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All at SEA – key assessment of EU funds programmes in Latvia fails to address environmental concerns, opportunities

There is a big long list of technical jargon attached to the programming documents of the EU funds for the 2014-2020 funding period – enough to fill an entire blog post on its own. But you will be relieved to read that, in the context of Latvia’s ongoing negotiations as to how we will spend our future EU budget money, I will focus on only one of these items. It may be a bit of a mouthful, but it is what it says it is – only in Latvia, as environmental NGOs are discovering, what should be a safeguard for the environment appears to have gone missing.

A so-called ‘strategic environmental assessment’ (SEA) of EU funds programming documents is supposed to explain to stakeholders and the wider public the likely impacts – both positive and negative – on the environment as a result of the implementation of the Latvian funding programme for 2014-2020. Around EUR 4.5 billion is at stake in Latvia over the seven year period. If certain projects or initiatives are likely to bring about detrimental impacts, then an SEA is supposed to lay out the necessary steps to prevent, reduce or offset such impacts.

An SEA for future EU funds spending, it should be noted, is a requirement under both national and EU legislation.

Yet the recently published SEA report produced by international consultants KPMG for Latvia’s one over-arching operational programme – called, in the jargon, OP Growth and Employment – is the reverse of what it should be. Instead of the SEA process serving as a safeguard mechanism for the environment, what KPMG has recently produced for Latvia views environmental protection as a hurdle.

For example, the SEA report describes how in some cases nature protection measures have turned out to be damaging for economic activities, and also stipulates that any new EU directives in the field of environment may undermine economic development.

On page 60 of the report, we learn that: “It is likely that in the period 2014-2020 in the EU there will be new environmental directives adopted and there are no resources foreseen for implementation of these new requirements. It would cause additional costs and restrictions to economic activities. […] Already now designation of nature protected areas in the bay of Riga has caused serious economic problems and burden to ports and sea freight transport, whereas there is no adequate protection of these areas ensured”. The report also suggests that before deciding on the protection of nature, we should calculate the costs and assess whether we can afford to sustain that.

Perhaps more concerning is that the SEA report seems to be oblivious to the fact that infrastructure or development projects, by their very nature, do have an impact on the environment. Pages 55 and 59 seek to downplay environmental impacts because, according to the authors, there is not enough detail in the OP itself about planned activities: “the OP doesn’t contain any specific measures or activities that could lead to negative impacts on environment in medium and longer term, threaten biodiversity or such.”

But let’s look at one example from the OP, a specific objective that aims to “facilitate the development of the major ports, increasing their carry capacity and safety level”. Indicative activities intended for support in this regard include: the reconstruction and construction of access roads for road transport and railway as well as the relevant infrastructure, and; the reconstruction and construction of moles and breakwaters, aquatorium deepening”.

It is clear that these kind of measures will have some environmental impact and risks, and that, therefore, these ought to have been assessed and described in KMPG’s report.

Similarly, the report also fails to give any environmental assessment of the likely impacts of such activities as: “reconstruction of the main highways within TEN-T network and connection of city infrastructures to TEN-T network”, and; “investments in development of Riga and Pieriga transport infrastructure ensuring the multimodality of Riga as a metropolis”. Among other things, the latter plans envisage an increase of transit freight movement on the left bank of the Daugava. Once again, at least the likely environmental impacts of such large infrastructure projects should have received attention in the SEA report.

Moreover, and despite national regulations requiring it, the SEA report also fails to look at alternatives, even not assessing whether the implementation of the OP might lead to the improvement or worsening of environmental quality compared to the status quo.

Environmental NGOs such as my own, the Latvian Green Movement, have been actively involved in the process of developing Latvia’s EU programming documents, and we have been striving to increase allocations for environment related activities.

At the same time NGO analysis and assessment of the future EU funding programme has led to concerns that certain programmed measures could be environmentally controversial. We have repeatedly expressed concerns about the use of public funds for activities that are damaging to biodiversity and that would further worsen the status of habitats of EU importance – an EU level report from this year found that only 11 percent of habitats of EU importance in Latvia have a good conservation status.

Yet, for instance, the planned measure of drainage system reconstruction without environmental safeguards would cause adverse impacts on the following habitats of EU importance: Northern boreal alluvial meadows (6450), Fennoscandian lowland species-rich dry to mesic grasslands (6270*), Hydrophilous tall herb fringe communities of plains and of the montane levels (6430), Molinia meadows (6510).

These drainage measures in fact fall under a specific OP objective that does sound good: “adapt to climate change by reducing the threat of floods, to ensure quality of living of people and promote business competitiveness and continued business activities”. Yet, without mitigation measures, the risk of damage is high: ‘improved’ drainage will in fact increase nutrient run-off to the Baltic Sea and decrease the water quality; eutrophication is already a major threat to wetland ecosystems in Latvia, and the proposed measures will further worsen the status of the habitats of EU importance.

Environmental NGOs have proposed the inclusion of mitigation measures in the above measures, such as the use of ecosystem services to mitigate floods – for example, through the creation of wetlands and ponds to minimise run-off. These proposals, though, were rejected by the Ministry of Agriculture in the first public hearing phase – yet it’s precisely these types of environmental concerns that should have been picked up and described in the SEA report.

The report completely fails to recognise numerous comments made by environmental NGOs and the Ministry of Environment and Regional Development during the elaboration of OP and related programming documents. When looking (or not looking) at alternatives, at least some mention ought to have been made of the sustainable solutions proposed for the drainage issue.

As page 22 of the SEA report blithely deadpans, however: “All suggestions and comments have been considered when preparing the final version of environmental report and those have helped to prepare more balanced and better suggestions for those who elaborate the OP”.

It is unclear if KPMG expected this report to receive wide public scrutiny, but certainly it has provoked both mirth and frustration among the NGO community – and, too, from certain national officials. The same company has also carried out an ‘ex-ante evaluation’ of the draft programming documents for the period 2014–2020 and it can only be hoped that a better job has been done there. That evaluation, however, is not made public, and only a half page summary of conclusions and recommendations will be included in Latvia’s draft Partnership Agreement.

Where now, and will the European Commission step in?

This highly dubious SEA report is now out for public consultation. A public hearing meeting is scheduled for August 29 and environmental NGOs and other players will raise various issues and make comments. The Ministry of Environment and Regional Development is planning to do the same.

But should it be the task of NGOs to attempt to rewrite the whole report, to point to potential – and pretty self-evident – environmental problems and propose mitigation measures?

And anyway, if the Ministry of Finance that is responsible for the OP does not want to listen, won’t we be wasting our time?

Our abiding motivation and interest in continuing to engage boils down to two things: this is significant new investment money for Latvia, and with continuing economic hardships across the country, it deserves – now as never before – to be deployed well; moreover, the European Commission has sought to frame the 2014-2020 spending period as one that has climate and biodiversity considerations as part of its DNA.

In these circumstances, and given the overall shoddy quality of the SEA report, it seems inevitable at this stage that Latvian NGOs will have little option but to petition the Latvian supervisory body responsible for oversight of the SEA process.

We hope that the European Commission will do the same.

All eyes on the EBRD – will it go coal free?


Guest post from Justin Guay, Sierra Club

Just weeks after President Obama announced an end to US taxpayer support for overseas coal plants, two of the world’s largest IFIs, the World Bank and the European Investment Bank (EIB), followed suit. Now the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is considering coal restrictions of its own. Once final, these restrictions will reinforce a message that is growing louder every day – coal has no place in the 21st century clean energy economy.

Before we get to what’s going on at the EBRD, let’s summarize the policies that have been put in place over the past month at the IFIs. They’ve helped set the tone for the EBRD and will likely be incorporated in whatever policy is ultimately adopted. Remember these institutions have collectively provided USD 37.5 billion to the coal industry since 1994 so they’re pretty important. Here goes.

First, as a part of his climate plan, President Obama has outlined a ban (with rare exceptions) on U.S. public financing of overseas coal plants. The president wasted no time implementing this policy with the US Export Import Bank (the most heavily impacted and fossil fuel friendly US agency) rejecting a new 1,200 MW coal plant in Vietnam just weeks later. This was a huge decision given the U.S. Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank funding has supported over USD 7 billion in coal finance over the past few years. Days later, the US Trade and Development Agency shelved plans for a controversial new coal plant in the Ukraine. Those two decisions reinforced the fact that the US is serious when it says it’s closed for overseas coal business.

At almost the same time, the World Bank and EIB introduced stringent restrictions on coal financing of their own (see here and here). Both were put in place after long deliberations which in the case of the World Bank took almost two years only to be finalized thanks to the leadership of Dr. Kim.

The significance of these two policies following on the heels of President Obama’s overseas coal ban is enormous. Both provided billions to the coal industry over the past few years – USD 5 billion from the World Bank and USD 1.5 billion from the EIB But the impact of this funding is even larger than it appears, because it helped leverage several times more in private investment while providing a cover to the coal industry by ensuring public acceptance of this destructive energy source.

It is into this whirlwind of activity that the EBRD stepped when it released a draft of its new energy policy. As currently drafted the policy won’t past muster given what has happened at other institutions. So what exactly does the EBRD need to do to be up to snuff?

First and foremost it would need to create an official policy statement that restricts support for coal projects by declaring an end to finance for both new and refurbished coal plants. To reinforce this policy it can, and should, follow the EIBs lead and include a carbon intensity metric to help screen out dirty projects. The EIB has proposed 550 grams/kWh which means for all intents and purposes the only fossil fuel plants the institution can support are natural gas. But even this standard may be strengthened as the EU is pressured to ratchet that down to 350 grams/kWh to reflect best in class gas plants.

But the EBRD can’t stop there. It must also extend the air emissions standards outlined in the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) to rehabilitated as well as new coal plants. The IED sets important limits on the level of air pollution fossil fuel plants can create (and therefore the type of pollution control technology that must be deployed). Exempting rehab projects exposes local communities to dangerous and deadly air pollution. This loophole must be closed.

Currently half of the EBRDs USD 8.9 billion energy portfolio supports fossil fuels (including approximately USD 1 billion in past financing for coal). Getting this policy right is incredibly important for tackling climate change and shifting scarce public resources to clean energy. So let them know you’re watching.

Help us out by tweeting: All eyes on @EBRD: Time to move #BeyondCoal. #coalfreeEBRD

The EIB finally limits coal lending

Last Friday, the EIB published a new energy lending policy, which shall be in place for some five-six years. Already in a draft, the EIB had stated that it would limit coal lending, but loopholes remained (pdf).

In the weeks up to the day when the bank’s Board voted the final version of the policy (July 23), many actors have been pushing the bank to do more, including the European Commission and various EU countries which are stakeholders of the bank.

And we did see last minutes positive changes, when the bank improved the draft following an explicit request by its Board to close some of the loopholes.

All eyes are now on the third major international (public) financial institution which still lends to coal: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Read more


Our campaign to end coal subsidies from international financial institutions.

Find updates, data and more

The policy we have on the table today practically eliminates financing to the most carbon intensive power generation projects by introducing an Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) at the level of 550 g CO2/kWh and its own carbon pricing (€ 28/tCO2 in 2013 and € 45/tCO2 in 2030). This means in practice that most coal power plants can no longer be financially supported by the EIB unless they co-fire at least 25% biomass or are high efficient co-generation installations.

When pushed by its Board to close loopholes, the bank agreed to discard exemptions for the financing of the peak power plants exceeding the EPS and limited the exemption based on “security of supply” argument to one clearly defined situation: when the project is on isolated energy systems such as small islands with no feasible mainland energy connection ‐ and even then only where there is no economically viable alternative.

Additionally, the bank limited the application of exemptions to the EPS rule for projects in countries outside of the EU only to low income countries (listed by the World Bank) and in the situation where the project would have a significant positive material impact on poverty alleviation and economic development.

At Bankwatch, we were happy to see the improvements proposed by the Board to the new EIB energy policy. We think it is important that the Board listened to the arguments made by several organisations and actors who, after seeing the draft, called for restricting the EPS exemptions. The fact that the EPS level will be reassessed – and potentially lowered further – next year is also a significant breakthrough.

The new EIB policy came just one week after the World Bank too had announced major restrictions to its own coal lending. So all eyes are now on the third major international (public) financial institution which still lends to coal: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The EBRD published July 25 its new draft energy policy which is very disappointing when it comes to how much coal – alongside oil and gas – projects could still receive public funds.

The EBRD definitely has much to improve in its draft policy: they should start by eliminating financing for coal and other high carbon new power plants as well as for the rehabilitation of existing high carbon power plants and stop the financing of oil and coal extraction. Another area where the EBRD can follow the good example set by the EIB is in investing more in housing renovation, including in the energy efficiency of public buildings. Such lending would bring much better transition and energy security impact than more centralised fossil fuel based power plants or fossil fuel extraction fields.

[Campaign update] EBRD not digging for truth at the Kolubara mine, Serbia


The longer we are monitoring the Kolubara mining operations and the way people are being treated by the mining company, the more obvious it becomes that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is not able to monitor and influence its client’s conduct and that it is not able to uphold the rights of local residents vis-à-vis the omnipotent Serbian energy monopolist EPS.

The latest, and maybe most blatant example is a two year delay in establishing a grievance mechanism that stipulates how and where locals can get information about their rights and the compensation process and where they can complain about misconduct by the Kolubara mining company (a subsidiary of state electricity company EPS), specifically concerning expropriations.

Here the details:

  1. The Stakeholder Engagement Plan (pdf) for the Kolubara “Environmental Improvement Project” from February 2011 stipulates that a grievance mechanism will be established and made public by March 15, 2011.
  2. Responding to requests for information from CEKOR, the EBRD wrote
    • on February 14, 2012 (one year later) that “the public has been notified about the existing complaints procedure”
    • on April 17, 2012 that “[p]eople who are directly affected by resettlement or expropriation are informed via a number of means, including public meetings, in writing and most importantly in person at their homes.”

    Both statements were based on information from EPS.

  3. A few days ago, EPS told us in a letter (pdf, own English translation of Serbian original (pdf)) that the grievance mechanism only came into force on February 20 this year – two years later than scheduled and one year after EPS told the EBRD that the mechanism already existed and was known to the public.

What may have been known to the public earlier is only the contact person for complaints, SEP Team manager Zoran Markovic, appointed by EPS. Without an established procedure how to deal with grievances, however, this can hardly be comforting for people who don’t have much reason to trust EPS.

When the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development gets involved in a controversial project, it often claims that its involvement will improve the environmental and social standards of the activity and the project company. When it comes to enforcing these improvements however, the bank regularly shies away from putting pressure on its clients and relies on their reassurances that everything goes according to the agreed standards.

Not only took it EPS two years to establish a complaint mechanism. The EBRD apparently accepted the company’s claims at face value without verifying the information. Whatever the reason for this (capacity impasse? naive trust in EPS? sloppiness?) it’s an intolerable oversight on the part of the EBRD, leaving local communities to themselves.


* Campaign updates on the Bankwatch blog highlight news from projects we monitor as well as from our member groups and partners.

PPPs “poor in practice” admits new EBRD-financed study


A few days ago I did a double-take when the EBRD sent out a press release calling PPPs in central and eastern Europe “Pretty on paper, poor in practice”. What could have happened to make the EBRD turn against one of its most dearly-held infrastructure funding models? Had a Bankwatch secret agent infiltrated the EBRD media department?

On closer inspection it turned out that the press release accompanied the release of the first Economist Intelligence Unit regional Infrascope study (pdf) for Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in fact despite the surprisingly frank headline, much of the study is in fact exactly what one would expect from an EBRD-financed study.

There is no such thing as additional private finance for infrastructure. In the end the public will always pay, and pay dearly. If the public sector can’t afford to pay directly for infrastructure, then it can’t afford PPPs.


Not a silver bullet for public infrastructure. Our website Overpriced and underwritten exposes the hidden costs of public-private partnerships.

Although there is huge variation in the countries surveyed, none of them are doing well on all the criteria surveyed. Some have better institutional set-ups (Croatia, Latvia), some have more actual projects experience (Turkey, Hungary), some have better legislation (Croatia, Lithuania), but none of them have all the elements that the study authors consider necessary to achieve perfect PPP project.

Even the top scoring country, Croatia, only scores 63.5 out of 100, and let’s face it, if Croatia is the top-scoring PPP country then something is quite wrong.

According to the definition of PPPs used for the study, Croatia has only done three PPP projects – most of the points it scores come from its as yet relatively untested legal and institutional framework.

Our own research on Croatian PPP projects such as the Zagreb wastewater treatment plant and Arena Zagreb shows that in practice they have proved to be very poor value for money for the public.

So it seems that there is wider and wider consensus that PPPs are not doing well in practice in central and eastern Europe. But it is in the reasons given and the conclusions drawn from this experience that the Economist study starkly differs from the increasingly broad range of PPP critics.

Among the prominent criteria measured as an ingredient for success are the legal and institutional frameworks in the countries. Yet while these are obviously needed if a country decides to pursue PPPs, it is unlikely that the best legal and institutional framework in the world can overcome the largest problems with PPPs: the accumulation of off-balance-sheet debts and the impossibility of truly transferring risk to the private sector when essential public services are at stake.

The countries in the region which have implemented multiple PPPs (Hungary comes to mind) have found this to their cost. The study does point out that private partners in Hungary effectively received a guarantee from the government that their costs would be met, thus exposing the government to significant commercial risk. But it appears to suggest that Georgia’s approach of transferring maximum risk to the private sector is a viable alternative. However this is false, as it is usually the public that finally has to pay for any unforeseen issues in projects or service price increases, as the private sector will not be willing to do without profits and the public cannot do without essential services.

The study also cites lack of political support as a reason why PPPs are not doing well in some countries (eg. Hungary, Slovakia) and points to governments not adhering to commitments made by previous administrations, as if this phenomenon is purely the result of fickle governments changing their opinions as often as their underwear. But this is not a cause of PPPs not doing well, it is a result of previous governments implementing poor quality PPPs and/or too many PPPs.

Successive Hungarian governments have spurned PPPs since 2009 not because they are fickle but because previous governments had clocked up high levels of hidden debts by carrying out over 100 PPP projects, some under highly unfavourable terms. Likewise the Slovak government which came into office in 2010 did not refuse to prolong the extension for the financial close of the D1 motorway project because the colour of the project papers didn’t match their suits – it let the PPP collapse because it was extremely expensive and had never been convincingly proved that it was a better option than building the motorway using a usual public procurement model.

Unsurprisingly, such blind spots lead the study authors to the conclusions that 20 years of failure is simply an invitation to try harder. That giving up is not seen as an option is already clear in the Executive Summary, which says “the logic behind PPPs remains inescapable: infrastructure gaps require filling, and governments often do not have enough money or know-how to do it all themselves.” But there is another unmentioned logic which remains inescapable: There is no such thing as additional private finance for infrastructure. In the end the public will always pay, and pay dearly. If the public sector can’t afford to pay directly for infrastructure, then it can’t afford PPPs.

While we wouldn’t claim to have studied every circumstance under which a PPP project could be undertaken and therefore can’t claim that there is never a place for any PPP, 20 years of widespread failure in the region rather suggests it is time to try something else.

The obvious question would be what? The first and main answers are planning, prioritisation, and tackling wastage and corruption. There is no getting around the basic fact that some infrastructure is simply not affordable and hard decisions need to be taken. For that, honest public debate is needed about what are real priorities. Regional governments don’t need to dream up complicated alternatives to public procurement – first they need to get the basics right and learn to walk before they try to run.

New facts are busting energy myths


Energy is an important issue cutting across some of the big problems of our time such as climate change, security and the economic crisis. What sources of energy we use and how we finance them influence how our societies will function in the decades to come.

Good decision making therefore requires reliable information on the costs, impacts and potentials of different energy sources and financial instruments. The available information, however, can be dated or shrouded by tenacious myths. (A study published yesterday by the German Institute for Economic Research for instance has found that the European Commission’s strategy documents for the energy sector significantly underestimate the costs of nuclear and coal and overestimate those of renewable energy sources.)

Our friends at Counter Balance have therefore taken a look at a number of the myths and facts related to energy production, the EU’s energy policy and the financing activities of international financial institutions.

The outcome, a series of fact sheets, helps find answers (not always easy ones) to questions like “How does the European carbon market work?”, “Which sources of energy are expensive and which are cheap?” or “How reliable is the electricity production from renewable energy sources?”.

With the energy policy revisions of the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank heating up, it’s all the more important to get the basic facts straight.

Here are some points to get you started.

EU carbon trading

  • Rather than enabling the transition away from a fossil fuel economy, the ETS has acted as a subsidy for major polluters in Europe.
  • Even conservative estimates suggest that between one- and two-thirds of carbon credits bought into the ETS “do not represent real carbon reductions”.

Download the factsheet on EU carbon trading

Europe & coal

  • Coal power plants may seem cheaper to construct when compared to renewables, but because of the very high temperatures in the burning chambers they require expensive and frequent maintenance – the yearly costs to maintain a coal power plant may be as high as 10% of the initial investment to build the plant.

Download the factsheet on Europe & coal

Europe and energy security

  • The EU recognises that to solve global environmental problems, a drastic reduction in its own use of fossil fuels is needed. At the same time, the EU is part of a global resource and energy race with other countries and its energy policy centres around the construction of a series of oil, gas, electricity and solar projects in neighbouring countries in order to diversify Europe’s energy supply.

Download the factsheet on Europe and energy security

EU policy and nuclear energy

  • Plans for new nuclear build face the challenge of finding investors and the large amounts of money needed for construction, making nuclear an economic liability for the project promoters. The 2012 World nuclear industry status report finds that five of eleven nuclear companies were downgraded by Standard & Poor’s in the past five years. Moody’s also assigns a higher risk profile to companies that pursue new nuclear generation plans.
  • Nuclear power and renewables are not complementary to another and cannot be used in parallel to reduce carbon emissions.

Download the factsheet on EU policy and nuclear energy

Shale gas

  • Together with other necessary equipment and storage ponds, fracking infrastructure can cover large areas. In Europe, such land use might potentially lead to problems because of population density.
  • Shale gas is still a fossil fuel and thus carbon-intensive. A study by the Commission confirmed that shale gas activities – including the process of fracking itself and burning of shale gas – release greenhouse gas emissions and are more carbon-intensive than conventional gas.
  • Every drilling process (for shale gas) requires as much as 15 million litres of water. In addition, every drilling operation uses several tonnes of highly toxic chemicals.

Download the factsheet on Shale gas

Renewable energy sources

  • In 2010, only 71.5 percent of energy produced in the EU was used by the end consumer. 23.5 percent of this energy was lost, with 5 percent used by the energy sector itself.
  • The strength of renewable sources of energy does not lie in the possibility to produce large amounts of energy in one place as is the case with fossil fuels or nuclear power plants. With renewable sources of energy, people can take control of their energy supply and support the independence of communities and regions.

Download the factsheet on Renewable energy sources

The European Investment Bank’s energy lending

  • While the EIB is an EU institution and is required to lend for projects in line with Europe’s policies on energy and climate change, the bank at times takes a schizophrenic approach to the energy sector because of the diverse EU policies and strategies related to energy.

Download the factsheet on EIB energy lending

Project bonds in times of crisis

  • With the Project Bond Initiative and the Project Bonds Credit Enhancement, the Commission and the EIB have chosen to incentivise the expansion of financial markets and to use public funds – derived from European taxpayers money – to transform infrastructure into an asset class

Download the factsheet on Project bonds in times of crisis

Energy infrastructure investments for economic recovery

  • In the last decades the EU has to a considerable extent externalised its “polluting” industrial production to countries outside Europe, giving a push to fossil fuels-based energy generation in these countries.

Download the factsheet on Energy infrastructure investments for economic recovery

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