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Race to the bottom: dire air quality worsens as BiH government mulls new coal plant at Tuzla

It was a warm morning in early October, the sun bright and a faint smell of burnt coal in the air. The home heating season started late this year, after a prolonged summer. We were in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to install our dust pollution measurement equipment, exactly one year after our first-of-its-kind, independent monitoring was done here.

In 2016, our particulate matter (PM) monitoring results were eye-opening on a number of levels: not only were both PM10 and PM2.5 values above the recommended limits set in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the World Health Organisation on almost all the days observed, but the levels also skyrocketed in the evenings. This trend raised concerns about whether pollution filters at the Tuzla power plant even functioned properly.


For the whole time, the PM10 values were always above the legal limit for the 24 hour average.


This year, we wanted to probe locals’ claims that pollution had been getting worse with time, and to determine if the high peaks recorded are indeed caused by the nearby Tuzla lignite power station and the associated facilities.

The monitoring equipment was placed in the same location as before, and for the whole nine days when it was in place, not once were the PM10 values below the legal limit of 50 micrograms/m3 for the 24 hour average. In fact, the average values during the observation period (10-19 October) were 40 per cent higher than for the same period in 2016.

Comparison of PM10 values in Tuzla, BiH, 2016 vs 2017.The values of PM2.5 measured were also higher than in the previous year by 10 per cent, and the concentrations were twice as much as the WHO’s recommendation of 25 micrograms/ m3 for the 24 hour period. The locals knew what they were talking about.

Comparison of PM2.5 values in Tuzla, BiH, 2016 vs 2017.If there is consensus in the medical world about anything related to PM pollution, it is that prolonged exposure to PM2.5 carries a high risk factor for heart and cerebral diseases, as well as premature mortality.


Since locals had not started heating their homes, the pollution couldn’t come from household stacks.


What is even more worrying is that October 2017 was much warmer than October 2016, meaning that in conversation with the locals of Tuzla, we learned that there was no reason to start heating their homes yet. So if the increased levels of PM were not originating from household stacks – which is the favourite pollution bugbear of the authorities, together with traffic – there must be another source of concern.

Where does the dust come from?

In the graph with PM10 emissions, three high peaks stand out: 11 October between 4-6 AM, 15 October between 4-9 AM, and 18 October between 7-9 AM. We looked at the meteorological data provided by our air pollution monitoring equipment for these specific intervals and came to a straightforward conclusion: depending on the wind’s direction, either the Tuzla coal power or the associated ash disposal site, or both, are responsible for the spikes.

We came to this conclusion because our equipment was placed south of the ash disposal site and north of the power plant. Therefore, when the wind blows from the north – as in the top half of the diagram – and the PM10 emissions are extremely high (up to 937 micrograms/m3 for an hourly value) we can point to the dried ashes blowing from the ash dump in the direction of the town. Similarly, when the wind is blowing from the south – the lower half of the diagram – and the PM10 emissions are high, it is obvious that the power plant’s chimney is the culprit.

What are the Bosnian authorities doing about it?

The air quality in Tuzla is dire and has attracted the attention recently from international media outlets including Euronews, BBC and RAI News, whose television crews have made their way to this town in the world’s second most polluted country.

Yet the Federal Government is set to give the green light to the state owned energy company, Elektroprivreda BiH, to build yet another unit at Tuzla’s power plant. The 450 MW proposed Tuzla 7 project would require additional coal capacity.

The project promoters claim that the new unit would be in line with the EU pollution standards, but the project’s environmental permit/EIA clearly suggests the project will not meet the EU’s recently-adopted Best Available Techniques (BAT) standards. Rather, the project is much more likely to result in an increase of coal that would need to be mined and an increase in ash production, which, as seen above, plays a critical role in aggravating local air pollution.

Local opposition to a new ash disposal site is high, and in April 2016 the local community representatives delivered a petition with 2100 signatures against the proposal to the Federal Ministry of Environment and Tourism. While some units will be shut down in the future, constructing unit 7 would still represent an overall capacity increase, the exact opposite of environmental improvement.

As the ten-year saga continues, plans to build Tuzla 7 at an estimated cost of EUR 722 million received a boost when the government recently indicated a contract for a loan from the Export and Import Bank of China (China Eximbank) could be signed soon, provided the State Aid Council also gives its consent for loan guarantees. The plant is expected to be built by China Gezhouba Group and Guangdong Electric Power Design, according to an EPC (Engineering, Procurement, Construction) contract signed in May 2016.

China’s ‘green policies’ in practice

China’s ‘Green Credit Directive’ and its key performance indicators require Chinese banks to assess, monitor and mitigate social and environmental impacts throughout the lifecycle of the project. However, the project’s planned ash disposal site Šički Brod is without an environmental permit, and yet, China Eximbank failed to factor in this irregularity its project appraisal. This has resulted in an unresolved legal challenge.

One thing is clear: China Eximbank’s client, Elektroprivreda BiH, is not fulfilling the required level of environmental and permitting obligations. For its part, China Eximbank has avoided disclosing the bank’s own due diligence on the project.

Local civil society representing the affected communities have since 2013 made efforts to alert China Eximbank and Chinese authorities overseeing overseas projects including Tuzla 7 about the non-compliance of these practices, but their complaints have fallen on deaf ears.

While the spirit of the Green Credit Directive and other recent ‘green policies’ launched jointly with China’s Belt and Road Initiative are laudable, if China Eximbank finances projects like Tuzla 7 and others in the pipeline, there won’t be much left to inspire confidence about China’s green leadership.

The only other thing more pressing than the impending cold season, temperature inversion and thus an escalation in air pollution in Tuzla, is the China+16 summit held next week in Budapest. During these high-level meetings, financing contracts are signed. But why would any government rush to throw their country’s public budget into such a long-term loan when so many problems with this project remain unaddressed? To be sure, the answer is not for the benefit of air quality and the health of local people.

A growing menace in Ukraine as proposed loan to agribusiness giant adds to conflict

Regular readers of this blog know Ukraine’s agribusiness conglomerate MHP as a company that is in constant conflict with the communities where it operates. In spite of repeated complaints from a number of villages and even violent attacks against active opponents of the company’s endeavours, MHP has received three loans worth USD 161 million since 2010 from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and that sum is set to get bigger.

On 29 November, the bank will decide on another loan of USD 25 million, this time for a 10 MW biogas plant in Zaozerne in the Vinnytsa region. The plant is part of the broader expansion and development of a local Vinnytsa poultry farm, which is owned by an MHP subsidiary and includes the construction of 12 rearing facilities in addition to an existing twelve. The biogas plant and the new rearing facility – ‘Brigade’ 47 – are the two pieces of infrastructure at the source of conflict between MHP and the Zaozerne community.

Adding pollution to an already-polluted area

Zaozerne and the Vasylivka community are located about 10 kilometres from the town of Ladyzhyn and its coal power plant, which is one of the biggest polluters in the region, with the ash sludge from the plant deposited on land in Zaozerne. Brigade 47 and the biogas plant would only add more pollution to the area.

Despite the potential for a substantial increase in pollution, the cumulative impacts from the expansion have not been assessed. This would require an assessment of the facilities connected to the existing 12 brigades that house roughly one and a half million chickens a piece – the slaughterhouse and the wastewater treatment plant. Instead, the preliminary assessment for the biogas plant was based on baseline concentrations of air pollution roughly 30 kilometres from the proposed location of the new plant. The selection of this location necessarily downplays the cumulative pollution risks for these communities from the additional facilities

The project assessment also passes over the impacts from an extension of the biogas plant facility, the combined heat and power generation (CHP) station. While the preliminary EIA mentions a biogas plant, transport and co-generation facilities as one project, the impacts of co-generation are studied neither by MHP nor the EBRD. This is in breach of the bank’s standards.

This map shows the location of agribusiness enterprises and the communities that feel the impacts.

Divide and rule

As with both the Brigade 47 and biogas projects, MHP has shown particularly poor engagement with the local communities. Public hearings again were conducted in the smaller of the two relevant villages, Vasylivka. This means that the larger part of the community that resides in Zaozerne had no chance to be heard, as they were not informed about the public hearings, so they could not comment on the project’s design.

This follows developments in Spring 2017, when Zaozerne activists filed a court case to the Vinnytsya Administrative Court to cancel a ruling of the Head of the Tulchyn Rayon State Administration, which resulted in the current construction permits being granted. Locals also sent a petition to Ukraine’s president, condemning the actions of MHP’s owner, the oligarch Yuriy Kosyuk.

The court case was closed in August but in October the appeal court reopened the investigation. The Head of the Tulchyn Administration, however, filed a court case against four local activists and a local online media site. This in our in our view was done to intimidate and criminalise voices critical of the project, furthering the perceived contempt of MHP for local dissent. Locals have also reported instances of surveillance, pressure placed on relatives and visits from the state security services.

Too soon for a loan

Considering the legal irregularities in the local approval process and the incomplete impact assessment, approval of an EBRD loan for MHP’s biogas plant is premature. A decision on the project should be postponed at least until the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for the full project (including the biogas plant and cogeneration) is developed, the cumulative impact assessments are completed and locals are allowed to freely express their opinion without intimidation.

Bulgarian gold in offshore paradise linked to European public lender

The article below by Dimitar Sabev was originally published in Bulgarian on Bodil.bg. It outlines Dundee’s dealings in more detail. It has been translated and slightly edited for coherence.

Three offshore companies and one cooperative

Dundee Precious Metals Chelopech – the concessionaire of Bulgaria’s largest gold mine, is linked to two offshore companies from the Curacao Island: Dundee Precious Curacao GP B.V. and Dundee Precious Curacao LP B.V., as well as to another offshore company registered in Tortola, British Virgin Islands – Vatrin Investment Ltd.

The three offshore companies, which may be traced in the filings of the Bulgarian Commercial Register, are certainly not the only “paradise” assets of this Canadian investor. It is enough to recall that in 2003 the Chelopech mine and the gold deposit in Krumovgrad were also bought by an offshore company – Dundee Precious (Barbados).

Yet Dundee Precious Metals Chelopech is part of an even more complex corporate scheme involving the Dutch cooperative company Dundee Precious Metals Cȍoperatief U.A., which holds 100% of the capital of Vatrin Investment.

A cooperative is an unusual ownership vehicle for a transnational investor. But it was not chosen by chance, for according to the Dutch law, in certain cases cooperatives are not liable for dividend withholding tax. There are also options for avoiding the corporate income tax. “The Dutch cooperative can prove to be an attractive vehicle in private equity structures”, as lawyers advise.

For this tax purpose, a “fiscal unity” with a limited liability company registered in the Netherlands is required. Of course, “Dundee” also owns such company: Dundee Precious Chelopech B.V., being in turn owned by another company registered in Denmark, of the family of Dundee Precious Metals.

Happy birthday, Nathan

The ultimate owner of Dundee Precious Metals Chelopech is Nathan Edward Goodman (80). Ned Goodman, as he is also known, is one of the large investors in Canada and America. He is a billionaire and according to media reports under his management are equity funds of USD 100 billion (Dynamic Funds, Beutel, Dundee Wealth, Goodman & Company, etc.). Ned Goodman invests the money of his wealthy clients in real estate, energy, infrastructure, and metals.

His tremendous wealth and influence have brought him great recognition: in 2016, Goodman was appointed to the Order of Canada, a prize awarded to only 113 people.

In his youth, the Canadian graduated geology and at the beginning of his career he worked at a mining company. This explains his interest in the gold deposits in Bulgaria. There is no doubt that his investment in Chelopech was a rare find: in 2003 he paid USD 26.5 million for the mineral-rich, but poorly managed mine, and a proven gold deposit in Krumovgrad. The acquisition price is equal to the net profit of the company’s operations in Bulgaria for a period of only six months.

Ned Goodman has four sons, and two of them, Mark and David, are actively involved in the management of Dundee Corp. Of course, they do not do this for free: according to Reuters, their combined annual salary is more than USD 4.3 million. There is no record of how many shares they hold and what dividends are paid to Nathan’s sons.

Goodman is both the owner of a precious metal mining company and an investment advisor. In recent years, he signaled that gold prices will increase on the world exchanges and advised his customers on buying it. In 2013, he stated that “very soon” the US dollar will cease to be a global reserve currency. One may conclude by oneself: buy gold as a hedge.

In addition, Goodman lobbies for the implementation of “Plan North” – a huge extractive program aiming at industrialising 1.2 million square kilometers of pristine land in the northern part of the Canadian province of Quebec. The plan envisions USD 80 billion in revenue in a period of 25 years, by extracting gold, platinum, zinc, uranium, diamonds, timber etc.

Where is the gold mine?

At least 3 or 4 offshore companies, a Dutch cooperative, several companies registered in the Netherlands, Denmark, UK … Why Dundee Precious Metals – part of the larger Canadian “Dundee Corp.” holding, is using such a complex corporate structure?

It is clear that offshore companies guarantee the anonymity of the shareholders who do not want their names to be disclosed. Moreover, by using offshore shell companies the liability is blurred in cases of environmental damages, a fact of great use in the extractive sector.

Not least, the traces of material flows moving between continents remain also hidden. The arsenic – rich gold and copper concentrates from Chelopech are delivered to a smelter located in Namibia, where ores, imported from third countries are also processed. Then the end product refined to 98.5 percent metal content is sold to the Switzerland based global trader, Louis Dreyfus. All these operations involve margins, risk, and private interests.

But the most obvious reason for the “offshore line dance” is tax. The Chelopech mine is a very profitable enterprise and during the last 6 years it has reported a net profit (after tax) of BGN 740 million combined. This is equal to nearly USD 450 million as of 20.11.2017.

The positive financial result has been duly taxed with the low corporate tax in Bulgaria and this brought to the Bulgarian budget a total revenue of BGN 85 million for the last 6 years.

In 2015, the enterprise in Chelopech achieved a net profit of BGN 88 million (~USD 53 million), but Dundee Precious Metals Holding in Canada declared a profit of only USD 7.6 million.

The gap was even wider in 2016, when the net profit of the Chelopech mine was BGN 67 million (~USd 40 million), while Dundee Precious Metals in Canada reported a loss of USD 147 million (mainly assigned to asset write-offs in Namibia).

In the wasp nest

The reported sales of gold and copper concentrates from the Chelopech mine for the period between 2011 and 2016 are worth exactly BGN 2 billion (~USD 1.2 billion). This amount is incomparable to the slightly over USD 5 million, paid to the Bulgarian government as a lump sum by the first foreign concessionaire, Navan, in 1998.

The public interest in managing this national golden wealth is a painful issue in Bulgaria. Even the cautious anti-corruption body BORKOR has indicated that the deal for Chelopech is among the most negative examples of concessions in Bulgaria.

Because of their profits in order of tens and hundreds of millions per year, the foreign investors may afford to build a positive image through sponsorships, industrial initiatives, and similar activities. In comparison to most Bulgarian extractive companies, Dundee Precious Metals Chelopech maintains better standards of remuneration, labor safety, and environmental performance.

Yet all this does not distract the company from pursuing its profit maximisation policy. Is the profit declared equal to the real profit that goes into the pockets of the owners?

Even the low corporate tax in Bulgaria is a considerable expense, when applied to a company with such a high profit margin. Accordingly, almost BGN 185 million (~USD 111) are administrative expenses reported by the company in Chelopech for 2011-2016.

Geologists know that the polymetallic ores around Chelopech, besides gold, silver and copper, also contain a number of rare earth elements, such as germanium. The official long-standing statement of the company is that the rare metals from the Chelopech ore cannot be extracted commercially. Thus the concession fee paid by Dundee to the Bulgarian government includes only the three main metals: gold, silver and copper.

Yet the company itself admits that the content of germanium in the ore is about 8 g/t. When processing 2.2 million tons of ore per year, the value of the accompanying yield of only this rare metal should amount to USD 17 million per year. According to Dundee, this wealth is not being used and is discarded.

Note that the metallurgical plant in Tsumeb, Namibia, has been processing the rich polymetallic ores from the adjacent mineral deposit (already exhausted), before being purchased by Dundee Precious Metals in 2010. The technology of the smelter is designed to extract lead, zinc, copper and … germanium and other rare metals from the ores.

This fact, in itself, is not an evidence that Dundee is extracting germanium. As well as sprouting of subsidiaries throughout tax havens does not necessarily imply that they are used for tax dodging. Well, they can be used for something … uh … else.

Either way, a sophisticated offshore corporate structure is a controversial issue for a company working tightly with the public sector. In the case of Dundee Precious Metals, there is a double offshore trouble. Firstly, they profit massively from exploiting a national public asset in Bulgaria. Secondly, since December 2016 they have the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as a strategic shareholder.

The EBRD, a multilateral developmental bank, holds almost 10 percent of the capital of the Canadian umbrella company which channels its profits home through layers of paradise entities. Maybe it is worth mentioning that the EBRD has explicitly declared its commitment to “enhancing transparency”.

Déjà vu in biodiversity: public banks pitted against international wildlife convention

On Monday, November 13, the Secretariat of the Bern Convention, the European wildlife treaty, sent a letter to Georgia’s Ministry of Environment asking for clarification on the changes to one of the country’s Candidate Emerald sites. The Emerald site network of the Bern Convention designates areas with great importance for biodiversity and high conservation value.

The area in question is part of the pristine Svaneti mountains, a gem of unspoiled nature. In 2016, Georgia’s government decided to drastically reduce the size of the Candidate Emerald site Svaneti 1 in an attempt to simplify plans for a string of more than 30 hydropower plants.

In the letter, the Secretariat explains that “the site comprises some of the most pristine nature areas in Georgia” and expresses its concern “over the fact that the area of the Svaneti 1 Candidate Emerald site has been drastically reduced.”

A map with a red and a green area. The large red area marks the part that has been removed by Georgia's government from the Candidate Emerald site Svaneti 1.
Georgia’s government decided to reduce the size of the Candidate Emerald site Svaneti 1. The excluded (red) area contains sites for many planned hydropower projects.

The letter comes in reaction to a complaint filed by Georgian Bankwatch member group Green Alternative (supported by the Balkani Wildlife Society) with the Bern Convention Secretariat. An area that has been adopted as Emerald Site enjoys stronger protection, for instance in that more precise impact assessments have to be carried out for infrastructure developments. But also Candidate sites enjoy special protection once their importance for biodiversity has been established.  Depending on the further developments in the case, Georgia’s plans for constructing dams and other hydro installations in the area might therefore be seriously in danger.

In 2015, in a similar case, the Bern Convention called upon the government in Macedonia to stop all hydro constructions in the protected Mavrovo national park, also a Candidate Emerald site and biodiversity hotspot. Shortly after, both the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development withdrew their funding for two hydro projects in the park.

The most advanced of Georgia’s hydro plans in Svaneti, 280 MW Nenskra hydropower plant in Upper Svaneti, is set to receive up to 75% of its finance from international development banks, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

Not only the importance of Svaneti’s biodiversity, but also the long standing conflicts over the territory of indigenous Svan people that are affected by Nenskra and other projects should be reason enough for development banks to regard Svaneti as a no-go zone for large infrastructure development. Until now, however, public lenders have repeatedly stated their willingness to invest in Georgia’s hydro sector, in spite of the associated risks for the country’s unique nature and communities.

We’ll continue monitoring the case. Watch this space or sign up for updates via RSS or for our newsletter.

Europe’s energy citizens are on the rise – if we let them

Following the fast-paced innovation in renewable technologies in recent years many small businesses, municipalities, communities or single families now own renewable energy sources. More Europeans are becoming so-called “energy citizens” – investing in their own energy source for various reasons. Some want to improve their energy efficiency and save money for bills, while others want to become self-sufficient or make profits.

Well documented case studies demonstrate that small-scale renewables bring a plethora of benefits for their owners. Often, however, individual cases cannot be replicated elsewhere because their implementation and benefits depend on specific local characteristics. The following stories illustrate this in sharp relief – capturing some of the struggles and successes of real citizens.  (You can read these stories in more detail at the People’s Budget website.)

Lessons in renewables

One prime example is the complex of the technical school in Volyně, Czech Republic. The school replaced its old coal boiler with one running on biomass and added a heat pump since the former heating was expensive and polluted local air. The school and its employees solved the problem by using the original boiler house and its heat distribution network. Now, the school can regulate the use of resources and adjust the temperature in the school’s rooms depending on the specific needs. As a result, the energy consumption was decreased, along with heating costs for many years to come. The investment was financed by European funds and the money saved from the project will go back into the development of the school.

https://vimeo.com/235355946

On the other side of the Czech Republic, the municipality Velká Kraš purchased wind turbines in the early nineties. The specific shape of the local hills made this option viable, due to wind currents that meet while crossing the mountains. The town had received EU funding to partly cover the investment but had trouble with its profitability due to unstable electricity prices. Today, however, the power plant brings CZK 1.5 million (EUR 57.6 thousands). The mayor is happy that the income is generated from a local project, but the troubles associated with price instability made the mayor cautious. She does not want to repeat the endeavour.

Pioneering self-sufficiency

The town Knežice, which lies in the lowlands of the river Elbe, chose a different strategy. It built a biogas station, a reaction to the unused energy potential of local bio-waste. Manure was collected from an agricultural cooperative, waste from the forests and gardens, the content of septic tanks and food waste from nearby restaurants and canteens. The town sells the produced electricity to the electricity grid and uses the generated heat itself. Most of the town’s houses are being heated by the biomass boiler. The town’s energy supply has become self-sufficient. Like Velká Kraš, the town also paid part of the investment through EU funds.

Renewable financing for charities

Marek Cernocky from the non-governmental organisation Energeia focused on hydropower. The organisation managed to collect finances to cover part of the investment from individual donors and from EU funds, while the remaining costs were covered by loans. All the profit of the power plant is invested in social services and educational programmes provided by Energeia. In contrast to so many other organisations in the Czech Republic, the donors of the organisation do not finance specific activities anymore, but instead participate in repaying the loan. The donations increase the power plant’s profitability and are thus revalued. Energeia transformed irregular donations in a stable, almost inexhaustible income which increases as the loan is being repaid.

https://vimeo.com/235353937

From food to energy self-sufficiency

Lastly, on the border of Šumava national park a bio-farmer settled with the goal of becoming self-sufficient in food and energy supplies. To achieve his goal, he purchased photovoltaic panels. These panels are placed on the huge roof of a hayloft, which is naturally faced to the south to dry the hay as much as possible. The panels have the potential to be his sole source of energy. However, the farmer has to find a way to accumulate the electricity generated from the panels so that the energy could be used during the evening.

https://vimeo.com/235350361

What these stories prove

Specific projects of small renewable energy sources often cannot be replicated easily in other places. All of them are unique in that they use the concrete characteristics of the given environment, a factor which cannot be ignored while sourcing energy.

Yet, despite the situational differences, there are plenty of ways to create and use renewable energy. Today, everybody has the potential to purchase or produce one’s own renewable energy installation; one only needs to think about the type of the source, how it can be incorporated into the environment, and if there are possible community benefits.

One of the crucial recurring needs is, however, the financing of these investments. Most of the described projects depend on loans or donations. Usually, the investments are too big to be covered individually or by small organisations. EU funds are a popular solution for financing these projects but are not always accessible and great differences exist across countries regarding the eligibility of who and what type of project can benefit from EU funds.


An EU budget that creates targeted financing solutions for energy citizens, and improving the EU rules around EU funds to improve equitable access to financing is part of the solution needed.


Another challenge lies not in creating and implementing the projects, but in the intricacy of the paperwork and political affairs. The municipalities, communities, and individuals are more often stopped by complications in submitting their proposals. In order to help local communities, politicians should set rules for making EU funds more accessible to the public after 2020 and advocate for the ease of proposing local projects.

As one part of the solution, “one stop shops” could be a useful tool how to make EU funds more accessible for European citizens. Single local or regional contact points where citizens can come for advice and to help to arrange all aspects of their RES installation – including applying for EU co-financed support schemes.

There are multiple examples showing individuals striving to create sustainable, local energy sources. With the help from the EU and local politicians, these individuals will be able to make their dreams a reality.

Kill the funding. Kill the pipeline.

It was an inevitable decision, but that doesn’t make it any less dumbfounding: less than two weeks ago the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) signed off a $500 million loan to finance TANAP, a gas pipeline that’s part of the biggest, most expensive new fossil fuel project in Europe – the Southern Gas Corridor. This investment in a carbon bomb is hard to swallow given the hundreds of lives lost to increasingly extreme weather events across Europe this year: the wildfires that ravaged Portugal, devastating drought and flooding in Italy, and the first time a hurricane threatened to make landfall in Europe.

Now let’s remind ourselves that this public bank is making the decision to use taxpayer money to finance Europe’s biggest new dirty energy project just two weeks before governments from around the world convene, in Germany, to lay out specific plans towards implementing the Paris Agreement — and this is starting to look like an insult.

Read the full article at 350.org

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