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Guest post: Throwing evidence to the wind? The World Bank continues pushing PPPs


This article originally appeared in the Autumn 2015 edition of the Bretton Woods Observer. It was reposted here with slight layout changes with kind permission by the Bretton Woods Project.

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In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting pressure on public resources, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a key pillar of development strategies, including those of the World Bank (see Observer Autumn 2014). As argued by Nancy Alexander of German political foundation Heinrich Böll, mega infrastructure projects financed through PPPs are now considered the recovery’s silver bullet, including among developed countries (see Observer Winter 2015). These trends are evidenced by the threefold increase in World Bank support to PPPs from 2002 to 2012 and its establishment of the Global Infrastructure Facility in 2014 (see Bulletin Nov 2014) which has as its objective to facilitate the “preparation and structuring of complex infrastructure PPPs to enable mobilisation of private sector and institutional investor capital.”

Exposing the myth


Public-private partnerships are not a silver bullet for public infrastructure. Our website Overpriced and underwritten exposes the hidden costs of PPPs.

Read more

‘Solutions Bank’ ignores evidence

Given that one of the explicit objectives of the World Bank’s strategy is to “promote public-private partnerships” and that PPPs would comprise a cross-cutting solutions area (see Observer Autumn 2015), the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in 2014 published an evaluation of the Bank’s effectiveness in “supporting countries to use PPPs” (see Observer Autumn 2014). While the evaluation failed to consider the democratic governance implications of these ‘partnerships’, something raised by Eurodad in its July report on PPPs, it nonetheless warned that “contingent liabilities for governments that emerge from PPPs are rarely fully quantified at the project level” and highlighted that despite the Bank’s poverty eradication objective “it cannot … be assessed how far PPPs benefited the poor as large data gaps exist.”

Concerns about the risks associated with PPPs have also been acknowledged by the IMF, which in 2014 developed a PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (P-FRAM). In its summary brochure on the P-FRAM, the Fund notes that the tool was developed “to assess the potential fiscal costs and risks arising from PPP projects”, noting that “in many countries, investment projects have been procured as PPPs not for efficiency reasons, but to circumvent budget constraints” thus resulting in the procurement of “projects that either could not be funded within [governments’] budgetary envelope, or that exposed public finances to excessive fiscal risks.”

In March the World Bank’s Public Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Centre (PPPIRC) identified 10 important risks associated with PPPs, including that “development, bidding and ongoing costs in PPP projects are likely to be greater than for traditional government procurement processes” and that the “private sector will do what it is paid to do and no more than that”, thus putting into question the extent to which governments should count on the willingness of the private sector to go beyond its profit motive and to act in support of sustainable development outcomes. Yet, in the webpage introduction of its PPP reference guide 2.0, developed jointly with the Asian Development Bank, the Bank notes:

“PPPs, are increasingly recognised as a valuable development tool by governments, firms, donors, civil society, and the public. The reason is straightforward: all over the world, well-designed PPP transactions have delivered quality infrastructure and services, often at lower cost, by harnessing private sector financing, technical know-how, and management expertise.

Despite the inclusion of caveats and cautions in World Bank documents, such as the reference to ‘well-designed PPP transactions’ qualifier above, civil society organisations remain sceptical of the willingness of the Bank, in the words of Nancy Alexander, to “relinquish their bias in favour of PPPs in favour of an even-handed assessment of PPPs versus public works”. The current unease about the apparent contradiction between the Bank’s research findings and more cautious public statements, and its investments and policy advocacy mirror concerns raised nearly a decade ago by the Bank-commissioned 2006 independent evaluation of Bank research. The evaluation criticised the Bank for giving internal research favourable to Bank positions “great prominence” while ignoring “unfavourable” research and was also critical of the Bank’s use of its research “to proselytize … Bank policy, often without taking a balanced view of the evidence, and without expressing appropriate scepticism.” It additionally identified “a serious failure of the checks and balances that should separate advocacy and research.” The lack of integration of critical views at the country level is echoed by the IEG’s 2013 client survey, which found that “only 6 per cent of [field based staff] … frequently read IEG reports.”

Summarising the findings of IEG’s 2014 evaluation of learning at the World Bank during a presentation in London in June, Marie Gaarder, manager of IEG’s public sector department, concluded that most of the Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results reports “lack rigorous evidence on the extent to which observed outcomes can be attributed to Bank interventions” and that “the Bank’s project performance assessment system is not a reliable source of evidence of outcomes.” Considering the incentive structures that impede learning at the Bank, the evaluation noted that “about 70 per cent of respondents to IEG’s survey of Bank staff feel that the pressure to lend has crowded out learning” (see Observer Summer 2015).

Despite these concerns, the Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) continue to push PPPs through a variety of channels, including a “PPP knowledge lab” and dedicated “PPP Days”. An August report titled Partnering to build a better world, internally produced by MDBs for the G20, focused on MDB cooperation in encouraging private sector investment in infrastructure. The report details the depth of MDB cooperation on PPPs and provides additional evidence of the extent to which views critical of PPPs are ignored.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank’s private sector arm, runs an online course on PPPs and publishes the Handshake magazine, the World Bank’s journal on PPPs that “explores how the public and private sectors can together address complex global challenges.” Despite the fact that PPPs in health and education have been severely criticised (see Observer Summer 2015) and water privatisation schemes have been reversed in many cities (see Observer Autumn 2015), the IFC continues to identify these sectors as priority areas for their PPP investments and technical support.

In its 2015 report on the poverty focus of World Bank country programmes, the IEG referenced its 2011 evaluation of IFC’s poverty impact, which found that its measurement and evaluation framework “did not quantify benefits to the poor and there were no indicators for measuring a project’s effect on poverty” and that “the majority of investment projects generated economic returns but did not provide evidence of identifiable benefits to the poor.”

Aldo Caliari of US-based NGO Center of Concern said:

“We see this pattern again and again, Bank evaluations and analyses question the way it does things with no perceivable changes on the ground. Now the Bank is in the business of producing myriad tools to ‘help countries do better PPPs’ and we wonder: how can it truly help countries when it so clearly fails to incorporate internal learning and the incentives remain so skewed in favour of lending?”

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When environmental improvement becomes resettlement – lessons from Serbia’s Kolubara mine


In a few hours I will be in Vreoci, a village stranded in the heart of the Kolubara mining basin in Serbia, one of the biggest in Europe. I am there to present the findings of an analysis of involuntary resettlement practice for coal mining in this region. The study ‘A clear and present danger’ (pdf), commissioned by Bankwatch and executed by Nostromo Research, shows how the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has failed to enforce a number of its own standards on involuntary resettlement.

Notably, the project’s summary on the EBRD’s website admits with distinct euphemism that “EPS is faced with a number of on-going environmental and social challenges”, and “implementation of EBRD’s environmental and social requirement has in the past been mixed”.

Download the study

I am always nervous when I travel to Vreoci. I’ve been there three times already in the last year: in winter, when people burn lignite to heat their homes, making the air unbreathable; in spring when smoke from spontaneous coal fires in one of the fields covered part of the village in thick smoke; and in the dry summer, when the locals had no running water because they are connected to the same water network as the mines, and obviously it’s the coal digging that comes first.

These are the conditions in which over 3000 people live every day as a result of extensive mining in the Kolubara region, supported also by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the German development bank KfW. Their 2011 loan to the state owned Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS), which operates the mines in the Kolubara basin, theoretically supported “environmental improvements”. In reality, the only improvement visible seems to be the amount of lignite extracted.

After more than five decades of mining little has been done to address the environmental and social impacts for the villages in the region and the local communities have asked repeatedly to be collectively resettled and justly compensated in a way that allows them to preserve their livelihoods.

But a resettlement plan (known as the “Blue Book on resettlement”), agreed in 2007 between the Serbian government, EPS and the local council of Vreoci, is still far from being fully implemented. Our new report shows that the EBRD has failed to enforce a number of its own standards on involuntary resettlement, and both the EBRD and KfW have failed to carry out a full social impact assessment of the mine expansion. As a result, the longer a response is delayed, the more the locals suffer.

Our analysis argues that in spite of the EBRD’s declared mission to increase the quality of the lignite and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fuel combustion, in reality what EPS was doing on the ground was promoting a major expansion of lignite extraction – with the equipment covered by the 2011 EBRD and KfW loan. This also inevitably entailed the need for resettlement. The Banks ignored the fact that the Kolubara Mining Basin is effectively one field, integrally managed by a single enterprise, MB Kolubara, controlled by the banks’ client EPS.

Now, the EBRD is considering a new EUR 200 million loan to “restructure and refinance expensive short to medium-term EPS financial debt” (with a target date for approval on October 28).

Even if it is a corporate restructuring project, it does include “environmental and social due diligence focus[ed] on opportunities to improve environmental, safety, social and labour governance capacity to develop a more strategic approach to managing these issues”.

Notably, the project’s summary on the EBRD’s website admits with distinct euphemism that “EPS is faced with a number of on-going environmental and social challenges”, and “implementation of EBRD’s E&S [environmental and social] requirement has in the past been mixed”.

Although the more optimistic of us would say that the sheer public acceptance of a problem is one step forward towards improvement, I remain faithful to one of the recommendations in our study launched today: the EBRD should publicly acknowledge a major responsibility for the environmental damage and human rights violations taking place in the Kolubara mine basin since 2011, and do right by the community of Vreoci.

Financing the post-2015 agenda – the problematic role of development banks


This week sets a new milestone for the international community as the UN Security Council is preparing to vote on the new development agenda to replace the Millennium Development Goals. The draft agenda outlines 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and over 160 sub-goals to gear development efforts over the next 15 years. While the previous MDGs have brought positive results in poverty reduction and access to education and healthcare, they have also been criticised for not addressing the drivers of growing inequalities and devastating environmental degradation. The SDGs, despite admitting to the importance of addressing such root causes, don’t seem to be taking any courageous steps in addressing structural injustices in the global economic system.

The implementation of the post-2015 agenda requires the mobilisations of massive resources estimated at around EUR 5 trillion per year. Traditional donors admitted to not being able to raise this sum, but international financial institutions jumped in, pledging to be in the front line for financing the new development agenda. They committed to mobilise over EUR 400 billion (pdf) in the first three years for the overly ambitious agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The heavy involvement of IFIs who operate closely with the the private sector raises serious questions for civil society around the world on whether the post-2015 agenda will manage to address the root causes of inequality, poverty and environmental degradation.

The international agreement on the financing mechanisms for the post-2015 agenda, adopted at the Addis Ababa conference in July 2015, has been heavily criticized by civil society. Condemned as a commitment to privatise development the agreement shows an over-reliance on private finance (including the transfer of public Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the private sector); it fails to address tax injustice or to facilitate better oversight over public and private finance and the accountability of businesses; it is suspected to further increase the debt burdens of developing countries. The agreement confirms that some of the most fundamental flaws in the way development is financed remain unchanged.

International financial institutions (IFIs) seized the moment to confirm their importance in development finance. A group of IFIs, including the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank pledged to move from billions to trillions (pdf), a declaration rather scary considering the mixed legacy of IFI funded projects and their impacts on the environment and local communities. Their use of financial instruments such as global loans (pdf) to financial intermediaries (like private banks), public-private partnerships, blending (the use of aid money to subsidise or support public or private sector projects) does not succeed in prioritising poverty reduction, inequalities, vulnerable groups or environmental protection.

Global loans are put forward by IFIs such as the EIB to stimulate the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through financial intermediaries including commercial banks. Research shows that they appear to provide greater stimulation to the intermediary banks, the first recipients of the loan that have little contractual obligations (pdf) as to where they spend the money and no penalty mechanisms for not delivering on their initial aim.

Public private partnerships (PPPs) are promoted as the main instrument for large infrastructure projects within the SDG agenda. For such high-risk projects, mobilising public funds to attract private investments also means transferring the risks to the public sector, that is to the taxpayers. The increased risk for public coffers is not something that is easily dealt with by less developed countries that suffer from weak governmental capacity and scarce public resources. In addition, PPPs and other blending instruments are disconnected from local needs and realities and do not include strong public participation, bypassing human rights and environmental sustainability.

Another concern associated with blended financial instruments is that rather than attracting private funds for public priorities, blending will increase the influence of the private investors and their interests over public resources. Even though evidence shows (pfd) a poor ownership by developing countries over such projects and financial interests often out-weighting development objectives, blending of ODA with loans from public or commercial banks has seen a steep increase from EUR 15 million in 2007 to EUR 490 million in 2012.

Furthermore, IFIs have serious deficits of transparency, public participation and accountability resulting from the policies of the institutions that govern the projects they are financing. The public information policies of major IFIs such as the EBRD overly prioritise commercial interests over transparency of information on environmental and social standards of the supported projects.

The experience with development finance by IFIs stands in stark contrast to the claim that the SDGs bring forward a people and planet centred approach.

Sustainable development is ultimately connected to empowering local communities and protecting the environment. It needs to be driven away from old paradigms of large-scale and heavily polluting projects as promoted by the current finance for development agenda. Comprehensive reviews and monitoring are required to assess the development effectiveness of the instruments put forward by international financial institutions for implementing SDGs, including:

  • monitoring their impact on poverty reduction, inequalities and environmental protection;
  • assessing the presence of strong social and environmental safeguards;
  • evaluating the alignment of projects with country development strategies including the presence of strong public participation;
  • evaluating the degree to which projects involve support to companies and intermediaries in and from the recipient countries.

Guest post: Italian mayors protest against the Trans Adriatic Pipeline


This guesst post was prepared in cooperation Counter Balance and Re:Common.


Though the summer sun wanes in the south of Italy, the debate over the future of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) remains hot. During the Fiera del Levante, an annual business event in Bari, local mayors left the venue when the Undersecretary of State De Vincenti said that TAP is “a project that will cause no damage to the environment, and an opportunity to develop tourism and agriculture”. This is just the latest instance of discontent over the project.

TAP will run from Greece to Italy via Albania and is part of the Southern Gas Corridor, a series of three pipelines designed to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Italy for the European market. The project is among the top priorities of the EU’s energy security strategy but faces fierce opposition.

The project was given a green light by the Italian government in April 2015 in spite of opposition in the region, the province and numerous municipalities, including the municipality of Melendugno where the pipeline will enter Italian soil.

As the pipeline will cross dunes, pinewood, olive groves and state roads, local administrators and residents fear that it will impact the region’s essential tourism and agricultural sectors. Tensions were already high after local citizens and authorities were ignored by the Italian government during the environmental impact assessment process for the project in 2013 and 2014.

Following the authorisation of the project in 2014, the situation continued to deteriorate when the EIA was challenged in front of an administrative tribunal, with three proceedings now underway. In parallel, judicial authorities are investigating on alleged violations of national laws, adding complexity to the broader picture.

In May 2015, the mayor of Melendugno Marco Potì sent an open letter to the European institutions backing the project, including the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The letter reflected the positions of local civil society organisations and 40 other mayors from the region who have voted for several motions opposing the project. So far the letter has not received a response.

A first loan of USD one billion was approved by the EBRD for Russian oil major Lukoil, one of the companies in charge for the development of the Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan that will supply the Southern Gas Corridor.

Civil society across Europe protested the loan, given the increased repression of media and human rights groups in the country, and urged the EBRD not to finance the project. The European Investment Bank is now in the running for the project, having announced in August 2015 that it would consider financing the Italian, Greek and Albanian sections of the TAP. The loan would be one of the largest in the history of the institution at EUR 2 billion.

The mayors who stood up against the project, as well as local citizens and NGOs, expect that the European Commission and the EIB listen to their concerns and ensure that the project adheres to the EU’s principles on human rights and the environment. Given the situation both in Italy and Azerbaijan, this will be a challenging task for these EU institutions to justify.

Slovenia and the Energy Union: clash in priorities, renewables as collateral damage


Tomislav Tkalec from Focus, Slovenia contributed to this blog post.


In a series of blog posts, Bankwatch campaigners and guests are weighing in on the implications that the EU Energy Union, as laid out by Vice-President Šefčovič, could have for each of the countries.

See earlier installations on our Energy Union section.

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As Maroš Šefčovič continues his Energy Union tour to discuss member states’ performances and their opportunities from the energy initiative, we have an interesting discovery from Slovenia.

The Commission’s assessment for Slovenia (pdf) from July holds no big surprises in that it advocates strongly for gas infrastructure, among others “the LNG terminal in Krk (Croatia) and several gas pipeline projects”. However, a leaked document outlining the Slovenian government’s priorities for an Energy Union reveals a stance that seems to collide with what Šefčovič has on offer.

The document dates from the beginning of this year. Similar to the non-papers from Germany and the UK and the Czech Republic, it was sent to Brussels by the Slovenian government before the Commission outlined its vision for an Energy Union in its February communication.

While the Commission’s outlook on energy efficiency overlaps with that of Slovenia – both stress the importance of energy efficiency and the need for financing instruments, the two don’t see eye to eye when it comes to security of supply.

The Slovenian government writes in its February non-paper:

“A functioning and fully integrated internal market, energy efficiency and the use of low-carbon domestic sources is the first and most important answer to increased security of supply in the EU. Any strategy on security of supply must go hand in hand with EU’s strategy on decarbonisation.”

The emphasis on decarbonisation sounds promising at first but is in fact a cheeky way of protecting Slovenia’s plans to prolong the lifetime of the Krško nuclear power plant from 2023 to 2043 and to build a new reactor there. (Slovenia is also hoping to develop a sandstone fracking project in Petišovci.) But the diversification of gas suppliers and routes, a top benefit for Slovenia according to the Commission’s assessment, are quite apparently not on top of the government’s wish list.

It also suggests opposition to the European Commission’s priority project, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). This becomes more distinct when the Slovenian government even suggests clear funding restrictions for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD):

“One important aspect that needs to be addressed further within the Energy Union is the financing of big infrastructure projects (transport or energy wise) through European support institutions (EIB, EBRD). All projects, accessing to EU funding, should only be supported if they contribute to the long-term goal of GHG emissions reduction.”

The EBRD has already approved financial support for the Shah Deniz gas field that will supply the Southern Gas Corridor and the EIB is considering a EUR 2 billion loan for the Trans-adriatic Pipeline (TAP), a European stretch of the SGC. (And rather ironically, the two banks financed almost half of Slovenia’s economic and climate disgrace that is unit 6 at the Šostanj lignite power plant (TEŠ 6).)

The collateral damage of this clash in priorities is that neither the Slovenian government nor the European Commission acknowledge the potential for renewables. Between the two, the most likely scenario for Slovenia’s energy sector is one dominated by nuclear and gas. And while nuclear is technically a low-carbon energy source it would also be one of the worst options for a transition away from fossil fuels, loading huge burdens on a small country like Slovenia – be they related to nuclear fuel supply or waste – and increasing its energy insecurity.

Already now, renewables support schemes are being reduced in Slovenia and elsewhere. Since the feed-in tariff for photovoltaics was lowered in 2012 we have witnessed the downturn of the photovoltaic sector. Other new renewables projects are virtually non-existent.

The renewables potential will not be realised if financial incentives and priority projects are not aiming in the right direction. Sinking money into massive nuclear or fossil fuel infrastructure reduces the possibility to support decentralised, small-scale renewables installations that offer both more flexibility and more security.

Images and graphs: Large-scale agribusiness in Ukraine and local communities

Ukraine’s agriculture was the only sector in the country to grow in 2014. International investors like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are happy to point this out – and the role they are playing in financing these investments.

But an investigation published today into one of the main beneficiaries of loans from the EBRD and other multilateral development banks shows that cheap Ukrainian food products are coming at the expense of severe impacts on local communities.

In this blog post, before publishing some high-resolution images (see below) from the Vinnytsia poultry complex operated by Ukraine’s biggest poultry producer Myrinovsky Hlibproduct (MHP), we will offer some details on the size of public finance being provided to Ukraine’s agricultural sector and who the beneficiaries are.


Read more background:

  • a quick overview in our press release,
  • details from our fact-finding mission in our report Black earth – Agribusiness in Ukraine and the marginalisation of local communities, or
  • SOMO’s report Chicken run, examining the corporate strategy of MHP.

Development banks, multinationals and offshore companies

Out of the total financing volume from the EBRD, IFC and EIB that we examined only 10% went in support of enterprises incorporated in Ukraine that are neither part of a multinational family group nor are linked with offshore companies.

Since 2009, three development finance institutions – the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the World Bank’s private finance arm) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) – provided about USD 1.4 billion in loans for Ukraine’s agricultural sector.

The biggest winners of this boom are industrial agricultural corporations, chief among them Myrinovsky Hlibproduct (MHP), a Ukrainian vertically integrated agricultural holding that controls about 60% of the country’s poultry production and has revenues of around USD 1.4 billion (2014). Ukraine’s fifth richest man and MHP founder Yuriy Kosyuk owns more than two-thirds of the company.

As one of the biggest players in Ukraine’s agricultural sector MHP has received more than half a billion dollars from the three institutions:

World Bank (IFC): USD 321 mln (five loans)
EBRD: USD 161 mln (two loans)
EIB: EUR 82 mln

The question, though, is whether not only agroholdings like MHP, but also the Ukrainian state benefit from these loans – something that is rather implied than proven when financiers promote these investments.


Source data available upon request.

Out of the total financing volume from the EBRD, IFC and EIB that we examined (2009-2015) only a meagre 10% went in support of enterprises incorporated in Ukraine that are neither part of a multinational family group nor are linked with offshore companies. The rest went to companies incorporated offshore (40%), subsidiaries of multinational companies (30%) and subsidiaries of offshore companies (20%).

Communities engulfed by massive poultry complex

The Vinnytsia poultry complex includes 12 rearing zones, a fodder plant and oil processing factory, hatcheries, a slaughterhouse, a water processing facility and manure storages. Each rearing zone contains about 1.5 million birds in 38 rearing houses.


A map of the Vinnytsia poultry complex indicating the scale of infrastructure that locals are facing.

All installations are concentrated north-west and south of Ladyzhyn. The small town of Mykhajlivka (top left) with about 1000 inhabitants is surrounded by five rearing zones between 2 and 4 kilometers away. Seven and a half million chickens in close vicinity and the associated movement of trucks, manure and live animals creates significant pressure on the local population and their environment.

The owner of the Vinnytsia complex, MHP plans to expand the complex to twice its current size. This has locals fear for their quality of life and many have reservations about leasing their land to the company.


Two rearing houses – Download in high resolution



The fodder factory of the Vinnytsia poultry complex stands just across the street from people’s homes who once lived only in green fields. – Download in high resolution


Manure management

Locals complain about the odour from the rearing zones and animal transports. A particular problem is manure which MHP applies to its own crop fields.

Our mission however noticed irregularities in several places.


A pile of manure next to a field where manure had already been applied. – Download in high resolution



Bones and feathers in the pile show that the manure is coming from the Vinnytsia poultry complex. – Download in high resolution



More sludge on open fields. – Download in high resolution



More sludge on open fields. – Download in high resolution



The manure storage of the Vinnytsia complex has only concrete walls as protection. – Download in high resolution



Download in high resolution


Pressure to lease land

Currently, agricultural land cannot be sold in Ukraine. MHP can, however, lease land for up to 49 years.

The total land bank of MHP accounts for around 380 000 ha of land around the country. But for its expansion plans the company requires vast fields of additional land especially in the region near Ladyzhyn.


A leaflet distributed among the villagers advertising the land lease and promising profits. – Download in high resolution

As locals told us, the company puts pressure on them to sign lease agreements.

People in Ulianivka and Bilousivla described how the company, failing to get agreement when approaching the community as a whole, systematically pressured land owners individually to sign the leases. People were approached individually up to four times. The most vulnerable people, usually elderly, single or widowed women, were targeted the most. Also families of MHP workers were being intimidated to sign the lease.

“We gathered together and decided against leasing our land. 410 people signed against, one was for construction. There are 50 people from the village who work for the company and they are putting pressure on these people’s families.”

“The company’s manner is rude, aggressive and brutal.”

The company does not want to engage

In preparation of our fact-finding mission and during our visit we experienced the non-cooperative attitude of MHP.

Non-governmental organisations, in particular the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine (NECU) was included in MHP’s Stakeholder Engagement Plan as stakeholders with whom the company should engage in communication.[*] Nonetheless MHP refused to speak to us during our visit.

Having been contacted by us several times, prior to our arrival MHP wrote us that employees will not meet or provide environmental information because

“… it will be difficult to find mutually beneficial points for future cooperation, therefore MHP representatives will not meet or provide information for CSOs [civil society organisations].”

During our visit, we were rather aggressively told by security personnel to leave from the company’s office near Ladyzhyn.

–

The reports of Bankwatch and SOMO suggest that the problems with MHP and its Vinnytsia poultry farm are rooted not only in the company but also in the environment for agribusiness in Ukraine. MHP is one example how a company uses the opportunities provided by weak safeguards and low standards at national level, special taxation for agricultural enterprises, the international buzz around the country’s agricultural sector and the favourable financing that comes with it.

MHP, as many other businesses would in this situation, minimises costs and maximises profit, resulting in externalities for the local population affected by its operations. If anything, the involvement of multilateral development banks should help these pitfalls of doing business.



* The currently available version of the Stakeholder Engagement Plan (on MHP’s website) does not include NECU. A version from 2014 of which we have a hard copy does. We are not aware of the reasons for being removed from the document. A scan of the hard copy is available on request.

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