Blog entry

A second coal fired power plant for the Tajik capital

Tajikistan has long suffered from serious energy shortages. Ninety six per cent of the country’s electricity is generated by hydroelectric power plants, and acute electricity shortages appear often in winter, when water levels in rivers are low. Many villages in Tajikistan still do not have access to the electricity grid, and until this year, cities were limited in electricity supplies in the autumn and winter periods.

Deliveries of natural gas from its only foreign supplier Uzbekistan stopped 2012, so residents have no choice but to inefficiently heat their homes with electricity. The Tajik government subsidises electricity supplies for three main groups: the general public, pumping stations for irrigation and large steel mills like the Talco aluminum plant , which are two significant contributors to the economy.

In order to reduce power consumption and ensure uninterrupted electricity supplies, authorities have decided to build a second, 100 megawatt thermal power plant – Dushanbe-2 – in the the capital. The president has said that in addition to securing supplies, the project will contribute to the industrial development of the capital and agricultural and industrial production of the central region.

Costs for the Dushanbe-2 plant are estimated at USD 349 million, оf which USD 331 million is from the Chinese Eximbank and USD 17.4 million from the Tajik government’s largest energy holding company, Barki Tojik. The Chinese construction company Tabian Apparatus StocCo (TBEA) was selected as the main contractor for the construction. The project was implemented under a tripartite agreement between the Ministry of Energy and Industry (now the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources), JSC “TBEA” (China) Ltd. and “TBEA Dushanbe mining industry”. Barki Tojik is believed to manage Dushanbe-2, but some interviewed sources suggest that the holding company also oversees a process of transmission and distribution of electricity, but not generation.

Construction on the first stage of Dushanbe-2 began in November 2012 and was completed in 2014. The second phase of construction began in 2015 and lasted for 17 months, bringing the total capacity of Dushanbe-2 to 400 MW. However, the power plant is not working at full capacity during most of the year. Electrical substations at Shahrinav (220 kW), Hissar (110 kW) and Hissor Shahrinav (110 kW) were built as a part of the TPP “Dushanbe-2” complex.

Dushanbe-2 is the largest thermal power plant in the country and the main consumer of domestic coal. It consumes about 45 per cent of the coal mined in the country. About 180 000 tonnes of coal are used monthly during the heating season. The coal is delivered to the plant by vehicles from the Ziddi coal deposit. Operation of the power plant has lead to a drastic increase of coal mining in Tajikistan.

According to official data, woven and electrical filtration systems are installed at the plant in order to ensure low combustion emissions into the atmosphere. Special scrubbers treat up to 99.8 per cent of the emissions, while the plants solid waste is used in the production of building materials (blocks and bricks).

However, various sources deny the presence of the quality filters for cleaning emissions. As Dushanbe-2 began its operations, rumors spread that the contractors installed second-hand equipment from China, which the Tajik authorities deny.

In addition, the coal storage area – with a capacity of more than 120 000 tonnes – was built close to the plant and less than 50 metres from residential homes. The plant is located near the centre of Dushanbe, and is less than a kilometre from the city botanical gardens, amusement park and a soon-to-be-constructed sports complex.

Local residents living in the neighborhood of the project complained about dust deposited all over their streets during the first stage of the power plant’s operations in 2014. Employees and visitors to the amusement park repeatedly spoke of dark soot covering the area.

While the storage of coal remained in the open for some time, it now is covered with a special construction.

Director of TBEA in Tajikistan Van Tszyan responded to a number of these complaints that because the project was just beginning, it would use diesel in the first stages of the project.

Many official agencies were against the construction, including the Dushanbe executive authority, Environmental Protection Committee, Agency for Construction and Architecture, State Committee on Investments and State Property Management, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.

However local environmental groups maintain their concerns over the impacts of coal in the energy sector and its effects on the environment in Tajikistan.

Gacko: if only the laws were as strong as the air pollution

I first visited Gacko in 2015, on a bike tour of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The day had started in Sutjeska National Park, with stunning scenery along the Sutjeska river gorge and nothing but the sound of nature around us, occasionally interrupted by the few vehicles passing by.

Nothing could have warned me of the bleak view of the town we would reach after a blissful 400 meters descent. Not just an old and smoky coal power plant appearing out of nowhere, but also a huge dusty open-cast lignite mine dominating the town.

I remember thinking how the geography of the place really doesn’t do justice to local community, because they are stuck with all the smog at the bottom of the valley. On that hot summer day the air was thick, but it must be unbreathable during the cold season, when temperature inversion keeps the layers of polluted air close to the ground.

Two and a half years later, it turns out my gut feeling was not that wrong. Data from the only air quality monitoring station in Gacko is very difficult to obtain. So local residents, or anyone concerned about the air quality in town, have no way of knowing how bad the problem actually is in real time.

In November 2017, Bankwatch and partner NGO Center for Environment from Banja Luka brought our independent dust particle monitoring device to Gacko. It remained there for almost two weeks, between 13 and 25 November, at a time we expected air pollution levels to be rather high.

In the first half of the monitored period the results did not raise any concerns, with the exception of a spike in emissions on 19 November at 8:00 (see hourly measurements below).

Three such emission peaks stand out in the graph above: on 22 November at 23:00, the following morning at 8:00 and the absolute highest, on 23 November at 20:00. Our analysis, based on wind direction at these times, leaves no room for doubt that the first pollution spike, on 22 November, originated at the local coal-fired power plant, the second at the coal mine, and both the power plant and mine were the source of the peak on the evening of 23 November.

The apparent within-limits values during the first half of the monitored period can be explained by the weather conditions in Gacko on those days. Snow was just settling in on the day of the installation of our air quality monitor and remained throughout the following week. While we hear quite often that precipitation “washes away pollution”, its effect is really that snow (or rain, for that matter, just for shorter periods of time) makes the ground wet which makes it harder for dust to get picked up into the air again.

Yet, on a dry day, particulate matter would settle on leaves, rooftops or the ground, and get kicked up again when the wind blows. So the snow in Gacko that week offered only a temporary reprieve. Once the particle trap melted, the real face of air pollution became obvious. Daily emissions of PM2.5 – the more dangerous of the two pollutants, because it travels deeper into the lungs and persists longer – were constantly twice the WHO recommended limit for the 24h hour mean of 25 μg/m³.

The local air quality legislation, which should safeguard people’s health, is one of the reasons Gacko suffers bad air. The air pollution levels we recorded are in fact within Republika Srpska’s limits [PDF]. But these very same laws set the maximum yearly average for PM2.5 at 15 times the level recommended by the WHO. This is why we chose to refer to the latter, as the international benchmark, to assess air quality in Gacko.

Common problem, measured differently

Throughout last year, our independent air quality monitoring device has travelled across four other Western Balkan countries, all of which have different PM maximum limits in their national legislation, but nothing as lax and health-endangering as those in Republika Srpska.

For PM10 there seems to be an understanding in all national legislations that the daily average should stay around 50 μg/m³. One exception is Bosnia’s other entity, the Federation of BiH, where this limit was at 62.5 μg/m³in 2017.

But for PM2.5 the situation is very mixed. Countries like Montenegro and Macedonia have adopted EU standards in their legislation capping the annual average at 25 μg/m³, and Serbia has an even stricter annual mean limit of 20 μg/m³, while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has no limit for PM2.5 pollution.

Seeing this, one must wonder who is this average year-round value for PM2.5 of 150 micrograms/m3 in Gacko made for, the people or the industry?

These differences in standards are just one of the reasons why we have repeatedly asked the European Commission to introduce air quality legislation into the Energy Community Treaty. Such a move would set the tone for a unified approach towards air pollution which affects tens of thousands of people in the Western Balkan countries every year.

Efforts in the EU to curb air pollution, finally visible after a decade of joint action, risk being thrown onto the rails unless close neighbours in the Western Balkans make this a priority as well.

Talking too much in the marshrutka: how I came to treasure Saventi

During my first trip to Svaneti I got sick from talking too much in the marshrutka, a Georgian share taxi: too many passengers, lots of local roadside food and one experienced mountain driver. The marshrutka dropped us off directly at the doorstep of Mimoza’s house, a friend of one of my co-workers: more food, more wine and more chacha, the ‘Georgian grappa.’

“I will not survive this,” I remember thinking to myself. “And tomorrow I have to teach teenagers photography,” recalling the reason for this long journey.

The next morning I was surprised to see where I actually was. No snowy peaks, nor magical towers on the horizon. And I think I haven’t see anyone with the traditional Svan hat. Is this my hangover?

I had landed in a remote village full of people, houses, gardens and domestic animals running between fences, all surrounded by a pristine forest.

And still, I was feeling like home, and when I entered the local school the feeling only improved. The youngsters in Svaneti are not only good students, they are also full of talent.

Then I decided that Svaneti will become my second home: a place I’ll never stop visiting, a place full of warmth and tenderness, a place where I must reciprocate what had been offered to me.

I admire the Svan people. They are strong, passionate and proud – proud of their culture, their traditions and livelihood.

We have established a faithful, and passionate, relationship since the moment I entered their houses.

But I am worried. Plans to build 35 hydropower plants across Svaneti would change it beyond recognition, and the people I met there know their region is facing a chain of threats: climate change, loss of natural resources, and flooded lands.

The promises they have heard from both the government and the company building the Nenskra dam, the largest hydropower project in the region, are ambiguous. And if the Svans’ demands have been ignored until now, what guarantees do they have that things will not get even worse?

Tomorrow (January 17), the board of directors of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is expected to decide on a USD 214 million loan for the Nenskra project. If this project goes ahead, it will change the lives of people and landscape of this unique region forever.

Join my journey through Svaneti to understand what’s at stake.

[Campaign update] Montenegro drops Skoda Praha as partner for Pljevlja II coal plant – now time to drop the project altogether

This week, the Montenegrin government and Elektroprivreda Crne Gore (EPCG) finally announced the termination of the contract with Czech company Skoda Praha to build the controversial Pljevlja II coal power plant.

More than a year after the withdrawal of the Czech Export Bank from financing the project, Skoda Praha has not managed to find financing for the project, as it was obliged to do under the contract.

This is another nail in the coffin for a project which groups like Green Home, MANS and Bankwatch have argued is not only climate-damaging but also economically unviable. Even the EBRD’s then representative in Montenegro, Giulio Moreno, stated earlier this year that the EBRD does not support the new unit as Montenegro can generate electricity from other sources, and that its construction was clearly a political decision.

Montenegro certainly generate electricity from other sources. We are talking about a country of 600,000 people here, not 60 million. In addition to its existing hydropower plants, in 2017 the 72 MW Krnovo wind farm started operating and construction started on the 46 MW Možura wind farm. But the country’s significant solar potential has hardly been touched yet, nor has its energy saving potential. That much more can be done has been shown by a range of energy scenarios by NGOs, think-tanks and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

Unfortunately, instead of using this ideal opportunity to consign Pljevlja II to the history books where it belongs, EPCG and the Government have emphasised their commitment to moving forward with it, and promised to make a proposal on an alternative solution for carrying out the project by the end of January 2018.

But it’s not too late to stop digging this ever-bigger hole. Finding a new partner, adjusting the project to meet the latest LCP BREF standards and re-assessing the project’s finances will all take years. Better to stop now, turn Montenegro’s energy policy around, and make the country into a real ecological state, as required by its constitution.

Pyromaniacs in Budapest want to burn EU funds in new waste incinerator

The Hungarian government clearly wants to build more waste incinerators. Recent national waste management strategies and plans include various tools and incentives for incineration and declarations and propaganda materials point out that more municipal waste incinerators are needed.

As part of these plans, a waste incineration time bomb is ticking for a yet unknown location in Budapest.

According to the Ministry of Development and the potential beneficiary the City of Budapest the new incinerator HUHA II is needed to solve the sewage sludge issue of Budapest and thus to meet new EU waste regulations of a maximum of 10 percent landfilling and an increase in waste utilisation.

Both institutions have claimed that careful planning would precede the project, including an examination of various national waste scenarios. Since HUHA II would require EU funding, such an approach would be necessary anyway.

However, contrary to these claims it seems that the decision for HUHA II was made well before other options were even considered. For instance, the EU tender for the HUHA II development under the Environment and Energy Operational Program (EEOP) was announced in early spring 2017, well before the Sewage Treatment and Disposal Strategy was adopted in summer, as well as other regulations that were supposed to set the waste framework and help decide whether such incinerators are needed at all or not.

Not surprisingly, Hungary’s new waste strategies and a new national decree now just „happen” to support the development of HUHA II by advocating for a scenario that favours waste-to-energy solutions, including the co-firing of waste and other materials. As an additional negative consequence public, health and environmental interests will most likely come second to economic considerations when HUHA II’s feasibility is being examined as required by the EEOP, including decisions on location and technology.

Nearly one-third of the EEOP waste–related funds, 50 billion forints (160 million eur) would be used by HUHA II. This will not leave enough EU Funds to set up a proper national waste prevention and recycling system.

The European Commission’s stance

Also the European Commission considers HUHA II a problematic and risky project. In its Communication on “Waste to Energy” and in the Country Report for Hungary, the EC recommends to prioritise waste prevention, selective collection systems and recycling infrastructures, especially for Hungary and similar countries where the incineration/combustion rate is still low and dumping rates are high. Hungary specifically has a rare opportunity to develop a waste management system that is not dependent on incinerators or landfills but are in coherence with the circular economy principle.

The Commission also underlined to avoid the build-up of new incinerators that cause overcapacity and risk becoming stranded assets. HUHA II would definitely create overcapacity because the sewage sludge plus the residential waste from Budapest would not be enough to maintain its operation.

It is possible that EU financing will ultimately not be available for HUHA II, because it goes against the circular economy package and the OP ex-ante priorities. In that case, however, if Hungary’s authorities remain stubborn and the incinerator is built, it must be “fed” continuously, even if its maintenance is economically unprofitable and there is not enough waste coming from the region. Local governments and residents will be forced to pay the price for waste imports and transporting from other parts of Hungary or from abroad, in addition to the health or social impacts due to pollution.

The perils of sludge incineration

Combustion of household waste – especially when it is burnt with sewage sludge – causes far more problems than it seems to solve. Due to the high moisture content of sewage sludge, its burning requires extra energy, and the residual slag still only ends up on landfills – so it is not a recycling process or real utilisation, just less disposal.

The problem is even more exacerbated if the sludge is co-fired with mixed communal waste with a high moisture content. Then additional fuel is consumed for combustion, so the energy gain is even lower. After the incineration, approximately one fourth of the input material becomes hazardous waste, which is even more difficult to depose safely.

A better solution for neutralising (communal sewage) sludge can be composting: the composted sludge can be a useful fertiliser substitute in agriculture and can be used in the same region where the sludge was produced, without extensive transport costs. There are some good examples for this in Italy and France. It is important that the sludge does not contain high heavy metal or other toxic levels. This can be ensured with public awareness raising and proper sludge treatment before composting.

As the list of reasons against incinerating waste, and especially against co-firing sewage sludge with communal mixed waste, goes on, Hungary’s authorities increasingly appear like pyromaniacs who only care about torching it all off:

The household waste going for incineration is not properly sorted, so it still contains valuable raw materials like plastic and paper, which are burnt although they could be recycled and thus utilised in a much more economical and environmentally friendly way.
Incineration is a very expensive technology compared to other waste management solutions and it hardly creates jobs – as opposed to recycling or reuse industries.
The incinerator emits an average of 28 times more toxic, carcinogenic dioxins and three times more carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides than a coal-fired power plant producing the same amount of energy.
Waste incineration takes local governments to a dead end for 30-50 years as the investment and operation costs are expensive and long term, so it prevents municipalities from being able to switch to other more advanced waste management methods.

Hungary must learn from the mistakes of the EU’s old Member States: for example, in Austria since 2013, the rate of recycling decreased due to an increase in the incineration rate. This resulted in non-compliance with the EU’s waste management obligations that can result in serious legal consequences. Hungary can still avoid this if it does not force waste incineration.

Friends of the Earth Hungary and its partner, the HUMUSZ Association, follow the HUHA II case from the beginning and propose to withdraw the project from the EEOP. FoE Hungary also has an NGO delegate in the EEOP Monitoring Committee and advocates for spending the EEOP funds for proper waste management for Hungary: waste prevention, recycling and public awareness raising.

Guest post: One beast with many heads – a hydropower hydra in the Balkans

As the Greek myth goes, once upon a time there lived a water monster called the hydra that had many heads. Every time its head was chopped off, the hydra regrew new ones. Its breath was poisonous and its blood so virulent that even its scent was deadly. No one could possibly kill the hydra until Hercules finally slayed it.

This old myth dogged a team of activists during a field visit to Macedonia to monitor several hydropower plants financed by the European financial institutions, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). We visited six mountain rivers and nine small dams that interrupted their flow, and though the projects were numerous, we had a feeling that we were looking at one and the same problem.

A map of Macedonia with four hydropower installations marked in different places. — Four tentacles of the hydra: Lipkovo, Tearce, Tresonecka and Brajcinska 1 and 2

Head number one: suffocating rivers with inadequate flows

According to Macedonian rules, the residual flow of a project, i.e. the amount of water that is allowed to flow in the section of the river modified by the hydropower plant is defined only as ten per cent of the average water flow. Under this definition, the river on which a dam is located is sentenced to an everlasting low water period, which makes fish inactive and leads to extremely degraded populations.

This poor “ten percent” definition of residual flow is applied in only one EU Member State, Bulgaria. And even in Bulgaria, its first River Basin Management Plans 2010-2015 ruled that in all protected areas – like Natura 2000 sites – the minimum residual flow is set at 70 per cent in order to achieve a site’s conservation objectives.

Most of the projects we looked at in Macedonia are located in protected areas, whether Emerald sites or National parks. However, we discovered that for both hydropower plants working during our visit – Brajcinska reka 1 and Tearce 97 – even this minimal requirement was not fulfilled. Water samples taken at Tresonecka indicate that this minimum was not respected there either.

Left: Abundance of water above the intake of Brajcinska reka 1, even during the dry season. Right: The result of damming the river: a dry river bed below. (Photos by Andrey Ralev)

Head number two: faulty fishpasses

Fish passes are built on dams, usually in the form of a series of pools shaped like a staircase so that fish can in theory ‘climb’ the dam.

Intake and a fish pass on the Kamena reka, Skopska Crna Gora (Photo by Andrey Ralev)

As a lifelong fisherman, I take special interest in how fish passes function – or, more often than not, do not function. The team made detailed measurements and assessments of each fish pass (see the full report HERE ), and the most extreme example comes from the case of Kamena reka.

The river bio corridor through which species pass was fully blocked, meaning that the fish pass had a manmade plug at the upstream exit and there was an artificial wooden barrier in the riverbed above the lake.

A zoom exposes the blocked fish pass (Photo by Andrey Ralev)

This is done to catch leaves and branches to protect the intake grates from clogging, but it also becomes an impassable obstacle to migration. No water was running through the fish pass, and the lake was full of silt with traces of eutrophication – gas bubbles constantly emerging on the surface – almost like the hydra’s poisonous breath.

Blocking a fish pass is a common practice in Bulgaria, as this diverts all water from the river for hydropower production, rather than to provide the necessary flows for the ecosystem’s survival.

All intakes were equipped with pool-type fish passes, which, even if perfectly implemented, are still questionable in terms of effectiveness. This is why independent monitoring is needed, but such oversight cannot be provided by project developers.

In spite of our best efforts, though, independent monitoring is essential to challenge our findings – the latest technologies, like underwater video cameras, could be used. Monitoring also should be carried out during the upstream trout migration period, which depends on the climate in the autumn.

Pristine nature is at stake

As stated above, most of the hydropower plants that we visited are located within the boundaries of proposed Emerald sites and national parks in Macedonia. The biological monitoring discovered species listed in Annex II of the EU’s Habitats Directive, some of which are of priority conservation status. This would mean that any hydropower should be prohibited on these rivers.

Left: Stone crayfish (Austropotamobius torrentium), priority species found above the Kamena reka intake, right: Butterfly and vegetation in Mavrovo national park (Photos by Andrey Ralev)

Of course all life in nature is interconnected. Rivers provide for animal and plant species alike, so one cannot remove a river and expect that the rest of the life will thrive. This is particularly evident in the case of the cascades at Tearce 97-99

More broadly, cascades have had a devastating, long-term impact on river ecosystems, due to the problems caused to the migration of fish and other aquatic species. During the spawning period, fish are supposed to migrate to spawning spots as quickly as possible. Even if fish passes are perfect – which is not the case – too much time is needed for the migration through cascades, not to mention the downstream migration.

This is why cascades are not permitted especially in Emerald sites or other protected areas, even though the Tearce cascade is located within the boundaries of the Shar planina proposed Emerald site.

Left: Bear cub footprints in Pelister, right: a road carved through the forest in the Pelister national park

Conclusion

We only caught two operators red handed – Brajcinska reka 1, who did not release water into the river, making them gunpowder dry below the intakes, and Tearce 97, who violate the residual flow requirements. But the operational assessments for other HPPs are also negative due to the disrupted bio corridors.

Though blocked upstream migration of aquatic species is not supposed to have an immediate impact, this will inevitably lead to long term impacts on a river. Even if the fish pass is operated by the book, this pool type has already proven unsatisfactory.

Upstream migration is but one issue. Downstream fish migration is an unsolvable problem for these types of fish passes. This is why we found fish held back downstream in most of the pools during our monitoring. Providing only one way for fish to migrate is unacceptable.

We must find solutions to these challenges soon, as there is only so much time to chop the hydra’s heads off.

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