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Blog entry

The recap on recapitalisation


Media reports following the conclusions of the emergency EU summit at October’s end and the eurozone bailout plan focused overwhelmingly on the extent of Greek sovereign debt woes and details of whether the EFSF bazooka could deliver firepower equivalent to that of Tony Montana (it seems unlikely that it can given the poor performance of offerings to date).

Apart from a few exceptions, there was significantly less analysis devoted to the other pillar of the bailout, specifically the requirements on recapitalisation of eurozone banks, with estimates suggesting that more than EUR 100bln is needed if banks are to meet 9 percent targets by June 2012.

The implications of recapitalisation for central and eastern Europe (CEE) are severe. EBRD chief economist Erik Berglof has told the Wall Street Journal that the threat of deleveraging posed by recapitalisation (i.e. eurozone banks scaling back operations in CEE to finance their own needs) is “considerably worse” than after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.

This is because the EU summit communiqué does not define effectively enough where eurozone banks can and cannot turn to shore up their capital ratios. What the plan fails to provision for are the subsidiaries of eurozone banks operating in CEE. The region and its majority-owned foreign banking sectors are back on the chopping block.

What role will international financial institutions be given in this unfolding situation? Already there are reports that the EIB will ramp up its investments to contain a lending freeze, with some suggestions of as much as EUR 74bln in the next two years. History repeats itself though, so this should be cause for concern given the previous response from the IFIs to the financial crisis in our region.

It should be remembered that it was precisely the EBRD, EIB and the World Bank Group who were first called to arms in 2009 to contain the spread of the crisis. With their Joint Action Plan the IFIs made more than EUR 33bln available in just over two years, exceeding an initial volume target of EUR 24.5bln. An overwhelming majority of these loans were signed with the same eurozone banks operating in CEE – Unicredit, Société Générale, BNP Paribas – that are now widely expected to turn back to the region to meet recapitalisation targets through deleveraging. What now for all that bail-out money?

In their final report on the action plan, the heads of these institutions heralded that a banking system crisis had been adverted and lending to the real economy resumed, and it seemed all that was missing was the warship and mission accomplished banner.

However ‘saving’ the system in this way seems to have prolonged the inevitable for not addressing the underlying, structural issues at play here in the region. At the same time this mode of crisis response appears to have neglected the core functions and supposed value-added of these financial institutions as public bodies – that of getting financing to those who need it most in times of crisis, the small and medium-sized enterprises at the backbone of the European economy.

Our research into IFI financing for SMEs during the crisis paints a much bleaker picture. An evaluation of EIB crisis lending via its ‘global loans’, which are designed to benefit SMEs via lending from commercial banks, had an abysmal penetration rate of 0.001 percent of all SMEs in the CEE countries we surveyed. The EIB package that was designed to stimulate the SME sector of the economy appears to have provided greater stimulation to the intermediary banks who were the initial recipients of the funding – quite different than the EIB’s conclusions that it provided “a welcome ray of light in the current economic gloom.” Moreover the EBRD’s own assessment of its crisis response noted “For the EBRD to simply extend lines of credit to financial intermediaries for SME financing may not induce sufficient bank lending … the EBRD SME credit lines did not prevent the credit crunch, particularly for small businesses.”

As the eurozone crisis continues to unfold, IFI lending to the banking sector must be held to the task of supporting the most vulnerable – especially the SMEs in CEE – or it will continue to perform largely unsuccessful and unchecked as it has during the crisis to date. There needs to be much greater transparency and qualitative reporting on the results of what is actually being achieved with IFI lending to the banking sector, apart from just aggregated lending volumes.

What’s the real danger for Cohesion Policy: wrong accounting or wrong results?


In their annual report (published today), the European Court of Auditors found that (pdf) “Cohesion [Policy], energy and transport was the most error-prone EU area of EU expenditure, with an estimated error rate of 7.7%”.

There are two ways in which this finding can be interpreted and both are reasonable to some extent: On the one hand, it’s a clear hint in the direction of EU Member States to do their homework and learn how to handle proper public procurements. Many EU funded projects, particularly in new member states, are not exactly transparent in the selection of contractors, which raises legitimate concerns about the effective use of these huge amounts of public money.

On the other hand, some of the irregularities will also be an effect of the still high and often unnecessary administrative burdens for Cohesion Policy accounting – an issue perpetuated at both EU and national level. (Anyone who has managed an EU funded project knows the amount of paper work requested and the strain this can put on human capacity.)

Recognising these burdens, the European Commission has in its legislative proposal for the future Cohesion Policy eventually proposed to simplify these procedures in order to release some of the burden from the implementing authorities.

This indicates, in my view, a step in the right direction: move away from the focus on accounting, and instead focus on results.

This is good and necessary to make Cohesion Policy eventually efficient and effective, but it also requires setting the right priorities for what’s to be financed. To discuss the latter, Bankwatch and other environmental organisations will meet this month with representatives from the EU and from Member States and regions.

Our event Green investments to the rescue will examine in which investment fields future EU funds can foster sustainable regional development, secure long-term jobs in green sectors and help achieving EU objectives in the areas of climate, biodiversity and resource efficiency.

It remains to be seen whether EU Member States and the authorities implementing cohesion spending are more interested in (the reduction of) accounting procedures or in making Cohesion Policy what it should and could be: a strong instrument to help Europe become a sustainable economy.


Original image courtesy of flickr user bourgeoisbee – CC 2.0

Hydropower vs. nature in southeast Europe: EBRD complicity in environmental crime?

Why is it that when we advocate for something to the international financial institutions (IFIs) they often manage to give it a peculiar twist of their own?

Such is the case with renewable energy. We wanted sustainable, new renewable energy sources, but what do we get? Big hydro. Yes, the same old so-last-century big hydro that has been destroying nature and livelihoods for decades (pdf).

Regular visitors to our blog will already be familiar with Georgia’s ongoing conversion into an electricity socket for Turkey – with few benefits but serious risks for Georgians and their environment – but now the hydro trend looks set to spread to the Balkans.

On 8th November the EBRD’s Board of Directors is to vote on a terrible twosome comprised of the Boskov Most hydropower plant in Macedonia (pdf) and the Ombla hydropower plant in Croatia.

Both projects threaten protected natural areas: Boskov Most hydropower plant would be built within the Mavrovo National Park right on the area where the very rare Balkan lynx lives, while the Ombla plant would be built in a cave with five species of protected bats and numerous other rare cave-dwelling species like the eccentric-looking Proteus anguinus, sometimes known as the ‘human fish’. Both Mavrovo and the Ombla spring area are due to be Natura 2000 sites when Macedonia and Croatia join the EU, and in both cases the environmental assessment procedures have been seriously flawed.

Every day I see IFIs financing projects I don’t agree with, but even I’m shocked by this. It’s well known that there is a problem with EU accession countries rushing to build destructive infrastructure projects before they become EU members and can be penalised for violating EU environmental legislation, yet here is a European public bank that looks set to finance this very practice.

So my message to the European Commission and the EBRD’s Board of Directors is simply: We’re counting on you. Don’t rush into these projects. Both Croatia and Macedonia have serious potential for new renewables such as solar, wind and sustainable biomass, and for increased energy efficiency, but they are underdeveloped. The EBRD is one of the institutions that is best placed to send a clear message to the Croatian and Macedonian governments to do something about this, but will it do so, or just finance whatever is on the governments’ shopping lists?

Image source: rgbtock.com

Haircuts for eurozone citizens? A closer look at the EFSF


One of the elements of the rescue package that eurozone leaders agreed on after marathon talks yesterday is an increase in the financial capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), from EUR 440 billion to EUR 1 trillion. (The scepticism here in Slovakia towards the increase caused quite a stir earlier this month.)

The EFSF’s official function is to provide financial assistance to euro area Member States in distress. But this simplified understanding as well as the “nick name” eurozone bailout fund conceals some more sinister aspects of the facility.

Focus on liberalisation and public spending cuts

The EFSF, as it looks now, is yet another international financial institution (IFI), very similar to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its mode of operation based on a unified austerity model – privatise, liberalise, radically cut public spending, decrease taxes. We’ve seen the impacts of this “haircuts for citizens” approach for decades in the countries that received the IMF’s and other IFI’s assistance. And what’s happening right now in Greece might be a preview of what’s to come.

Large scale privatisation and tax reductions as essential parts of a universal therapy for countries in troubles have proven to only perpetuate the instability of public budgets and the inability to pay public debt. High level officials already had to admit that without increased income it will be impossible to improve public balance sheets no matter how strict the austerity measures we adopt.

Decision-making behind closed doors

An additional problem will be lack of public control. While other IFIs are finally opening up to public scrutiny (at least to some extent), all of the EFSF’s decisions are currently made behind closed doors. Scepticism about its transparency of decision-making is growing as all the decisions are now taken without public control.

Repeating the same mistakes that brought the financial crisis

If the proposal from Germany and France will be approved, the EFSF with its reliance on financial markets will turn into a multi-billion hedge fund depending on the will of private investors to trust the EU’s and its member states’ promises. Ironically, designed as a special purpose vehicle the EFSF will follow the same model of Collateralised Debt Obligations that stood at the beginning of the financial crisis. We can only guess where this would lead us to.

So then what?

Agreed, criticising is easier that coming up with solutions. While I can’t offer a comprehensive answer to the eurozone crisis, I know at least two imperatives for a eurozone bailout fund that really contributes to solving the debt crisis:

To avoid an escalation of austerity measures the conditionalities for ESFS borrowers should be such that have the potential to create a basis for future development (e.g. invest in education, energy savings, renewables and public services) and motivate countries to consolidate the income side of their budgets (i.e. progressive taxes rates, effective tax collection).

And certainly don’t use private intermediaries to raise funds.

The art of sustainability is not to finance coal


It was not the most comfortable sight: figures trapped inside a cube and people in suits standing outside and making sure no one gets out.

It wasn’t meant to be comforting either. Marko’s art installation symbolised EU citizens locked in a polluted environment, while European bankers and politicians are keeping them stuck in it by supporting and investing in the Sostanj lignite power plant project.

The European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have approved loans for the project, although it would make a laughing stock of Slovenia’s and the EU’s climate targets: By 2050, together with all other EU members, Slovenia will have to reduce its overall CO2 emissions by at least 80 percent. The new block at Sostanj alone would take up almost all of the country’s emissions allowance if the required reduction is achieved. In practice, this means that either Slovenia gives up the idea of building this plant or it will have to break its emissions reduction commitments as an EU member.

Many Slovenians oppose this project and this summer 18 000 people signed a petition asking the Slovene government to reconsider its plans. Now the Slovenian parliament has just refused to support a state guarantee for the banks’ loans.

The action was meant to bring those critical voices also to the centre of European decision making. Bankwatch, Focus and Banktrack will make sure decision makers will remember it when stepping inside a meeting room.

Images from the action are below. Marko’s story and a quick round-up of Sostanj and other EU funded coal power plants can be read in the leaflet we prepared for the action (pdf).


Photos by: Pieter Delputte

European Parliament makes a step towards putting the ‘E’ into EBRD


Among the many curiosities we’ve discovered over the years about the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are that it is not particularly European and it does not think it is a development bank.

Both of these issues lead to problems with accountability and proving positive results. For example the EBRD does not measure its development impacts on the ground such as number of people with drinkable water, employment levels or increase in waste recycling, but rather its ‘transition impact’, a slippery concept that currently involves a lot of liberalisation and privatisation, under the questionable assumption that these automatically lead to development results. [1]

And when it comes to the question of whether it is European, although the European Commission and EU member states own more than 60 percent of the EBRD’s shares, the bank is quite unaccountable to the European institutions. Take the ill-fated D1 motorway PPP case in Slovakia, for example. In 2010 while the European Commission was still investigating whether the Slovak government had adequately assessed the project’s impacts on a Natura 2000 area of high biodiversity value, its very own Executive Director at the EBRD voted in favour of the project. When Bankwatch tried to find out what had happened by submitting official information requests, it emerged that there was no paper trail showing how this decision had been made or what conditions had been stipulated.

Similarly, when we’ve spoken to members of the European Parliament about our concerns regarding the EBRD, it has become clear that the tools these elected representatives of the EU have for monitoring or influencing the activities of the bank is very limited.

No doubt we will continue to have debates about these issues for many years to come. But now the European Parliament took a step forward when it adopted a legislative resolution that includes conditions for the EU’s subscription to additional shares, i.e. for increasing the EBRD’s capital. Its requests to the bank included the following:

  • By 2015 the Commission should present a report assessing the effectiveness of the existing European public financing institutions in Europe and its neighbourhood, including recommendations on their cooperation and the optimisation and coordination of their activities.
  • On its website, the EBRD should provide appropriate information about the beneficiaries, the impact of its financial intermediary operations and the evaluations of projects.
  • The EU’s representatives at the EBRD should endeavour to avoid the bank financing any projects implemented with the use of tax havens, defined as “characterised notably by no or nominal taxes, a lack of effective exchange of information with foreign tax authorities and a lack of transparency in legislative, legal or administrative provisions, or as identified by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Financial Action Task Force”.
  • The EU Governor at the EBRD should report annually to the European Parliament on the promotion of EU objectives, especially Article 21 of the EU Treaty on the European Union, the Europe 2020 Strategy, and the significant increase of the transfer of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies. S/He is also obliged to report annually, among other things, on measures to ensure transparency of operations of the EBRD through financial intermediaries, and on how the EBRD has contributed to the Union’s objectives.

The issues identified by the Parliament covered only a small section of those called for by Bankwatch in the run-up to the capital increase of the EBRD, but are nevertheless welcome.

The call for the EU’s Governor at the EBRD to report annually to the Parliament will also be a useful opportunity for the EU’s elected representatives to ask questions about what the bank has been up to.

Notes

1. The bank is, fortunately, revising the way it measures transition, but the drafts we’ve seen so far suggest that the changes will not be very noticeable.


Original image courtesy of cygnus921 via Flickr.

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