (NECU) ‘nonsense’. The Ukrainian state nuclear operator filed a lawsuit against the civil society organisation because of the organisation’s conclusions on the condition of the second reactor of the South-Ukrainian nuclear power plant.

In her comment to Radio Liberty the MEP stated:

“I consider this matter strange. I said this to Energoatom representatives and I had a meeting with Ms. Vronska (Deputy Minister of Ecology covering for European integration – ed.) on this issue. I will also speak about it with the Minister of Energy. This matter is nonsense. Discussion is needed instead. The real issue is whether all the upgrades have been completed for this reactor of the South-Ukrainian NPP, which are required to extend its lifetime,” said Harms who is the Co-President of the Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.

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“It is normal in my country, Germany, or any other EU country, that non-governmental organisations accuse state authorities who are responsible for the safety of nuclear facilities of failure to do their job. After that, the authorities, minister, companies in the area of nuclear energy response to these challenges and present their arguments. But I cannot remember that something like a press release provided the basis for court proceedings like in the case against the National Ecological Center,” added the MEP.

At the end of August 2015, the National Ecological Center of Ukraine (NECU) was notified about the lawsuit from Energoatom filed against it. According to the environmentalists, the reason for the suit was NECU’s press release from May. It stated that the condition of the second power unit of the South-Ukrainian NPP failed to meet the requirements for its further safe operation.

Energoatom states that the information distributed by the activists is factually wrong.


Copyright © 2015 RFE/RL, Inc. Reprint allowed by Радіо Вільна Європа / Радіо Свобода

Up in smoke: the billions for Europe’s auto industry from the EU’s house bank

In the wake of last month’s Volkswagen (VW) emissions scandal, a Politico story, based on a Bankwatch analysis, revealed that the car manufacturer enjoyed generous public financial support from the European Investment Bank (EIB). But the full picture is even more disturbing.

Bankwatch’s analysis of EIB data identified 19 loans totaling EUR 4.3 billion for the VW group between 2005 and 2015. Fourteen of these loans were intended for improving fuel efficiency and reducing emissions, and out of them five were classified under the bank’s so-called ‘climate action’. Five loans worth EUR 1.53 billion are still to be paid back.

With the spotlight bright on VW for gaming the system, the EIB must now come forward and show exactly what it has done to ensure proper oversight over its loans to the company.

With the spotlight bright on VW for gaming the system, the EIB must now come forward and show exactly what it has done to ensure proper oversight over its loans to the company.

Today Bankwatch can reveal that between 2005 and 2015, the EIB lent European automakers EUR 20.4 billion. Diesel cars produced by seven of these companies have been found to have considerably higher nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions when put to more stringent tests than the ones currently in place in the EU.


The underlying data for this graph can be seen and downloaded here. The source data is available on the EIB’s website.


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Volvo, whose S60 D4 model was found to emit over 14 times more NOx than in regulators’ tests, has received EUR 1.75 billion from the EIB. The bank also lent Fiat, whose 500x 1.6 model emitted over six times that level, more than EUR 2.9 billion. Four loans totaling EUR 1.7 billion were extended to one or more unnamed automakers in Germany.

A number of these loans were explicitly intended for the research and development of engines with lower emissions. In fact, over half of all EIB loans to Europe’s car industry between 2005 and 2015 were classified as “climate action”.

These loans raised our concerns from the very beginning. In March 2009, after the EIB gave over EUR 3 billion to nine European car manufacturers, including VW, Bankwatch and Greenpeace expressed their scepticism about these investments. “CEE Bankwatch Network and Greenpeace call on the EIB to ensure that money goes to initiatives with a true impact on cutting carbon emissions from cars and not just to small-scale greenwash projects,” the statement read.

Now, in light of suggestions that other carmakers might have also manipulated emissions tests, the findings from our analysis cast doubts over whether those loans, meant for developing cleaner car engines, have indeed served their purpose.

In particular, labeling some of the loans as “climate action” is plain cynical. The EIB’s Operations Evaluation report (pdf) showed that between 2010 and 2014 the car industry received the biggest share – 11 per cent – of the bank’s total climate action lending. Despite some efficiency gains in car engines, this classification ignores the long-term cumulative impacts of loans that go to polluting transport instead of cleaner alternatives.

But it is now about the credibility of the EIB and its ability to ensure sufficient control over billions of euros in public funds. Failing to be transparent and publicly accountable – by disclosing all the relevant information – would make the bank complicit in both mismanaging public funds and contributing to chronic air pollution and climate change.

So far the bank has been restrained in informing about its actions towards VW group. EIB President Werner Hoyer said the bank has launched an investigation into the case and might ask the money back from VW. “If we determine that the loans that we have extended to drive engine developments have not contributed to combating climate change, but have possibly done the contrary, then that is a reputational problem also for us,” Hoyer told Bloomberg.

If the EIB suffers a reputational risk it means that the bank had been negligent in the case. So if the bank is concerned about its reputation, it would be wise to be as transparent as possible right now. The EIB does indeed document things like the results of research and development through monitoring reports about the achievements of its investments, but these are not publicly available.

The EIB’s accountability is on the line and the public interest in disclosing all relevant information clearly outweighs the bank’s normal transparency standards. Otherwise, how can the public know if the bank demanding its VW loans back is at all legally possible? Has the bank even secured such option in the loan contract?

Meanwhile, it is business as usual at the EIB, which has just announced a no less secretive loan of EUR 700 million to Daimler. A day after the loan was approved the Guardian revealed that Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz diesel cars have been found to produce at least 2.2 times more NOx in real driving conditions than the official Euro 5 level and five times higher than the Euro 6 level.

A month since the scandal was first revealed, and three weeks since the public learned that Europe’s biggest automaker received hefty support from Europe’s biggest lender too many questions remain – the ball is now in the EIB’s court.


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Public action: Mourning the demise of Czech responsibility for climate action


On October 6, Bankwatch member groups from the Czech Republic Centre for Transport and Energy (CDE) and Hnutí Duha held a funeral service to mourn the death of the Czech Republic’s responsibility for climate change. With a three meter tall funeral wreath (see visuals below) about three dozens of citizens grieved the loss of a piece of the Czech Republic’s landscape as well the country’s responsibility for climate action. The performance was a gift for minister of industry who met activists for talks about the current government’s climate and energy policy.

While the funeral was a mockery, the government’s upcoming decision to dismantle limits on coal mining is not. Established to protect the landscape of northern Bohemia and locals from the threat of evictions, limits on mining are keeping more than 1.3 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide in the ground that would otherwise be emitted if the coal were to be mined and burned.

The government is expected to decide to lift the limits on October 19.

Read more background about the mining limits and the impact it would have to lift them on our blog:
Czech coal mining communities are under threat

Visuals from the action

 
Funeral action - Czech coal mining limits


Made possible with funding from

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The EU’s bank turns its back on Europe’s long term climate goals


Earlier this week the European Investment Bank (EIB) published its new Climate Strategy, after it was adopted by the bank’s Board of Directors in late September. But it seems that the Board has decided to further dilute this already weak policy guidance document.

A reference to the EU’s 2050 decarbonisation roadmap as a long term vision guiding the EIB’s climate action, which appeared in the final draft published in August and brought to the Board, has been removed in the official document.

This could have counted as a minor, errant amendment if the whole strategy were anything more than a PR exercise.

Just when stepping up climate action financing is so urgently needed, the EIB’s new Climate Strategy does little more than consolidating the bank’s current financing practices and showcasing a worrying dearth of detailed financial and advisory solutions, numbers, volumes and timelines.

Already in 2008 the bank decided to allocate over 20% of its total lending to projects contributing to greenhouse gas emission cuts and adaptation to the impacts of climate change. In 2010 this target has been upgraded to 25%. Yet, after seven years of experience in supporting climate-related projects , the EIB is still unable to raise the bar. This is particularly shameful given that the bank’s climate-related lending has already exceeded 30% of its overall portfolio in 2010.

Not least, despite bank statements repeatedly naming climate action a top lending priority since 2010, the new Climate Strategy fails to commit to boosting the much needed support for energy efficiency in lower income EU member states.
 
Consequently, rather than scaling up its support for financing climate action, in line with the EU’s climate and energy targets, the EU bank’s pledge falls far short of the role the world’s largest public lender should be playing in the global effort to tackle climate change.

Guest post: Throwing evidence to the wind? The World Bank continues pushing PPPs


This article originally appeared in the Autumn 2015 edition of the Bretton Woods Observer. It was reposted here with slight layout changes with kind permission by the Bretton Woods Project.

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In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting pressure on public resources, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a key pillar of development strategies, including those of the World Bank (see Observer Autumn 2014). As argued by Nancy Alexander of German political foundation Heinrich Böll, mega infrastructure projects financed through PPPs are now considered the recovery’s silver bullet, including among developed countries (see Observer Winter 2015). These trends are evidenced by the threefold increase in World Bank support to PPPs from 2002 to 2012 and its establishment of the Global Infrastructure Facility in 2014 (see Bulletin Nov 2014) which has as its objective to facilitate the “preparation and structuring of complex infrastructure PPPs to enable mobilisation of private sector and institutional investor capital.”

Exposing the myth


Public-private partnerships are not a silver bullet for public infrastructure. Our website Overpriced and underwritten exposes the hidden costs of PPPs.

Read more

‘Solutions Bank’ ignores evidence

Given that one of the explicit objectives of the World Bank’s strategy is to “promote public-private partnerships” and that PPPs would comprise a cross-cutting solutions area (see Observer Autumn 2015), the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in 2014 published an evaluation of the Bank’s effectiveness in “supporting countries to use PPPs” (see Observer Autumn 2014). While the evaluation failed to consider the democratic governance implications of these ‘partnerships’, something raised by Eurodad in its July report on PPPs, it nonetheless warned that “contingent liabilities for governments that emerge from PPPs are rarely fully quantified at the project level” and highlighted that despite the Bank’s poverty eradication objective “it cannot … be assessed how far PPPs benefited the poor as large data gaps exist.”

Concerns about the risks associated with PPPs have also been acknowledged by the IMF, which in 2014 developed a PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM). In its summary brochure on the P-FRAM, the Fund notes that the tool was developed “to assess the potential fiscal costs and risks arising from PPP projects”, noting that “in many countries, investment projects have been procured as PPPs not for efficiency reasons, but to circumvent budget constraints” thus resulting in the procurement of “projects that either could not be funded within [governments’] budgetary envelope, or that exposed public finances to excessive fiscal risks.”

In March the World Bank’s Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Centre (PPPIRC) identified 10 important risks associated with PPPs, including that “development, bidding and ongoing costs in PPP projects are likely to be greater than for traditional government procurement processes” and that the “private sector will do what it is paid to do and no more than that”, thus putting into question the extent to which governments should count on the willingness of the private sector to go beyond its profit motive and to act in support of sustainable development outcomes. Yet, in the webpage introduction of its PPP reference guide 2.0, developed jointly with the Asian Development Bank, the Bank notes:

“PPPs, are increasingly recognised as a valuable development tool by governments, firms, donors, civil society, and the public. The reason is straightforward: all over the world, well-designed PPP transactions have delivered quality infrastructure and services, often at lower cost, by harnessing private sector financing, technical know-how, and management expertise.

Despite the inclusion of caveats and cautions in World Bank documents, such as the reference to ‘well-designed PPP transactions’ qualifier above, civil society organisations remain sceptical of the willingness of the Bank, in the words of Nancy Alexander, to “relinquish their bias in favour of PPPs in favour of an even-handed assessment of PPPs versus public works”. The current unease about the apparent contradiction between the Bank’s research findings and more cautious public statements, and its investments and policy advocacy mirror concerns raised nearly a decade ago by the Bank-commissioned 2006 independent evaluation of Bank research. The evaluation criticised the Bank for giving internal research favourable to Bank positions “great prominence” while ignoring “unfavourable” research and was also critical of the Bank’s use of its research “to proselytize … Bank policy, often without taking a balanced view of the evidence, and without expressing appropriate scepticism.” It additionally identified “a serious failure of the checks and balances that should separate advocacy and research.” The lack of integration of critical views at the country level is echoed by the IEG’s 2013 client survey, which found that “only 6 per cent of [field based staff] … frequently read IEG reports.”

Summarising the findings of IEG’s 2014 evaluation of learning at the World Bank during a presentation in London in June, Marie Gaarder, manager of IEG’s public sector department, concluded that most of the Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results reports “lack rigorous evidence on the extent to which observed outcomes can be attributed to Bank interventions” and that “the Bank’s project performance assessment system is not a reliable source of evidence of outcomes.” Considering the incentive structures that impede learning at the Bank, the evaluation noted that “about 70 per cent of respondents to IEG’s survey of Bank staff feel that the pressure to lend has crowded out learning” (see Observer Summer 2015).

Despite these concerns, the Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) continue to push PPPs through a variety of channels, including a “PPP knowledge lab” and dedicated “PPP Days”. An August report titled Partnering to build a better world, internally produced by MDBs for the G20, focused on MDB cooperation in encouraging private sector investment in infrastructure. The report details the depth of MDB cooperation on PPPs and provides additional evidence of the extent to which views critical of PPPs are ignored.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s private sector arm, runs an online course on PPPs and publishes the Handshake magazine, the World Bank’s journal on PPPs that “explores how the public and private sectors can together address complex global challenges.” Despite the fact that PPPs in health and education have been severely criticised (see Observer Summer 2015) and water privatisation schemes have been reversed in many cities (see Observer Autumn 2015), the IFC continues to identify these sectors as priority areas for their PPP investments and technical support.

In its 2015 report on the poverty focus of World Bank country programmes, the IEG referenced its 2011 evaluation of IFC’s poverty impact, which found that its measurement and evaluation framework “did not quantify benefits to the poor and there were no indicators for measuring a project’s effect on poverty” and that “the majority of investment projects generated economic returns but did not provide evidence of identifiable benefits to the poor.”

Aldo Caliari of US-based NGO Center of Concern said:

“We see this pattern again and again, Bank evaluations and analyses question the way it does things with no perceivable changes on the ground. Now the Bank is in the business of producing myriad tools to ‘help countries do better PPPs’ and we wonder: how can it truly help countries when it so clearly fails to incorporate internal learning and the incentives remain so skewed in favour of lending?”

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When environmental improvement becomes resettlement – lessons from Serbia’s Kolubara mine


In a few hours I will be in Vreoci, a village stranded in the heart of the Kolubara mining basin in Serbia, one of the biggest in Europe. I am there to present the findings of an analysis of involuntary resettlement practice for coal mining in this region. The study ‘A clear and present danger’ (pdf), commissioned by Bankwatch and executed by Nostromo Research, shows how the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has failed to enforce a number of its own standards on involuntary resettlement.

Notably, the project’s summary on the EBRD’s website admits with distinct euphemism that “EPS is faced with a number of on-going environmental and social challenges”, and “implementation of EBRD’s environmental and social requirement has in the past been mixed”.

Download the study

I am always nervous when I travel to Vreoci. I’ve been there three times already in the last year: in winter, when people burn lignite to heat their homes, making the air unbreathable; in spring when smoke from spontaneous coal fires in one of the fields covered part of the village in thick smoke; and in the dry summer, when the locals had no running water because they are connected to the same water network as the mines, and obviously it’s the coal digging that comes first.

These are the conditions in which over 3000 people live every day as a result of extensive mining in the Kolubara region, supported also by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the German development bank KfW. Their 2011 loan to the state owned Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS), which operates the mines in the Kolubara basin, theoretically supported “environmental improvements”. In reality, the only improvement visible seems to be the amount of lignite extracted.

After more than five decades of mining little has been done to address the environmental and social impacts for the villages in the region and the local communities have asked repeatedly to be collectively resettled and justly compensated in a way that allows them to preserve their livelihoods.

But a resettlement plan (known as the “Blue Book on resettlement”), agreed in 2007 between the Serbian government, EPS and the local council of Vreoci, is still far from being fully implemented. Our new report shows that the EBRD has failed to enforce a number of its own standards on involuntary resettlement, and both the EBRD and KfW have failed to carry out a full social impact assessment of the mine expansion. As a result, the longer a response is delayed, the more the locals suffer.

Our analysis argues that in spite of the EBRD’s declared mission to increase the quality of the lignite and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fuel combustion, in reality what EPS was doing on the ground was promoting a major expansion of lignite extraction – with the equipment covered by the 2011 EBRD and KfW loan. This also inevitably entailed the need for resettlement. The Banks ignored the fact that the Kolubara Mining Basin is effectively one field, integrally managed by a single enterprise, MB Kolubara, controlled by the banks’ client EPS.

Now, the EBRD is considering a new EUR 200 million loan to “restructure and refinance expensive short to medium-term EPS financial debt” (with a target date for approval on October 28).

Even if it is a corporate restructuring project, it does include “environmental and social due diligence focus[ed] on opportunities to improve environmental, safety, social and labour governance capacity to develop a more strategic approach to managing these issues”.

Notably, the project’s summary on the EBRD’s website admits with distinct euphemism that “EPS is faced with a number of on-going environmental and social challenges”, and “implementation of EBRD’s E&S [environmental and social] requirement has in the past been mixed”.

Although the more optimistic of us would say that the sheer public acceptance of a problem is one step forward towards improvement, I remain faithful to one of the recommendations in our study launched today: the EBRD should publicly acknowledge a major responsibility for the environmental damage and human rights violations taking place in the Kolubara mine basin since 2011, and do right by the community of Vreoci.

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